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 After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, accusations have been leveled against the United 
States, and specifically the CIA, for rendering hundreds of people suspected by the US government of 
being terrorists (or of aiding and abetting terrorist organizations) to third-party states such as Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Uzbekistan.  Critics have accused the CIA of rendering suspects to other countries 
in order to avoid US laws mandating due process and prohibiting torture, even though many of those 
countries have, like the US, signed or ratified the United Nations Convention Against Torture.  This 
process is referred to as ``extraordinary rendition''.  It was this recent incident of a coordinated effort to 
commit human rights violations that inspired my dissertation topic. 
 My dissertation looks at human rights violations as being the result of the coordinated efforts of 
multiple countries to avoid detection and punishment.  I utilize game theory to develop a formal model 
that produces predications that the interaction between potential human rights violators and human 
rights adjudication bodies revolves around states decisions to coordinate their violation behavior.  The 
first empirical chapter illustrates that states coordinate their violations so as to diminish the likelihood of 
detection and/or punishment.  The second shows that violators who coordinate their violations with 
other states, especially powerful ones, are more likely to receive a judgment in their favor than violators 
with fewer and/or weaker allies.  The final empirical chapter looks at victims’ decisions over whether to 
bring their complaint before the adjudication body.  The central finding is that coordinated efforts make 
it significantly less likely that cases will ever be heard at the international level.  I use the UN’s 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights to frame the context of the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
In December 2010 a Tunisian street vendor engaged in an act of self-immolation that would 
prove to be the spark that set the Arab world on fire.  Throughout 2011 to the present, the events of the 
Arab Spring continue to unfold.  Many have puzzled over the means by which this string of social 
movements and revolutions have occurred, pointing to social media as facilitating the spread of this 
revolutionary fervor.  Perhaps equally puzzling is the fact that the governments threatened by these 
revolutions have, seemingly, failed to learn from the failures of their counterparts, continuing to use 
militaristic responses and violence to abuse the human rights of those rallying against them, despite the 
relative failure of these mechanisms to bring about the downfall in countries that experienced 
revolutions before them.  Watching this course of events unfold, one must wonder: are these states 
emulating the behavior of their peers because, even though overthrow at the domestic level may be 
inevitable, they may be less prone to formal prosecution and punishment if they band together?  After 
all, with the exception of Libya and Egypt, leaders deposed in the Arab Spring are free, if in exile, with no 
charges against them at the international level.  We must ask if governments not faced with overthrow 
at the domestic level also choose such tactics in an effort to minimize the risk of international 
recognition of their violations and the punishment that could follow. 
Despite the existence of a vast number of international institutions which purport to deal with 
human rights issues and the great number of states which have committed to these institutions, 
Amnesty International reported human rights violations in 151 countries and territories in 2003. 
Decision-makers sign on to these agreements, but sometimes choose not to comply with them. What 
affects actors' cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether or not to comply with human rights 
agreements? Actors may choose to consider the normative effects that their actions will have on the 
domestic audience and their international reputation. Furthermore, actors are likely to consider the 
material costs and benefits of their compliance record. They may also be concerned with their ability to 
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retain power domestically as a result of these same reputational and material costs.  However, it also 
seems likely that when actors decide to commit human rights violations, they look to the behavior of 
other states in the system with a mind to try to coordinate their behavior. 
FORMULATING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
It seems that the most appropriate way to gain a better understanding of states' international 
human rights behavior is to start with the question of why some states don't violate human rights.  This 
may seem to be a counterintuitive way to approach the topic due to the fact that international laws 
against human rights violations have existed for over 60 years, but the fact of the matter is that a vast 
majority of states do commit human rights violations each year, the events of the Arab Spring 
notwithstanding.  Figure 1.1, below, illustrates that aside from a drop in the overall rate of violations 
during the third wave of democracy in the early 1990s, the percentage of countries showing respect for 
human rights is very low in all regions aside from Europe (due to its relatively low rate of violations over 
time), and that the rate of showing respect has actually increased in the last thirty years for both civil 
and political and physical integrity rights only in Asia.  This clashes directly with the increase in the 
number of international organizations working to prevent human rights violations.  
However, this increase in the rate of human rights violations in the world is not surprising when 
one looks at the current set-up for international institutions meant to prevent the occurrence of 
violations.  Getting away with human rights violations is quite common.  So, if a strategy exists for state 
governments to be able to better consolidate domestic power and there are very few costs at the 
international level for those who employ said strategy, why wouldn't we expect to see a large number of 
states using it?  The answer I propose, put quite simply, is that states that refrain from committing 
human rights violations do so because their ``friends'' aren't committing them either.  The tables below 
illustrate that states tend to violate human rights in clusters as well as respect human rights in clusters. 
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Figure 1.1 Clustering of Human Rights Respect By Region 
Table 1.1 shows the percentage of country-years across three categories of regime type in which 
physical integrity rights violations are occurring to any degree, as measured in the Cingranelli-Richards 
Human Rights Project dataset.  Physical integrity rights are the rights to be protected from political 
imprisonment, torture, killing, and disappearance. Here, I break regime type into categories based on 
states' scores in the Polity IV dataset.  I code states as democracies if they received a score of five or 
higher, as autocracies if they received a -5 or lower, and as anocracies if they fell between -4 and 4.  The 
time component in the table illustrates an important observation.  Within each regime type, the number 
of states violating physical integrity rights tends to increase over time.  This trend leads us to the 
possible conclusion that states are observing the behavior of their fellow states, whom they may label as 
``peers'', and base their decisions over their own human rights behavior on these observations.  We 
must also note that the magnitude of improvements we see over time are much smaller than the 
magnitude of decreases in respect for human rights that we see over time. 
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Year  Autocracy  Anocracy   Democracy 
1981-1985 94   90   53 
1986-1990  98   95   62 
1991-1995  99   93   73 
1996-2000   98   99   80 
Table 1.1 Physical Integrity Rights Violations: By Regime Type, 1981-2000 
Table 1.2 illustrates that the same trend is present for civil and political rights violations based 
on regime type over time.  However, there is a noticeable difference between country-year violation 
rates in the physical integrity rights table above and the civil and political rights table below and this is 
that the variation over time is lower.  While anocracies and democracies experience a large jump in 
violation rates between the late eighties and the early nineties, we can likely attribute this to what 
Samuel Huntington (1993) referred to as the ``third wave'' of democracy in which states without a 
history of democratic culture transitioned to democracy.  We see this same jump in the rate of physical 
integrity rights violations in democracies in Table 1.1, above.  Despite these large jumps in rights 
violations during the third wave, Table 1.2 below shows that states' rates of violation tend to increase 
over time. 
Year Autocracy Anocracy Democracy 
1981-1985 100 94 62 
1986-1990 100 95 64 
1991-1995 100 100 78 
1996-2000 100 100 76 
Table 1.2: Civil and Political Rights Violations: By Regime Type, 1981-2000 
Noticing a connection between regime type and violation rates is not novel.  Scholars have, for 
years, emphasized that the relationship between regime type and human rights violations is an 
important one.  Many of the underlying principles of democracy outline what state behavior in the 
realm of human rights should look like and these principles are underscored in the two tables above.  
Democracies, while perhaps not as well behaved as one might expect, show consistently better behavior 
in their human rights behavior than do anocracies or autocracies.  Thus, in order to better illustrate that 
states do seem to look to the behavior of their peers where compliance with all types of human rights 
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violations are concerned, a different lens needs to be used.  Looking at human rights behavior over time 
within regional groups in a bit more detail than Figure 1.1 provides will help us to determine whether a 
trend truly exists. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 separate the data used to generate Figure 1.1, above, in an effort to 
look at whether the rate at which clustering occurs at the regional level is affected by the type of human 
rights violations being considered. 
Table 1.3 shows trends within geographic regions over time with regard to physical integrity 
rights violations.  Here, just as we saw with the regime type tables, we see that the violation rates within 
each region tend to stay relatively similar over time or increase.  A notable exception here is North 
America, which consists only of Canada and the United States in this context.  Because the region 
includes only two countries, a large degree of fluctuation in the percentage of violation years is 
expected.  The other regions, however, show general upward trends in the percentage of country-years 
in violations are occurring.  This upward trend continues even into the late 1990s, illustrating that the 
third wave of democracy is not the driving factor. 
Year  Asia   Europe   Africa  
 Latin  
America 
 North  
America 
 Oceania 
1981-1985   90   49   90   89   40   6  
1986-1990   90   48   98   90   33   58 
1991-1995   92   55   96   94   70   45 
1996-2000   98   62   98   96   70   74 
Table 1.3: Physical Integrity Rights Violations: By Neighborhood, 1981-2000 
Table 1.4 depicts the same information presented in Table 1.3 for civil and political rights.  Here, 
again, we see a high level of fluctuation in the violation rate for North America, which is to be expected 
for the reasons explained above. We also see violation rates within regions tend to either stay relatively 
constant or increase over time.  Oceania clearly demonstrates a dramatic increase in the percentage of 
country-year violations over time, while Europe experienced a slightly less drastic increase over time.  
Latin America, Asia, and Africa all experienced relatively constant rates of civil and political rights 
violations over time. 
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Year   Asia   Europe   Africa  
 Latin  
America  
  North  
America  
 Oceania 
1981-1985   96   59   95   87   60   41  
1986-1990   97   57   97   84   0   42 
1991-1995   97   66   98   87   20   60 
1996-2000   96   64   98   85   0   75 
Table 1.4: Civil and Political Rights Violations: By Neighborhood, 1981-2000 
The data presented in Tables 1.1 through 1.4 highlight the need to reframe the question from 
above.  Rather than quibble over whether the more appropriate question is why states do or do not 
violate human rights, I submit that the most important question to answer is: why does the rate of 
human rights violations tend to snowball within relevant peer groups over time?  When groups decrease 
their violation rates, they do so to a very small degree. However, for the most part, we tend to see 
increases in the rates of violation amongst groups.  How can we most accurately characterize the group 
dynamic that leads to group-based increases in human rights violations?  There is a notable case that 
might help explicate how this process plays out.  I discuss it below. 
What Might Coordinated Action Look Like? 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, accusations have been leveled against the 
United States, and specifically the CIA, for rendering hundreds of people suspected by the US 
government of being terrorists (or of aiding and abetting terrorist organizations) to third-party states 
such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Uzbekistan.  Critics have accused the CIA of rendering suspects to 
other countries in order to avoid US laws mandating due process and prohibiting torture, even though 
many of those countries have, like the US, signed or ratified the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture.  This process is referred to as ``extraordinary rendition''.  In 2005, the Washington Post and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) published evidence regarding CIA flights and ``black sites'', covert prisons 
that are operated by the CIA and whose existence had been denied by the US government (Whitlock, 
2005a, b). It has also been reported that on October 4, 2001, a secret arrangement was made in Brussels 
by all members of NATO. Lord George Robertson, then British defense secretary and later NATO’s 
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secretary-general, explained in an interview after the fact that NATO members agreed to provide 
``blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other allies’ aircraft for military flights related 
to operations against terrorism'' (Grey, 2007). 
Both the Council of Europe and the European Parliament engaged in investigations of US 
practices of extraordinary rendition and the operation of so-called ``black sites'' in Europe.  The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) accused the United States of engaging in acts of 
disappearances, secret detentions and unlawful interstate transfers and called for EU regulations 
governing foreign intelligence services operating in Europe.  Further, PACE demanded ``human rights 
clauses'' in military base agreements with the USA.  In a resolution passed on February 14, 2007 
Members of the European Parliament approved by a large majority (382 voting in favor, 256 against and 
74 abstaining) their committee's final report, which criticized the rendition program and concluded that 
many European countries tolerated illegal CIA activities including secret flights over their territories. The 
countries named were: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
The administration of George W. Bush freely admitted to using the practice of extraordinary 
rendition, but qualified its decision to do so, stating that they had specifically asked that torture not be 
used. However, torture can still occur despite these provisions and much documentation exists from 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International alleging that it has happened in 
many cases.  In these instances, the US is argued to have allowed for the possibility of torture by 
releasing the prisoner into the custody of states that practice torture.  Since 2001, the CIA has allegedly 
captured about 3,000 people and transported them around the world (Horton, 2009), and known 
torture sites such as the Guantanamo prison camp for terrorists in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba are slated to 
stay open ``indefinitely''. 
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The multiple cases of extraordinary rendition practiced by the CIA with US government support 
illustrate the concerted effort by one government to coordinate human rights violations across multiple 
countries, many of which are and were members of the 1987 UN Convention Against Torture.  Further, it 
illustrates the US' ex ante perception that the reputational costs of such actions would be low if it 
coordinated its behavior with the states receiving its prisoners due to the fact that it would feasibly be 
able to defend its actions by saying that they ``specifically asked that torture not be used'' and that, 
while it may have to pay these low reputational costs at some point in the future, it would, in the 
meantime, receive the material benefits associated with the detention of alleged terrorists.  These 
coordinated actions not only provide a hint at US logic, but also that of international courts.  
International organizations such as PACE and the European Parliament brought cases, and later, 
decisions, against the US' use of extraordinary rendition, but are unable to punish any states that are not 
members of the European Union.  While many EU member states are conducting investigations in order 
to determine the level of responsibility they have toward victims of extraordinary rendition, only Italy 
and Sweden have imprisoned those responsible and only Sweden has paid damages to victims. 
The events surrounding practices such as extraordinary rendition beg the question, do states 
habitually make attempts to coordinate their human rights behavior?  The US practice of extraordinary 
rendition is not the only example of states coordinating their human rights behavior.  Another 
noteworthy case of such coordination took place in 1975 when states in the Southern Cone of South 
America, including Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile (with the US serving in an 
advisory capacity), implemented Operation Condor.  This was a coordinated effort by Southern Cone 
governments to eradicate alleged socialist and communist influence and ideas and to control active or 
potential opposition movements against the participating governments.  It was a campaign of political 
repression involving assassination and intelligence operations which resulted in a minimum of 60,000 
deaths, possibly more.  Punishment for these crimes has been largely incomplete and to the extent that 
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it has occurred, it has taken (for the most part) more than ten years after the crimes were committed 
for trials to occur. 
Looking for the Answer 
Tables 1.1 through 1.4 illustrate in a slightly more complex way what Figure 1.1 depicts - more 
states commit human rights violations than do not.  Because such a high rate of human rights violations 
occur every year, it is difficult to decisively determine from the tables above whether the dynamics of 
these violations are truly driven by coordinated efforts or if they are simply driven by the lack of a strong 
punishment mechanism at either the domestic or international level.  Overwhelmingly, the human rights 
compliance literature has highlighted the weakness of international institutions and their abilities to 
prevent and/or punish human rights violations.  Further, in light of the weakness of international human 
rights enforcement mechanisms, the literature has focused on the necessity of strong domestic 
punishment mechanisms in order to punish and, in the future, prevent occurrences of these violations. 
If domestic punishment capabilities are the only barrier that exists between state compliance 
and defection from human rights treaties, we should see a decrease in domestic punishment capabilities 
that happens in tandem with the increase in the rates of human rights violations.  Using the Cingranelli-
Richards Human Rights Database measure for judicial independence, which ranges from 0 (indicating 
that the state's judiciary is not independent) to 2 (indicating that the judiciary is independent for the 
most part), Figure 1.2, below, shows that this is not the case.  The number of states that have an 
independent judiciary, which in theory should be capable of prosecuting human rights violations 
domestically, has not varied to the same degree that the violation rates of either empowerment or 
physical integrity rights have varied.  The violation rates have increased, while the number of states 
capable of punishing these violations domestically has not changed to a great degree, especially in the 
last twenty years. 
10 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Judicial Independence and Human Rights Violations 
How can we reconcile small climbs and dips in judicial independence with sharp spikes in 
violation rates?  I propose that states are capable of these acts due to their expectations of a decreased 
likelihood that they will get caught if/when they coordinate their human rights violations.  The process 
of coordination may vary from a simple decision to violate after observing that other peers are also 
violating to a concerted effort by a group of states to violate in tandem as was the case with the US-
initiated extraordinary rendition.  Whether the coordinated effort is extensively planned or simply the 
result of some human rights copy cats, one thing is clear.  Continued efforts to understand human rights 
violations as an interaction that takes place exclusively between a potential violator and an international 
court provides an incomplete understanding of the rationale that potential violators use when making 
decisions about their future behavior vis-à-vis human rights. 
This Prisoners' Dilemma logic that has been used extensively to understand international 
compliance behavior for a variety of issue areas in the past does not seem to be useful in helping one to 
understand clusters of human rights violations.  The Prisoners' Dilemma helps us to understand why 
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states cooperate when they have an incentive to defect. While this logic can be helpful in understanding 
two-player interactions between a potential violator and an international adjudication body in a number 
of other issue areas, it is not helpful in the realm of human rights.  Where human rights behavior is 
concerned, states receive very little benefit from the compliance of other states with international 
human rights law.  Furthermore, their own behavior affects only themselves.  Thus, the Prisoners' 
Dilemma logic typically used in understanding compliance behavior when one state's compliance affects 
the costs and benefits of its fellow institutional members does not apply here.  This logic works fairly 
well in understanding compliance (or the lack thereof) with international environmental law or with 
trade agreements, but it fails to catch the interstate and state-institution dynamic where human rights 
are concerned.  The only way that the human rights behavior of one state might affect the costs and 
benefits of violation for another is if a larger number of violations insulates individual states from 
punishment. 
A QUESTION THAT BEGETS (MORE) QUESTIONS 
If we start with the question of why violation rates seem to snowball within peer groups and we 
submit that the answer here is that states coordinate their violations in order to decrease the risk of 
punishment, it quickly becomes clear that one other question must be answered in order to understand 
this upward trend in violations over time: Does coordination work?  When states violate in groups, does 
individual punishment become less likely?  In other words, we must determine whether the assumption 
that we're attributing to states is a reasonable one.  In order to answer this secondary question, it is 
necessary to expand the focus of the project beyond just the behavior of potential violators.  First, we 
must determine what makes victims less likely to bring cases in front of international adjudication 
bodies.  Second, it will be necessary to determine when international adjudication bodies are less likely 
to punish states whose cases are brought before them.  If states are correct in operating under the 
assumption that coordination minimizes the likelihood of punishment, then we should observe victims 
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and international adjudication bodies being less willing to seek punishment for violations that take place 
as the result of a coordinated effort.  In this project I develop and test a formal model which makes 
specific predictions about the effects of coordinated action on the likelihood that violations will occur, 
that those cases will be brought in front of international adjudication bodies, and that violators will be 
punished. 
In determining whether or not coordinated action minimizes the likelihood of being caught 
and/or punished, it will first be necessary to determine whether or not the victims of human rights 
violations are less likely to bring a case in front of an international adjudication body if the number of 
violators in the international context is high.  The logic here is simple.  It is reasonable to suspect that 
victims of human rights violations care most about seeing that justice is dispensed for the wrongs that 
they suffered. Thus, victims are likely to ``venue shop'' for a forum in which they perceive that they are 
most likely to receive justice.  If precedent in the international human rights literature is correct, these 
victims are unlikely to perceive that they are likely to receive justice at the international level and, thus, 
unlikely to bring cases there.  However, there is likely to be an important exception to this rule.  Because 
international adjudication bodies require that all domestic avenues for justice have been exhausted 
before a case is deemed admissible at the international level, we might reasonably expect that those 
who will bring cases at the international level are those who did not receive justice at the domestic level 
either because their case was (reasonably) deemed to be without merit or because corruption at the 
domestic level prevented them from receiving a just decision.  Thus, there are barriers that exist at the 
domestic level that could prevent and/or prolong an individual complainant's efforts to have their case 
heard at the international level. 
Where the behavior of the adjudication body is concerned, we will once again need to 
determine whether the number of states violating in a given year affects the likelihood that the body 
will issue a judgment in favor of the victim of the violations.  Beyond this, it will also be necessary to take 
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into consideration the effects that the power status of the violator has on the likelihood for punishment.  
Powerful states tend to be integrated into the power structure of the human rights body itself, 
minimizing the likelihood that they will be punished.  Furthermore, states that violate human rights and 
are doing so in tandem with a powerful ally may also escape punishment to the extent that their 
powerful ally is willing to shelter them from punishment.  This latter scenario seems most likely when 
the powerful ally can do this with little costs to itself. 
In what follows, I describe the design of the dissertation and describe briefly how each chapter 
will contribute to the answers to the overarching research question of why international human rights 
violations occur in clusters and why the occurrence of violations within clusters seems to increase over 
time.  Furthermore, I highlight the implications that each chapter has for the secondary question for the 
project of whether coordinated action decreases the likelihood of individual punishment. 
DESIGN OF THE DISSERTATION 
The following chapter contains a literature review which serves to provide a background on the 
human rights literature relating to compliance with international law, the adjudication behavior of the 
victims of human rights abuses, and the behavior of the international adjudication bodies meant to 
punish these abuses.  This chapter also further illuminates the gaps that currently exist in the literature 
and illustrates how this project serves to fill said gaps. 
The third chapter develops a formal model, its equilibria, and the model implications for the 
coordination model of human rights compliance.  This chapter provides a more specific understanding of 
why human rights compliance may be better viewed as a coordination issue than as a cooperation issue.  
I also develop several testable implications and identify the circumstances under which potential 
violator(s) will choose not to violate human rights and those under which an international adjudication 
body will decide to issue a punishment for violations.  It will also identify the testable implications from 
the model that pertain to the behavior of victims of human rights abuses. 
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A fourth chapter includes an empirical test of the implications of the model with regard to the 
behavior of a potential violator.  This chapter looks at whether the empirical record supports the notion 
that violators are more likely to violate human rights when their peers also have a record of violating 
and when the domestic costs of violations are high.  I conceive of and test two different measures of 
coordination based on different definitions of how states might identify their international group of 
``peers'', or other states whose behavior they might seek to emulate. 
The fifth chapter consists of an empirical test which seeks to make and test predictions about 
when victims of human rights abuses will choose to bring cases in front of international adjudication 
bodies.  While this chapter only tests directly one hypothesis derived directly from the formal model 
developed in Chapter 3, I develop and test two additional hypotheses that help the chapter to provide a 
more complete understanding of the implications that circumstances unique to a given country-year 
have on the probability of punishment at the international level as well as individual state's 
consideration when deciding whether or not to commit human rights violations at home.  The 
hypotheses tested in this chapter, while not formally derived, are of the same motivation and spirit as 
those derived formally and tested in Chapters 4 and 6. 
In the sixth chapter, the implications of the model with regard to the behavior of the 
international adjudication body are subjected to empirical tests.  This chapter will determine the effect 
of coordinated violations, the costs of prosecution, and the costs of refraining from prosecution on the 
UN-based Human Rights Committee's admissibility decisions and its decisions either in favor of 
complainants or states for violations committed.  The results of this chapter have implications for the 
effect that costs and benefits to the body's legitimacy have on its decisions and the overall effectiveness 
of the Committee as an adjudicator of human rights violations. 
A final chapter will serve to summarize findings and illustrate the ``big picture'' from the 
project's findings.  This chapter will include predictions about the future behavior of potential violators, 
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victims of human rights abuses, and international adjudication bodies and the effects that the findings in 
this project will have for future research.  It will also outline suggestions for future research which will 
serve to elaborate on the answer to questions of human rights compliance. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE 
What causes variation in human rights violations over space and time?  Chapter 1 served the 
purpose of illustrating the fact that a great many states violate international human agreements most of 
the time.  With the steady increase in the number of international institutions which purport to deal 
with states' human rights behaviors occurring in tandem with a steady increase in the number and 
degree of human rights violations occurring in states, many scholars have argued that international 
human rights institutions are incapable of preventing the occurrence of human rights violations.  Despite 
this discouraging evidence, some states manage to refrain from committing such violations. In light of 
the number of states that find themselves unable to resist committing such violations, the good 
behavior of this group of states is interesting.  However, in order to answer the question of why we see 
variation in terms of states' decisions over whether or not to comply with their human rights treaty 
obligations, it will be necessary to answer three component questions. 
The first of these asks what political leaders see as their choice set where complying or defecting 
from human rights treaties is concerned.  When deciding what their level of compliance with these 
institutions will be, leaders must strike a delicate balance between, essentially, violating human rights 
enough to receive the benefits of doing so without paying a prohibitive level of costs for their actions.  
The second component question looks to determine what domestic actors' possible actions and 
incentives are with regard to their responses to violations and/or compliance with human rights treaties 
on the part of their political leaders.  When human rights are violated, what steps can the victims take in 
order to seek justice for the wrongs and how do these steps affect those responsible for the violations?  
The third and final component question regards the responses of international institutions to the 
behavior of violating states and the individual victims who bring cases before the institution.  What are 
the possible responses of these actors and how is their behavior constrained by state parties and the 
individual complainants who bring their cases before these international adjudication bodies? 
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In this chapter I look to review the extant literature that has proposed answers to these 
questions and pose three important critiques of it.  The first critique addresses the fact that scholars' 
tendencies toward viewing international human rights regimes as epiphenomenal because their 
punishment capabilities are weak is a flawed view.  In many senses, international adjudication bodies 
have the capability of martialling international public opinion by openly prosecuting cases that are 
brought before them.  Even when the punishments issued by these bodies are weak and/or not 
enforced, the knowledge of the state's actions are publicly known, which can lead to a great many costs 
to the state for its behavior which are not directly implemented by the body itself.  The second of these 
is that human rights, as an issue area, is distinct from other issue areas in that compliance in the issue 
area of human rights cannot be understood in the same ways as compliance in other issue areas.  
Scholars' tendency towards viewing all compliance as looking like a Prisoners' Dilemma is flawed in that 
preferences where compliance with human rights regimes are concerned, states gain very little from 
cooperation with the regimes and impose few (if any) costs on their counterparts with acts of defection.  
Finally, as I will discuss in the conclusion of this chapter, both of these flawed approaches to 
understanding human rights compliance fail to help us understand the clusters of violations that we saw 
in the previous chapter. 
The chapter is laid out as follows.  I begin with a section looking at the compliance literature in a 
very general way, attempting to understand whether and, if so, when institutions can curtail state 
behavior.  This sets the agenda for the broader work here, as it provides a lens through which we will be 
able to draw implications from the results found in later chapters.  In the second section, I provide a 
discussion that looks to answer the first component question of the analysis regarding the rationale that 
states use when deciding what their level of compliance with international human rights treaties will 
look like.  The third section looks at answers that have been proposed for the question of what causes 
variation in the rate at which human rights victims bring cases against their violators at the international 
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level.  A fourth section addresses the questions that have been posed for answering the question of 
what role international human rights adjudication bodies play in this dynamic and what cases variation 
in the rulings issued by these adjudication bodies.  A final section concludes. 
DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? 
Realists argue that states are unlikely to behave differently as signatories to human rights 
regimes due to the fact that human rights treaties hinder state sovereignty without any associated 
material or strategic benefits (Downs, Rock and Barsoom, 1996; Grieco, 1988; Hathaway, 2002; Jervis, 
1999; Mearsheimer, 1994/5; Powell, 1994). Observation of compliance with these treaties can be 
reconciled with this position based on the argument that states exhibiting compliant behavior do so only 
because they would have exhibited this same behavior regardless of their membership status. Realists 
maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are 
based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on 
state behavior.  Scholars such as Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996) argue that states respond to 
relative incentives and that compliance relies primarily on the depth of cooperation required by the 
agreement. 
As Simmons (1998) points out, it is exceptionally difficult to determine whether compliance with 
a regime is voluntary or due to the power of fellow regime members. The concern is with whether or 
not states are complying with obligations due to agreements, norms, or interpretations of proper 
behavior, rather than acquiescence to unilateral political demands based on the exercise of power 
alone. Agreements between actors with asymmetrical capabilities are rarely completely voluntary and 
decisions to comply might be caused by a feeling of obligation or coercion.  However, it is not clear that 
institutional effectiveness and unilateral political demands are entirely independent of one another.  
Krasner (1983), among a great many others, argues that international regimes might, most accurately, 
be characterized as intervening variables when trying to understand international behavior.  In this 
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sense, power and interests lead to the creation of regimes, which in turn affect behavior.  If strong 
states create institutions in order to reflect the power distribution at the time of creation, we would 
expect them to be diligent about punishing those who were not part of the creation process and who 
violate the rules created by the institution. 
Neoliberal institutionalists have also taken the position that institutions have an independent 
effect on state behavior, controlling for power and interests (Keohane and Martin, 1995). In fact, they 
argue that institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities. Institutionalists 
have tended to rely more upon legalistic arguments and the causal mechanisms associated with the 
audience costs literature when considering questions of compliance in the context of human rights 
regimes. The legalistic argument rests on the supposition that states will be more likely to comply with 
international regimes if their domestic laws are consistent with the international regime. Scholars within 
the legalistic tradition have found that the presence of an independent judicial system and a civil society 
that views domestic institutions and laws as being legitimate increase the probability that a state will 
comply with international human rights law than their counterparts without legalistic similarities to the 
regime in question (Cardenas, 2004; Haas, 1998; Hafner-Burton, Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008; 
Hathaway, 2002; Moravcsik, 2003; Slaughter, 1995). 
Material vs. Normative Costs 
However, this heuristic is useful in understanding human rights compliance only if another state 
stands to lose something as a result of human rights violations occurring elsewhere.  Because of the 
roadblocks that sovereignty issues present for humanitarian interventions (not to mention the fact that 
states are unlikely to realize many material interests from humanitarian interventions), states are 
unlikely to be presented with many situations in which the benefits of intervention are high enough to 
warrant their involvement.  This understanding of cooperation differs from that of issue areas such as 
the environment, trade or security.  Where human rights are concerned, potential violators are only 
20 
 
likely to give some consideration to the costs and benefits of compliance based on the likelihood that 
outside states will intervene (which is typically a long shot and limited to strong states) and very likely to 
give long consideration to the likelihood that a domestic opposition group will stand against them 
successfully. 
In opposition to this position, some make the argument that the development of international 
regimes facilitates the socialization of states to international norms of behavior (Chayes and Chayes, 
1993; Checkel, 2001; Finnemore, 1993; Wendt, 2001). Scholars arguing in favor of this particular 
rationale often take the position that the existence of international regimes can transform state 
interests. According to this view, states do not choose to comply because compliance is instrumentally 
valuable to them, but rather due to the fact that they have been socialized to see no other behavior as 
being appropriate. This would mean that the continued use of the standards set by the cooperative 
efforts of the states that established the regime would ride not only on the legitimacy of the individual 
states involved in the negotiation, but also on continued international adherence to the norms of 
behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Lutz and Sikkink, 2000). 
Trying to Find Some Middle Ground 
It is, in part, because of the liberal peace literature and in part because of the coordination 
literature that neoliberal institutionalists have sometimes argued in favor of the importance of the 
reputational benefits associated with regime compliance. The coordination literature indicates that in 
order for an international regime to come into existence, the member states must necessarily have 
agreed upon the regime's structure and rules. Because of the fact that the member states were able to 
coordinate their preferences for the regime and said coordination may have been associated with costs 
for the member states, noncompliance by one would be considered to be a betrayal to all because it 
would allow the ``rule breaker'' to benefit at the cost of the others. Because institutional involvement 
increases the number of interactions between states over time, individual states, if rational, should 
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strive to abide by institutional rules in the present in order to give counterparts reason to comply with 
their preferences in the future (Davis, 2004; Keohane, 1984). This practice of issue linkage encourages a 
give and take dynamic between states in which one state ``scratches the back'' of another in exchange 
for the chance to call in a favor at some future point (Lipson, 1991). 
Scholars' decisions to overlook the issue linkage dynamic and states' concerns with reputation 
have argued that there is a lack of institutional compliance on behalf of states where the issue area of 
human rights is concerned.  In approaching questions of human rights compliance in this way, they are 
only partially right in their characterization because they focus only on the costs that are most easily 
measured.  Alliance structures are likely an important consideration for states when they consider what 
their human rights behavior should look like in that poor human rights standards may be a ``deal 
breaker'' where some of their allies are concerned.  For example, the European Union and the United 
States, for the last two decades have adopted the practice of signing bilateral trade agreements with 
countries that have workers' rights standards ingrained.  Trading partners that do not adhere to these 
standards can expect to have their status as a favored trading partner revoked, which represents huge 
material costs due to the size of the EU and US economies.  Losing these trading standards come as a 
result of reputational costs. 
It is important to note that the reputational costs, as identified here, manifest as material costs 
of lost trade.  However, reputational costs are not limited to lost trade.  Even in the context of the UN, 
member states in the General Assembly or Security Council must work together in order to secure 
enough support to pass certain initiatives in a vote.  This means that when states lose reputational 
appeal with regard to issue areas that are important to their voting alliances, these alliances may break 
up and cause issues that are important to the state to fall by the wayside.  While these losses are 
extremely difficult to observe and measure, they are no less relevant to states' analyses of the costs and 
benefits associated with a particular action. 
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This reasoning culminates to illustrate that while the material costs of punishment may not be 
particularly notable for states, the implications of incurring such costs stand to be important in their 
decision-making process.  When cases are brought against states at the international level, this 
information is available to the international audience, making it exceedingly difficult for states to cover 
up the fact that they have broken international rules and norms.  When the international audience is 
made aware of such transgressions, they have the option to exact costs on the state.  It is also likely that 
the costs that the international audience can exact on the violating state are much greater than any 
costs that could be charged by an international adjudication body.  Thus, whether the punishment 
mechanisms of the international adjudication body are strong or weak is of little difference here.  
Rather, the role of the international adjudication body as the ``whistle-blower'' may be the important 
aspect of the interaction to consider. 
THE DECISION TO VIOLATE 
Strong states that are highly integrated in the international system, admittedly, play a large role 
in the formation of international norms.  Weak states and so-called pariah states tend to play a very 
small role in the institutional creation process and, thus, the norm creation process.  These human rights 
norms then tend not to reflect their understandings of appropriate behavior, much less their material 
interest-based calculations about what sort of behavior they should engage in.  Relatedly, we might 
expect that states involved in the norm creation process are more likely to have internalized human 
rights norms while states that were not involved in the norm creation process are less likely to have 
internalized these norms.  While this seems to be true for the most part in that we tend to see more 
human rights violations in nondemocracies and in lesser developed countries, it is not universally true as 
evidenced by the extraordinary rendition case discussed previously.  This was a case in which a 
developed, democratic state that is highly integrated in the world system perpetuated human rights 
abuses through practices such as torture, kidnapping, and extrajudicial killings. 
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Because we do see human rights violations committed in countries that do not make the list of 
the ``usual suspects'' as well as in countries that we might expect have not internalized international 
human rights norms, it seems more likely that states ''drive as fast as they can afford'' when it comes to 
human rights violations.  While they are aware that norms against human rights violations exist and 
have no trouble abiding by them at times, they are unlikely to abide by them when the costs of doing so 
are low and the benefits of doing so are high.  Speaking more specifically, we might expect norm 
internalization to be more likely to occur after the violator is caught and punished, which is consistent 
with research conducted on the effects of international criminal tribunals (Kim and Sikkink, 2010).  Thus, 
the norm internalization process provides us with less of an understanding of why human rights 
violations happen to begin with and more of an understanding of why they are less likely to occur after 
punishment has been carried out. 
This can likely be attributed to phenomena that reflect the findings of (Bueno de Mesquita, 
Morrow, Siverson and Smith, 1999a) with regard to human rights specifically.  Because of the limited 
likelihood for interference by the international community in foreign human rights matters, the 
domestic preferences are key to understanding the costs that potential violators can expect to pay for 
their behavior.  These domestic preferences against violations such as torture, extrajudicial killing, 
disappearance, political imprisonment are, perhaps, the effect of internalized international human rights 
norms, but we might also simply suspect that they are more likely rooted in the basic human instinct for 
survival.  However, the source of the domestic preferences is less of a concern here than is the source of 
the preferences of violators, which I argue is the concern for political survival domestically. 
Domestic Motivations for Human Rights Violations 
Theories that purport to explain why violations occur are as abundant as the instances of human 
rights violations that they seek to explain.  The common thread of these numerous explanations centers 
on the desire for domestic power.  A rather elegant formulation of this argument is provided by Bueno 
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de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith (1999) in their explanation of the effects that the size of a 
government's winning coalition has on their political survival.  When we make the simple assumption 
that, once in power, leaders' primary desire is to remain in power, the rationale behind engaging in 
human rights violations becomes more clear.  A key factor here, of course, is regime type.  Because 
autocracies have smaller selectorates and winning coalitions than their democratic counterparts, they 
are required to keep fewer people happy in order to remain in power.  This argument has been 
important to understanding variation in public goods provisions (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson 
and Smith, 2002), but it can also be used to understand the provision of public "bads" (Vreeland, 2008; 
Davenport, 1999).  The lack of accountability and the lower level of political participation allowed in 
autocracies is associated with low levels of respect for human rights (Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs 
and Smith, 2005). 
The political survival model, while useful for helping us to understand why governments may 
engage in or allow human rights violations to occur, does not explain why states sign on to agreements 
with which they may have little incentive to comply.  Here, the addition of the logic of two-level games 
becomes useful (Putnam, 1988).  Democracies and anocracies may sign on to human rights agreements 
as a commitment mechanism at the domestic level (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008; 
Vreeland, 2008).  In signing these agreements they attempt to tie both their own hands, as a 
commitment device aimed toward the domestic audience, and the hands of future leaders, as a 
commitment device aimed toward both the international and the domestic audiences.  This effort not 
only affects the long-term stability of newly formed democratic institutions, but also the level of trust 
that the domestic and international audiences can have in the new regime's commitment to becoming 
more democratic in the long term. 
This explanation for why anocracies may have more of an incentive to sign and comply with 
human rights agreements than do autocracies and even full-fledged democracies hints that audience 
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costs, at both the domestic and international levels are important in understanding compliance 
behavior.  The political survival argument is helpful in understanding both why governments may be 
incentivized to commit human rights violations and how governments can get away with human rights 
violations at the domestic level.  Both explanations provide explanations for variation in compliance 
behavior by illustrating the reasons for why leaders may want to violate human rights in some cases and 
not in others.  However, the weakness of these two explanations lies in their inability to account for 
cases in which no human rights violations occur even when leaders may stand to gain from human rights 
violations which they may be very likely to get away with at the domestic level. 
International Explanations for Human Rights Violations 
One explanation for these cases is provided by Hafner-Burton (2005).  Here, bilateral trade 
agreements with hard human rights standards may prevent states with an incentive to commit human 
rights violations from actually doing so by tying the state's lack of human rights violations to a definite 
economic benefit of continued trade.  The effects of these trade agreements with hard standards on 
human rights compliance are compared to those of trade agreements with soft standards and 
international human rights membership.  It is concluded that the coercive efforts reflected in the hard 
standards are more effective than the persuasive elements of trade agreements with soft standards or 
general human rights standards.  However, this explanation does not get around the endogeneity 
problem. 
Do states sign bilateral trade agreements with hard standards because they would not have 
committed human rights violations anyway or is it the agreement that warrants a change in state 
behavior?  In order to get around this problem, it is necessary to determine if there are systemic-level 
conditions that facilitate higher rates of human rights violations.  The domestic explanations outlined in 
the previous section illustrate why states may be incentivized to commit human right violations, but 
explanations that occur at the interstate level get caught up in the endogeneity problem because of the 
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difficulty of determining states' true intentions when they make a deliberate action such as signing an 
agreement.  Due to the overlying anarchic nature of the international system, one can easily argue that 
states can sign any and every agreement that comes their way without needing to have much fear of 
punishment.  However, there are other systemic factors that, unlike anarchy, do vary.  One such factor is 
the probability of punishment for human rights violations in the system. 
Under what circumstances is punishment for human rights violations most likely in the system?  
There are many contributing factors to variation here including the material costs of punishment, the 
reputational costs and benefits of punishment, and the international economic and political power of 
the punished.  By measuring variation in the probability of punishment at the systemic level and 
assessing the effect of this on human rights compliance, it is possible to get at the answer to the 
endogeneity problem by assessing whether and when we see states abstain from committing violations 
even when the systemic and domestic factors are conducive to states' ability to violate with impunity.  
But this begs the question: Can potential human rights violators exert influence over variation at the 
systemic level in the probability of punishment?  I argue that they can do this by coordinating their 
behavior where human rights compliance is concerned. 
What's Missing? 
Once all of the different costs and benefits that states and courts must consider when deciding 
whether to uphold human rights norms are taken into account, it becomes necessary to think about 
how this information is processed and who the relevant actors are.  One way that scholars have tried to 
do this is through the use of formal modeling.  While the use of game theory in the human rights 
literature is rather rare, its use in the broader exploration of regime compliance and cooperation is quite 
common.  The debate between neorealists and neoliberals has focused on the implications that 
repeated iterations of the Prisoners' Dilemma game can have on states' concerns with relative gains 
and, as a result, the potential for cooperation in the international system (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; 
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Stein, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1985; Jervis, 1999).  However, James Fearon (1998) points out that this 
debate has overestimated the occurrence of interactions in which preferences look like those found in 
the Prisoners' Dilemma game. 
Where the issue area of human rights is concerned, the decision to comply with agreements is 
generally treated the same as compliance with agreements in the realms of trade and the environment.  
The rationale here is that of a collective action problem which results in the free rider effect.  States are 
reluctant to comply with free trade agreements or higher environmental standards when they view 
other states as likely to defect because they stand to forfeit gains and, ultimately, to lose gains relative 
to those gained by defectors.  Where human rights are concerned, the collective action problem and the 
threat of the free rider effect are absent.  Forfeiting the ability to commit human rights violations while 
others are committing violations generally does not result in a distributional conflict between states.  
Rather, actors who choose not to commit human rights violations must fight a distributional conflict on 
the domestic level over who will obtain power within the territorial boundaries. 
In environmental or trade agreements, which are typically modeled as Prisoners' Dilemma 
games, players stand to benefit the most when they choose to defect during their counterparts' 
cooperation. Somewhat differently, when an actor decides not to comply with a human rights 
agreement, they stand the chance of being punished for their indiscretions unless other actors choose 
to support them against a court or other international body that has the ability to issue an indictment or 
reward for capture of the suspected abusers. In other words, I take the position that while the Prisoners' 
Dilemma game is an appropriate template for models of many different types of regime compliance, 
compliance with human rights agreements is more appropriately modeled as a coordination game. 
The lack of an explicit distributional conflict at the interstate level means that less is gained from 
using Prisoners' Dilemma preferences to understand compliance with human rights regimes.   Stein 
(1983) points out that in situations in which states face a dilemma of common interests, independent 
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decision making leads to equilibrium outcomes that are Pareto-deficient - outcomes in which all actors 
prefer another given outcome to the equilibrium outcome and, thusly, look like the Prisoners' Dilemma.  
This dilemma more closely represents decisions about the enforcement of human rights regimes.  
Decisions over whether to comply with human right regimes more closely resemble what Stein refers to 
as dilemmas of common aversions in which actors have a common interest in avoiding a particular 
outcome (such as punishment), as opposed to a dilemma of common interests in which actors have an 
interest in insuring a particular outcome.  Under these circumstances, potential violators do not prefer 
the same outcomes (actors are unlikely to care what happens to violators unrelated to their own cause), 
but they do share an interest in avoiding their own capture and punishment.  Stein draws the conclusion 
that in a dilemma of common interests, states stand to gain the most from collaborative acts in which 
they specify patterns of behavior and monitor against cheating.  However, when there is a dilemma of 
common aversions, coordination is required. 
THE DECISION TO BRING A CASE 
States must also consider various domestic circumstances in addition to the behavior of their 
international peers.  However, the sorts of domestic circumstances that states must consider are also 
affected by the international community.  The primary concern that states must consider at the 
domestic level is the likelihood that victims of human rights violations would bring a case against the 
violator(s) in order to get retribution for violations committed against them.  Victims of violations can 
bring cases at the domestic level and at the international level, so states must take both domestic and 
international laws into account as well as the strength of the punishment mechanisms at both levels.  
Victims must also take these same factors into consideration when deciding whether to expend the time 
and effort that goes into the adjudication process. 
Generally, one might argue that victims are likely to consider the depth of punishment that 
violators receive when punishment is administered at either the domestic or international levels for 
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human rights violations.  If the victim believes that punishment will be strict and carefully enforced, they 
may be more likely to bring a case than if they have ex ante beliefs that the punishment will be light or 
not enforced.  While Kim and Sikkink (2010) suggest that the severity and likelihood of punishment may 
be less important than the experience of the pursuit of justice by means of a trial, if the victim's ability 
to achieve justice is highly uncertain, they may not pursue it in the first place. 
The argument that Kim and Sikkink (2010) put forward is that when a trial occurs to punish 
human rights violations, the likelihood of future violations occurring in that state lessens dramatically.  
They come to this conclusion after looking at the rate of prosecutions of highly visible cases of human 
rights violations, such as the prosecutions in Argentina for the atrocities committed during the Dirty War 
or the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.  However, these highly visible cases are 
atypical.  Many cases of human rights violations are not as egregious or as widespread as those 
discussed by Kim and Sikkink (2010) which means that they are internationally less visible and, because 
of the low visibility, the reputational and punishment stakes are lower for those committing the 
violations.  Furthermore, since these violations are more widespread, the costs of bringing a case are 
shared across a larger number of people than when the victims are individuals.  Finally, violations that 
are more egregious and widespread more easily meet the threshold for prosecution because it only 
takes one person to begin the prosecution process for the whole group. 
These systematic differences have important implications for victims' decision-making processes 
when it comes to choosing whether or not to bring a case at either the domestic or international levels.  
Kim and Sikkink (2010) say that victims are unlikely to be concerned about whether the violators are 
punished if they are able to use the prosecution as a healing mechanism, but the logic here becomes 
circular.  If victims lose the case are they likely to feel healed by the process that caused the violators to 
get away with their crimes?  If victims have a chance of losing, are they likely to be willing to bring a 
case, even if it will give them ``closure''?  These are questions that have yet to be conclusively answered 
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in the human rights literature.  Based on the assumption of rationality, I suspect that victims will be 
more willing to go through the effort of prosecuting if they think it is likely that they will receive a 
judgment in their favor.  While victims may feel more satisfied if, in addition to losing the case, the 
violators have to pay considerable costs for their actions; I do not posit that the victims must be able to 
anticipate that some punishment will be carried out in order for them to feel that prosecution is worth 
their time.  I merely argue that victims will bring cases when they think that a judgment in their favor is 
likely. 
Domestic Factors Affecting Prosecution 
After the occurrence of human rights violations, the natural reaction for victims is to pursue 
justice.  In fact, Kim and Sikkink (2010) state that the prosecution process serves not only as a cathartic 
experience for victims, but that in the long term, it can prevent future violations.  This simple fact begs 
the question of why not all victims of human rights abuses choose to pursue the prosecution of the 
abuses.  One reason that cases may not be pursued at the domestic level is that mechanisms to do so 
may not be available.  A number of domestic traits might contribute to the overall availability of 
domestic recourses for the prosecution of violations.  The five traits most important to consider here are 
regime type, the presence or absence of conflict over resources at the domestic level, judicial 
independence, the strength and capacity of domestic institutions, and the degree of wealth in the state.  
These five traits are of particular importance here due to the fact that they are all determinants of the 
victim's ability to receive a fair trial in the country in which the violations occurred. 
First, we might reasonably expect that states with a democratic form of government may be 
more capable of punishing human rights violations due to the audience costs to which the government 
is subject.  Democratic leadership must, ultimately, answer to the voting population and in order to do 
this with success, they must make decisions that are viewed by the populace to be legitimate.  The 
perception of legitimacy tends to be harder to achieve as the size of the winning coalition increases 
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(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999a, b, 2002).  Because of the nature of the human rights issue area, the 
perception of legitimacy is at once easier and more difficult to achieve for democracies.  While 
democracies' decisions, once reached, are more likely to be viewed as legitimate across a broad societal 
base, a number of factors influence the speed with which this process will take place.  Autocracies, 
having less need to be concerned with broad-based perceptions of legitimacy due to their smaller 
winning coalitions, will likely reach decisions more quickly that are viewed as illegitimate by the large 
number of constituents that are not part of the winning coalition. 
Another important factor for determining whether domestic punishment occurs and if the 
decision is viewed to be legitimate by the citizenry is the level of group stratification that exists within 
the society.  Societies that are highly stratified are more prone to conflict, which easily leads to a higher 
rate of human rights violations between groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gurr, 2000).  States operating 
under these conditions are under monumental pressure to either behave in a conciliatory manner and 
attempt to diffuse tensions as much as possible or to be consistent in their preferential treatment of one 
group at the expense of others.  The decision that states reach on whether or not to be conciliatory 
largely depends on their regime type.  Democracies must keep a larger winning coalition happy in order 
for the government to stay in power, while autocracies must please a smaller, yet likely more 
particularistic winning coalition.  This means that in democracies with low levels of group stratification, 
we can expect that decisions perceived as being legitimate by a winning coalition sufficient in size for 
the regime to retain power to be come by more easily and more quickly than in democracies with highly 
stratified groups because the preferences of the winning coalition are more diverse.  Meanwhile, 
autocracies are unlikely to vary much regardless of the level of stratification in terms of the perceived 
legitimacy and the quickness of the decision.  For autocracies, what matters more than the level of 
fractionalization in the society is the level of organization of the largest opposition group (Gurr, 2000). 
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Finally, having taken regime type and fractionalization under consideration, individuals must 
then consider the level of judicial independence in their state before deciding whether or not to bring a 
case at the domestic level.  Admittedly, judicial independence is likely to be very closely related to 
regime type in that democracies are more likely to have independent judiciaries than are autocracies.  
However, it is not the case that all democracies have independent judiciaries.  Victims of human rights 
violations are likely to take this factor into consideration when determining whether or not to bring a 
case.  I anticipate that those residing in states with independent judiciaries are the most likely to bring 
cases because they are the ones most likely to anticipate a just due process.  This is not to say, however, 
that those residing in states with judiciaries that are only partially independent or that are not at all 
independent will not bring cases.  These individuals are merely more likely to base their decision over 
whether or not to bring a case on their perceptions of how just the process will be at the international 
level.  I discuss these considerations in the following section. 
Systemic Factors Affecting Prosecution 
It stands to reason that if domestic recourses for prosecution are not available to victims of 
human rights abuses, the likelihood of violations occurring increases and the likelihood that prosecution 
will occur at the domestic level decreases.  When the probability of getting justice at the domestic level 
is low, victims may choose to seek justice at the international level.  However, where the majority of 
international human rights treaties is concerned, victims of abuses must have exhausted all domestic 
recourses for justice before bringing their case before the international body.  In states with a more 
democratic system of government, a higher GDP, judicial independence, and a low degree of group 
marginalization, the process of exhausting the domestic recourses for prosecution are at once more 
likely to be lengthy and more likely to end in justice, thereby decreasing the need for international 
prosecution.  On the other hand, in states where some or all of these traits are not present, the 
domestic prosecution process is less likely to result in justice that satisfies the victim, regardless of the 
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length of the process itself which is likely to vary.  States not prepared to administer justice for human 
rights violations may decide to dismiss cases quickly so as not to have to deal with them or, just as likely, 
decide to stall so as to give the perception that justice will be had even if it will not. 
Ultimately, whether or not victims choose to pursue the prosecution of violators at the 
international level also comes down to whether or not they believe they will get justice as a result of 
their efforts.  Even if they bring a case before an international adjudication body, they have no 
guarantee that even the most seemingly clear cut and straightforward case will be decided in their favor 
due to the intricacies of international politics.  This means that while states are considering whether or 
not to violate, they may choose to take a calculated risk and violate, gambling that even if a case is 
brought against them, their own position in international politics may prevent them from being 
punished for their violations.  Thus, victims of human rights violations may very well also take into 
consideration the position of the violator in international politics and the likelihood that they have for 
winning the case when deciding whether to bring a case in the first place. 
The Effects of Individual Perception 
There are two factors that are likely to be extremely important in predicting whether or not an 
individual complainant will choose to initiate legal proceedings at the domestic level with a mind to 
continue the process to the international level.  The first of these is the level of trust that the individual 
has in the international adjudication process.  The second is the power identity of the state against 
which the case will be brought.  The level of trust that individual citizens have in the international 
adjudication bodies for the human rights issue area is likely to inform their decision to bring a case.  
Once the domestic judicial process has been carried out, if the victim of violations did not receive 
justice, they must consider whether or not to bring their case to the international level.  If the 
adjudication body has a poor record of issuing judgments against violators or if they have a poor record 
of issuing punishments that result in a noticeable change in the violator's behavior, the international 
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community is likely to have a poor perception of the body's ability to mete out justice.  If the 
complainant assesses that the probability of a judgment in their favor or punishment is low, they may 
very well choose not to bring a case at the international level, regardless of the results they receive at 
the domestic level. 
As discussed previously, state power has an infinite level of influence on the ability of 
international institutions to operate effectively.  Because powerful states are so important to the long 
term survival of the institutions that they create, these institutions oftentimes have no incentive to 
increase the costs that powerful states must pay for their continued existence.  Thus, one might 
reasonably expect that when violations occur in powerful states and/or when those violating are 
coordinating their efforts with powerful states, judgments at the international level in favor of the 
victims are less likely.  Institutions, due to their desire to continue to exist and operate, have little 
incentive to bite the hand that feeds them.  Those individuals considering the option of involving 
themselves in an international adjudication process are likely to assess that this is the case, particularly if 
they have a low level of trust in the functioning ability of the adjudication body to begin with.  
Ultimately, this means that individuals are less likely to bring cases when their trust in the adjudication 
body is low and when the state against which they plan to bring a case is a strong one that is likely to 
use its influence in the institution to avoid punishment. 
THE DECISION TO ISSUE A PUNISHMENT 
Adjudication bodies for human rights agreements have what may seem to be a fairly 
straightforward mandate: charge and punish human rights offenders in order to uphold international 
human rights rules and norms.  However, behind this mandate the practice of charging and punishing is 
considerably less straightforward.  While these committees are concerned with upholding the 
international rules and norms in the realm of human rights, they must also be concerned with the 
survival and continued legitimacy of the agreement and the committee itself. Although capturing and 
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punishing offenders is, in many cases, an efficient means of survival and a mode for gaining and 
maintaining legitimacy for these bodies, there may be some instances in which following the mandate 
can work at cross purposes with the committee's goals.  Further, it may at times be the case that the 
committee faces an uphill battle when attempting to realize its mandate due to counter efforts made by 
interested third parties. 
Research has indicated that, at the domestic level, the adjudication of human rights offenders 
serves not only as a cathartic experience for the victims of said offenses, but also as a mode of 
prevention against future offenses in the state in question (Kim and Sikkink, 2010; Lutz and Sikkink, 
2000; Walling and Sikkink, 2007).  However, these same findings have not been duplicated at the 
international level (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Hathaway, 2002; Neumayer, 
2005).  Why are the results found at the domestic level lost in translation?  Because upholding human 
rights norms isn't always the most important or focal goal amongst interested parties at the 
international level, our understanding of the process and its effects at the domestic level can sometimes 
fall short of explaining the phenomenon internationally. 
The biggest issue here is the ``tangled hierarchy'' that exists between human rights committees 
and the states that create them.  This issue is at the heart of any debate over the effectiveness of 
international institutions and their ability (or inability, as some would say) to have a lasting or detectable 
effect on state behavior.  States create these institutions with rules as binding or as flexible as they 
desire (Downs, Rock and Barsoom, 1996).  Once created, said institutions are only as powerful as they 
were created to be.  International human rights agreements are plagued by the fact that they are 
generally non-binding, they have weak or non-existent enforcement mechanisms, and many rely on the 
self-reporting of members for their monitoring capabilities.  Due to all of this, evaluation of the 
effectiveness of human rights agreements is difficult (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Checkel, 2001).  Is the 
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mere existence of an agreement enough to change states' behavior?  Or, is an agreement with weak 
enforcement sufficient? 
These are questions whose answers interest not only scholars in the realm of human rights and 
international organizations, but also those that make up the organizational bodies of the agreements.  
The assumption that the employees of international organizations tend towards preferring the long 
term survival of the institution, achieved by maintaining institutional legitimacy, is often made (Haas, 
1998).  Once created, institutions must remain effective in the eyes of those who created them and 
those subject to them in order for them to continue to be perceived as legitimate and to continue to 
survive.  Unfortunately for these institutions, the interests of the creators are oftentimes at odds with 
those subject to the international institutions.  Thus, councils responsible for adjudicating human rights 
violations must be strategic in their decisions over who and when to punish and the severity of said 
punishments. 
Dissecting the Decision to Issue a Punishment 
There are two lenses that adjudicating bodies must use to view their decisions over punishment 
for violations.  The first of these is whether the state receiving the punishment will comply.  Because of 
the lack of an independent enforcement mechanism in most human rights agreements and powerful 
states' abilities to get away with more than their less powerful counterparts, an adjudication body that 
metes out punishment to powerful states and their allies has little hope that the punishment will be 
carried out (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Mearsheimer, 1994/5).  Less powerful countries are unlikely to 
have the resources to carry out their punishment, especially when the punishment involves remittances.  
One caveat here is that less powerful states are unlikely to be willing to turn against powerful states 
with whom they must preserve good relations in order to insure their continued security and economic 
prosperity by failing to carry out the parameters of their punishment.  Regardless of states' power 
identities, punishment that is ordered but not carried out not only fails to uphold international human 
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rights norms, but can also lead to the decreased legitimacy of the institution and the norms that it 
embodies (Cardenas, 2004;  Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Checkel, 2001; Fang, 2008).  Thus, one might 
reasonably argue that, from a strategic point of view, adjudication bodies are better off not issuing a 
punishment when they have no expectation of the punishment being carried out by the states receiving 
it.  It may also be the case that a strong states' power in the human rights organization itself prevents it 
from receiving punishment in the first place. 
The case of the US' policy of extraordinary rendition provides an excellent example of why this 
lens is an important one to consider.  While the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and 
the European Parliament both engaged in investigations into the so-called ``black sites'' set up around 
Europe, their punishments were only successfully carried out for European violators as neither of these 
bodies has jurisdiction outside of Europe.  While the UN and the World Policy Council both issued 
reports on the activities of the US and European countries' policies surrounding the practice of 
extraordinary rendition, no punishment of these countries has occurred as a result of these international 
organizations' investigations.  While the European Union has a better record than many other regions in 
the realm of human rights, its member states' individual decisions to coordinate their behavior with the 
United States in order to facilitate violations illustrate that when a number of powerful states in the 
international community choose to coordinate their violations, very little can stop them. 
The second lens that adjudicating bodies must use to view their decision is through the human 
rights record of the violator.  In part, the logic here is similar to that expressed in the discussion of the 
first lens.  When powerful states and/or their allies are the ones committing human rights violations, 
issuing a punishment may not be the best option for the adjudicating bodies because such an act could 
lose them the support of important members to the agreement (Gourevitch, 1978;  Putnam, 1988).  This 
is undesirable not only due to the implications that this lack of support would have for enforcement of 
international human rights norms, but to the potential for lost trade with the powerful state.  On the 
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other hand, so-called human rights pariah states may seem to be an easier target for punishment.  
However, these states that have few allies and commit the most egregious human rights violations earn 
their identity as a pariah state specifically due to the fact that they have very little concern for their 
international reputation where human rights are concerned.  Here, notable examples include Iran and 
North Korea. 
Explanations for Inaction 
Using these two lenses, the adjudicating bodies for human rights agreements are likely to take 
under consideration three factors when deciding whether or not to issue a punishment.  The first of 
these is the probability that the punishment, once decided, will be carried out.  Due to the fact that 
these adjudicating bodies' survival is linked with their ability to successfully uphold human rights norms, 
it is key that when the council or committee issues a punishment, said punishment is realized.  Because 
human rights agreements do not (with the notable exception of the European Convention on Human 
Rights) have their own independent enforcement mechanisms, the probability of punishment is rarely 
100%.  As discussed above, it seems likely that when the violator is a powerful state, the probability that 
the state will submit to the punishment is low.  However, it is also possible that the state may carry out 
the punishment if it views human rights to be an issue area of some importance or if it views backlash 
against its actions (at either the domestic or international level) to be likely.  On the other hand, when 
the violator is a human rights pariah state, one might reasonably expect a low probability that 
punishment is carried out, regardless of any extenuating circumstances; because the state has already 
exhibited that it has little regard for human rights. 
The probability with which violators are punished is certainly extricably linked to the second and 
related factor that adjudicating bodies must take into consideration when deciding whether to issue a 
punishment.  This factor consists of the costs and benefits to their reputation for doing so.  The 
organization receives certain reputational benefits when it calls for the punishment of human rights 
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violators regardless of whether the punishment is carried out.  However, if the punishment is carried 
out, the reputational benefits of being perceived not just as an organization that upholds international 
human rights norms, but as an efficient and effective purveyor of justice. 
When the organization fails in its duty to call for the punishment of human rights violators, it 
always pays costs.  In the event of a powerful human rights violator, the organization pays reputational 
costs from less powerful member states who may view the lack of a judgment as being unfair as these 
less powerful states might rightly claim that the organization would not let them get away with such 
behavior.  In addition to the reputational costs that the organization pays to its member state-based 
audience, there are also reputational costs that originate from advocacy groups such as Amnesty 
International or Human Rights Watch, which are just as effective at engaging in ``naming and shaming'' 
campaigns against human rights organizations as they are against the violators themselves, and from the 
lay population which receives this information via said advocacy groups and the international media 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  Because human rights agreements are international governmental 
organizations, one can make the argument that such reputational hazards amongst the lay populations 
of member states and/or advocacy groups is of little concern to the survivalist instinct of the 
organization itself.  However, I argue that this is not the case. 
In early 2003 as it became more and more clear that the US-sponsored initiative to invade Iraq 
with the expressed support of the UN Security Council was unlikely, the support of the US public for the 
US' unilateral invasion of Iraq increased (Borger and White, 2003).  It is possible that this was due to a 
rally 'round the flag effect that occurred due to the impending invasion.  It is also possible that this 
increased support for unilateral action and a decreased need amongst the public can be attributed to a 
decreased level of confidence for the legitimacy of the UN in general amongst the American public.  In 
fact, (Borger and White, 2003) pointed out that a Washington Post and ABC News poll showed that after 
Colin Powell, then US Secretary of State, presented his evidence against Iraq at the UN Security Council, 
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57% of those questioned backed an invasion of Iraq in the face of UN opposition if ``some US allies such 
as Great Britain, Australia and Italy'' supported Washington. 
The unilateral action of the US flew directly in the face of states like France, Germany, New 
Zealand, and Canada who had traditionally been supportive of the US in the past.  As a result, the UN 
becomes an institution which, in the eyes of Americans, is either too weak to authorize an invasion that 
is justified or too weak to prevent the US from engaging in an invasion whenever it wants, regardless of 
international support.  In the eyes of the international community, the institution is merely viewed as 
too weak to control a hegemon.  Putnam (1988) argues that states play two-level games constantly in 
their foreign policy exercises.  When organizations are pressured by powerful states against punishing 
violations, it is the organizations that become the losers in these two-level games because they stand to 
lose the confidence of the other member states and that of the domestic populations of these states 
and the pressuring state. 
Furthermore, evidence indicates that advocacy groups can have a strong influence in 
international politics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Wapner, 1995).  Due to the fact that human rights 
agreements' monitoring mechanisms may in fact be just as weak as their enforcement mechanisms, 
advocacy networks play a crucial role here.  Beyond the information that they receive from advocacy 
networks, human rights organizations must largely rely on self-reporting or member states' duty to 
report in order to gather information on the occurrence of and nature of human rights violations.  Thus, 
organizations must rely on advocacy networks for their monitoring capabilities as well as for the 
influence they can hold over state governments.  To the extent that advocacy networks can aid the 
organization in its ability to uphold international human rights norms, these organizations receive no 
benefits and pay only the costs to their own legitimacy when the advocacy networks turn against them 
by highlighting their refusal to uphold the norms that they were created to uphold.  This not only affects 
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the future legitimacy of the organization itself by inhibiting its monitoring capabilities, but by harming its 
international reputation. 
CONCLUSION 
In the process of reviewing the extant literature on human rights compliance, complaints against 
violators, and the adjudication process, I have advanced two main critiques of the literature.  The first of 
these addressed the fact that scholars' tendencies toward viewing international human rights regimes as 
epiphenomenal because their punishment capabilities are weak is a flawed view.  The second of these is 
that scholars' tendency towards viewing all compliance as looking like a Prisoners' Dilemma is flawed in 
that states gain very little from cooperation with the regimes and impose few (if any) costs on their 
counterparts with acts of defection in the realm of human rights.  The synthesis of these two critiques is 
that both of these flawed approaches to understanding human rights compliance fail to help us 
understand the fact that human rights violations seem to happen in clusters rather than as isolated 
instances. 
Because we observe violations occurring clusters, it is necessary to determine what type of 
thinking leads states to decide to violate in groups.  The existing literature draws two conclusions about 
human rights behavior in states.  The first of these is that states commit human rights violations because 
institutional enforcement mechanisms are weak and unable to punish such behavior in any meaningful 
way.  If this were true, we would expect to see violations in every country-year because states' would 
have no concerns about punishment.  They would never have to worry about being caught in their 
violation behavior because the ramifications of being caught would be inconsequential to them.  This is 
clearly not what we observe empirically.  In Chapter 1 we saw great amounts of variation in the rate of 
violations with regions and regime type groups over time.  Further, we observed that the propensity for 
punishment does not vary in conjunction with variation in the clustered violations.  Thus, a myopic 
concern for punishment cannot explain clustered violations. 
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The second conclusion drawn by the existing literature was that the Prisoners' Dilemma is the 
scheme most often used to model compliance behavior because it explains how the costs and benefits 
of compliance and/or defection come as a result of state decisions to violate.  I have argued that this is 
not the case and that the structure of the payoffs in the Prisoners' Dilemma does not reflect the 
structure of payoffs where human rights interactions are concerned due to the fact that states do not 
exact costs on their counterparts when they violate human rights.  This means that states do not have 
common interests in protecting human rights, but rather a common aversion of avoiding any negative 
consequences associated with such actions.  If this is the case, we would expect that states would 
violate in clusters in the way that is depicted graphically in Chapter 1.  If states have the common 
aversion of experiencing punishment for their violations, they would work together to avoid it.  There 
are a number of ways that this can be achieved, including efforts to create institutions with weak 
punishment mechanisms and collective efforts to overwhelm these weak punishment mechanisms.  
These are the types of behavior that we would expect to explain the clustered violations from Chapter 1.  
It is both because we see clusters of human rights violations and because existing explanations fail to 
explain this phenomenon that I will propose a model of human rights compliance that is characterized 
by the coordinated efforts of states to violate human rights together in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3:  MODELING HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATION AND COMPLIANCE 
Do potential human rights violators consider coordination to be a viable strategy for committing 
human rights violations with a smaller probability of getting punished for their actions?  In order to 
answer this question it is necessary to answer two more specific questions.  First, do potential violators 
take into consideration the behavior of other potential violators when making the decision to violate?  
Second, when do adjudication bodies authorize punishment for human rights violators and to what 
extent is this affected by coordinated action?  In what follows I develop, first, a general discussion of this 
dynamic, second, an example and, finally, a model which makes predictions about the answers to each 
of these questions. 
The interactions of interest for this project are those that take place between states and 
between states and international adjudication bodies.  I assume that the primary concerns for potential 
violators are the likelihood that their violations will be punished at either the domestic level or through 
reputational costs at the international level.  I argue that these concerns over punishment and 
reputation both change their preferences with regard to their own human rights behavior and causes 
them to work to change the overall likelihood of punishment and/or reputational costs by making 
attempts to coordinate their behavior with other violators.  It seems likely that states work to alter the 
costs and benefits of their punishers through coordinated efforts to increase the costs of issuing a 
punishment for the relevant international adjudication bodies.  In doing so, states can help one another 
to minimize the costs of international punishment that they must pay in exchange for engaging in 
behavior domestically that is profitable to them. 
International adjudication bodies' primary concern is their continued existence and relevance, 
which is directly tied to the rate of the human rights violations which they are responsible for 
prosecuting and their success in prosecuting and punishing these violations.  I argue that state behavior 
affects these adjudication bodies' overall effectiveness in two ways.  First, states coordinate their 
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behavior in an effort to raise the cost of punishment for the adjudication body while simultaneously 
lowering their individual cost for punishment.  Second, by coordinating their actions in an effort to lower 
the probability of international punishment, they are able to create disincentives for individual 
complainants to bring their cases in front of the international adjudication body in the first place.  This 
unintended consequence benefits the adjudication body nearly as much as it benefits the violating 
states in that adjudication bodies cannot hope to prosecute cases that are not brought before them.  
Thus, if the individual complainants fail to bring cases, the international adjudication body cannot be 
expected to pay reputational costs when it inevitably fails to issue a punishment for the violations. 
The story created here to explain the human rights behavior that we see internationally 
resonates fairly well with the charts and graphs presented in the previous chapter.  It illustrates the 
reason why we see steady increases in the rate of human rights violations over time and why this 
increase is not explicitly related to states' capabilities to carry out punishment for human rights 
violations domestically.  Here, I look to characterize aspects of this interaction formally.  From the 
formal model in the following chapter, I derive hypotheses which I test formally in subsequent chapters. 
WHY COORDINATE? 
Consider, on one hand, two or more states which must decide whether or not they will violate 
human rights and, on the other hand, an adjudicating body that must eventually decide whether or not 
to punish violations that occur.  Suppose that the state at hand, domestically, observes a low probability 
of punishment if it chooses to violate human rights and that, internationally, it observes a high 
probability of a punishment being issued and a low probability that the international enforcement 
mechanisms will carry out such a punishment because they are weak.  Suppose further that this state 
observes, internationally, that a number of other states have the same low probability for domestic 
punishment as well as an incentive to violate human rights.  Suppose still further that the adjudicating 
body in question, caring about its long term survival, prefers to issue a punishment when such a 
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punishment is likely to be carried out and not to issue a punishment if the punishment is unlikely to be 
carried out in an effort to safeguard the legitimacy of the organization.  Under such circumstances, the 
coercion or communication of one state with another on the subject of violation becomes unnecessary 
because of the existence of two or more states with an incentive to violate and the possibility of 
decreasing the international likelihood of punishment by violating to the same degree at the same time. 
Let us consider in more detail the decision-making process for potential violators.  In order for a 
state to initiate coordinated human rights violations without either convincing or coercing others to 
violate with it, it must be strong enough to be a ``first mover''.  We can typify ``first movers'' as being 
states with a low probability of domestic punishment, a high domestic incentive to violate human rights, 
and states that are, internationally, strong enough to defy much of the explicit punishment that they 
might receive from an international adjudication body.  The question then becomes, for a state this 
strong, why is coordinated action necessary?  Here, the purpose of rallying others toward coordinated 
action serves the purpose of decreasing even further the costs of human rights violations. 
Bigger and/or more powerful states provide a benefit to their weaker coordination partners and 
receive nontrivial benefits from the participation of these partners in the coordinated violations that 
they commit.  The benefit that these ``first mover'' states provide to states that choose to coordinate on 
violation with them is a decreased likelihood for international punishment from the adjudication body.  
This comes as a result of the influence that powerful states have in the context of international 
institutions.  For the same reason that these ``first mover'' states are able to anticipate that they will be 
able to avoid punishment when they initiate the string of violations, weaker states can anticipate that 
these strong states will shield them from punishment if their violations are detected in an effort to 
continue to avoid detection and punishment themselves. 
Why would coordinated violations lead to a decreased likelihood of punishment from an 
international adjudication body? International adjudication bodies for human rights treaties are 
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responsible for meting out punishment when domestic punishment mechanisms fail.  These 
adjudication bodies have a desire to remain legitimate in the eyes of the international community in 
order to remain relevant and secure their continued existence.  The loss of legitimacy for these 
institutions is most important to their continued survival when it occurs in powerful states because it is 
these powerful states that maintain the highest level of responsibility in continuing to pay the costs 
associated with the maintenance of these international institutions.  Because these powerful states are 
the ones responsible for bring the institutions into existence and paying the costs for their continued 
existence, they expect that these institutions will not further raise the costs that they must pay in order 
to keep the institutions going.  If these costs for continued existence do increase, the adjudication body 
can reasonably assume that if they rise past a certain level, the state will not continue to pay them.  
Thus, we have the characterization of a strategic interaction that occurs between two or more potential 
violators and an international human rights adjudication body in which powerful, ``first mover'' states 
are committing violations and, by doing so, lowering the likelihood of punishment and increasing the 
overall number of violators. 
The question that remains, however, is why a powerful, ``first mover'' state really cares about 
whether other states violate with it or not.  These states have the ability on their own to decrease the 
likelihood of international punishment because they have power over the institutions, so what do they 
gain from additional violators?  They gain the ability to deflect both the material costs of punishment 
and the reputational costs of detection.  Whether these ``first mover'' states are committing human 
rights violations at home or abroad, when other states are also committing violations, these ``first 
mover'' states can pass the reputational costs of violations on to their counterparts.  In doing this, the 
``first mover'' states minimize the material costs that the weaker states are less capable of paying by 
intervening on their part with the adjudication body, while passing on some of the reputational costs 
that the powerful state itself might have to pay to these weaker states who can, perhaps, better afford 
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to pay them.  These weaker states have lower stakes when it comes to reputational costs and benefits 
because their own status as weak states mean that their actions in the international arena are not as 
much of a point of focus as those of their more powerful counterparts.  Thus, while these weaker states 
may pay reputational costs at the domestic level as a result of their actions, the international 
reputational costs are likely to be paid on a smaller scale than they would be for the more powerful 
states.  This means that while both powerful and weak states experience trade-offs as a result of their 
coordinated efforts, they stand to gain more from coordinating than they do if they violate in isolation. 
MODELING HUMAN RIGHTS AS A COORDINATION PROBLEM 
In order to model the stylized interaction characterized above, I consider a model of complete 
information between an international adjudication body, C, and two potential human rights violators, A 
and D, represented by the game tree in Figure 1. Each player in the game moves once and the game is 
repeated only once.  The two potential violators (A and D) simultaneously choose between violating 
human rights and abstaining from such acts.  The adjudication committee for the human rights regime 
may decide whether or not to issue a judgment as punishment for the alleged violations thereby 
encouraging associated institutions or states to organize the punishment of those judged to have 
violated human rights. 
The preferences of the committee and the potential violator(s) are opposed.  The committee 
prefers that no human rights violations occur because in the absence of violations, it is viewed as a 
legitimate and effective institution.  However, when violations occur, the committee incurs costs to its 
legitimacy and, if it chooses, the cost of issuing a judgment.  The potential violator(s) prefer to violate 
human rights with impunity so that they may reap the rewards of human rights violations without 
having to pay any costs.  Furthermore, these potential violators hope that increased numbers of 
defection may make punishment more difficult for the committee and the regime members charged 
with the responsibility of punishing human rights violators. 
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This hope of safety in numbers is reasonable due to the inherent difficulty of initiating 
punishment caused by the fact that these adjudication bodies do not have their own associated body 
responsible for carrying out their judgments and monitoring the behavior of all members is left up to the 
members themselves.  The committees associated with human rights agreements such as the UN 
Convention on Torture and the UN's International Conventions on Civil and Political Rights and 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights rely primarily on self-reporting from violating countries or from 
member states' duty to report when they observe violations from fellow members for the detection of 
human rights violations.  Furthermore, they rely on outside entities to carry out the punishment of 
violators.  Thus, the expectations of potential violators that punishment may be less likely when actions 
are coordinated is reasonable because as the number of coordinated violations increases, there are 
increasingly fewer states in the system which will exercise the duty to report and the likelihood of 
detection by the human rights committee decreases. 
In the interest of fleshing out the sequence of moves and the payoffs received, we start with A 
and D's choice of whether or not to violate human rights. A decision not to violate human rights yields a 
payoff of 0, while violators that do not get caught for their violations receive a payoff of 1, meaning that 
they get to continue violating human rights and fighting for power.  If a player decides to commit human 
rights violations, but gets captured for having done so, it pays a judgment, j>0, which could be thought 
of as time in prison or as some loss in trade for their indiscretions and would be decided by the relevant 
human rights committee.  The cost of the judgment is offset by the number of violators, such that when 
a violator is punished, it pays j/n.  This reflects the safety in numbers concept discussed above.  Also of 
note here is the fact that the committee's decision to punish has an effect on violators' payoffs.  This is 
due to the fact that international human rights committee decisions authorize the legitimate use of 
enforcement mechanisms by potential punishing entities.  Because these committees have no 
mechanism by which they can independently punish those against whom a judgment has been issued or 
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by which they can materially compensate anyone else to punish human rights violators, no punishment 
can legitimately occur without some domestic entity with an interest in carrying out the punishment.  
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a decision made to punish violators is based on whether a domestic 
court or international committee has issued an indictment and on a consideration of their own costs to 
do so.  When A and D decide to commit human rights violations, they are individually punished with a 
common probability, qє(0,1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Coordination Game Tree 
 
The Committee observes the choices of both A and D to violate or not violate human rights and 
then chooses whether or not to issue a judgment.  If neither state commits a violation, the Committee 
continues to be perceived as legitimate and receives the benefits, R, as such.  If a violation occurs and 
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the Committee chooses to indict, it receives r>0 multiplied by the number of violators, n, if the violator 
is successfully captured.  If the violator is not captured, the Committee pays the greatest cost, R>0, 
multiplied by the number of violators.  The decision to punish also means that the Committee must pay 
the costs of issuing a punishment, kє(0,1), which can be thought of as the time and other resources that 
go into the monitoring efforts as well as the negotiations over the make-up of the judgment.  If the 
Committee chooses not to issue a punishment, it does not have to pay the associated costs of doing so 
but it must pay r<R multiplied by the number of violators, n, for not upholding its stance against human 
rights violations.  The reputational benefit of capture to the Committee is greater if it has issued a 
judgment because it can be argued that the punishment is an endogenous effect of the judgment having 
been issued.  When the Committee chooses not to issue a judgment, it receives a smaller benefit 
because, while the punishment is exogenous, the Committee could still be argued to have affected the 
normative understanding held by the violator's punishers. 
Term   Definition   Value Constraints  
n   Number of Violators   n≥0  
k   Cost of Indictment   kє0,1)  
R   Cost/Benefit   r>0, R>r 
j   Cost of Judgment   j>0  
q   Probability of Capture   qє(0,1) 
Figure 3.1: Model Notation 
Equilibria 
There are three pure strategy, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) that I will discuss for the 
model.  Two of the pure strategy SPNE are characterized by the coordinated violations of A and D and 
vary only based on the Committee's decision of whether to issue a judgment.  The other pure strategy 
SPNE is characterized by A and D's joint decision not to violate human rights. 
Coordinating on Violation Equilibria 
Here, there are two relevant equilibria.  In both of the Coordinating on Violation Equilibria there 
is a decision made by both A and D to commit human rights violations, but in one the human rights 
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committee decides to issue a judgment and in the other it does not.  When states coordinate their 
violations and are caught and punished the punishment that they receive is distributed across the group.  
This distribution may or may not be equitable, but it is shared.  To the extent that each state has to pay 
at least some costs, the distribution of the punishment does not throw off their incentives to coordinate 
as much as it would if they had to pay 100% of the costs individually.  Because the judgment paid by 
states for violating human rights is offset by the number of states violating, Proposition 1 explains that 
states prefer not to violate human rights if no other state is committing violations. 
A state that violates alone pays the full judgment if caught and may perhaps be easier to punish 
because it does not benefit from the additional bargaining potential associated with fellow violators.  
These circumstances are, of course, most likely for weaker states, but even a relatively strong state that 
violates alone may be subject to some reputational costs for violations that are internationally known 
about and punished.  These reputational costs can happen at both the international and domestic levels.  
At the international level, we can think about these reputational costs in the form of a decreased 
willingness of other states in the international community to cooperate with the violating state in 
question on human rights or other linked issues.  On the domestic level, states punished for human 
rights violations can expect to pay certain audience costs, the extent of which, of course, are directly 
related to the state's regime type. 
Proposition 1:  A and D will never violate human rights alone. 
The probability of punishment also emerges as an important factor for states to consider when 
deciding whether or not to violate.  This probability must be sufficiently low in order for states to choose 
to violate human rights and is most easily met when the cost of the judgment, j, is low and the number 
of violators, n, is sufficiently high. Substantively, this means that if states can expect to pay a high 
judgment if a punishment is issued for their violation(s), they will refrain from committing the violation if 
they believe that they are likely to be punished.  What factors might contribute to a state's beliefs about 
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the likelihood of punishment?  In the context of the UN's Human Rights Committee, individual victims of 
violations are tasked with the responsibility of bringing a case before either a domestic or international 
adjudication body in order for a judgment to be issued.  Thus, the likelihood for punishment hinges 
entirely on the likelihood that individual victims of the human rights violations committed will pursue 
justice at the domestic and international levels.  The condition for the probability of punishment, q, that 
must be met in order for coordinated violation to occur is stated in Proposition 2. 
Although this particular model only explicitly includes a maximum of two violators, the payoffs 
and results would remain the same even if there were many more than two states violating at one time.  
State A may violate human rights (even if D is not) as long as some other state is violating with them.  
Thus, we can easily see from the cutpoint given in Proposition 2 that as the number of states willing to 
violate human rights increases, the probability of capture becomes more and more likely to fit within 
the parameter.  In other words, as the number of violators increases, it becomes more likely that the 
probability of punishment will be lower than the magnitude of the judgment in relation to the number 
of violators.  Furthermore, as more and more violations occur, the price of the judgment must increase 
as well if violations are to be deterred.  Thus, the Coordinating on Violations Equilibria can be thought of 
as bringing about a contagion effect where violations increase exponentially as soon as at least two 
human rights violators are identified. 
Proposition 2:  A and D will coordinate their human rights violations when q ≤ 
 
   
. 
If the above conditions are met, A and D will coordinate on human rights violations.  Having 
observed this behavior, the Committee must then decide whether or not it will issue a judgment.  The 
Committee makes this decision based on the cost of issuing a judgment, k.  This cost is associated with 
the time and effort that goes into hearing a case, making a decision on its admissibility, hearing both 
sides of the case, and, ultimately, making a decision based on the merits of the case.  Many individual 
complainants end up bringing their case before an international adjudication body more than once 
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before the case can be deemed admissible and a decision can be issued.  This means that a number of 
the cases that are heard by international adjudication bodies are heard multiple times, constituting a 
not insignificant cost in terms of time and effort spent by the adjudication body. 
The condition highlighted in Proposition 3 is most easily met when the probability of 
punishment, q, and the reputational effects of upholding human rights, r or R, are large.  This essentially 
indicates that, holding all other variables equal, the committee would rather issue a judgment when the 
reputational stakes are large and the probability that the punishment will be carried out is large than if 
the case will be long, drawn out, and tedious.  However, if the case does stand to be time consuming, 
the reputational stakes must be so large that the committee's legitimacy and continued existence would 
be on the line.  If these conditions are not met, we see the second equilibrium in which violators 
coordinate but the Committee does not issue a judgment. 
Proposition 3:  The Committee will issue a judgment when the cost of the judgment is sufficiently low 
such that k < qr+R. 
Of note here is the fact that the actions of the Committee have little effect on A and/or D's 
decision to violate human rights.  Regardless of whether or not the Committee issues a judgment, a 
state bases its decision of whether or not to commit violations on the behavior of other potential 
violators and on the probability of punishment.  Because committees have no independent ability to 
exact the punishment, potential violators are unlikely to be as concerned about the actions of the 
Committee as they are about the actions of potential punishers.  Although it should be noted that 
without a committee's decision to issue a judgment the probability of punishment is zero, it is also 
important to point out that even when a committee issues a judgment, the probability of punishment 
can take the value of zero.  Thus, the probability of punishment is a more important consideration for 
potential violators than is the likelihood of a judgment against their behavior being issued by a 
committee. 
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Of equal interest here is the fact that the Committee does not base its decision to issue a 
judgment on the number of violators.  The Committee issues judgments based on the cost of doing so 
which is directly affected by the associated reputational costs and benefits and the probability of 
punishment.  Arguably, the reputational effects of issuing a judgment and the probability of punishment 
are closely related to the number of violators in the system, as discussed earlier.  However, it is possible 
to imagine that the Committee's costs of indictment could be similar in a situation in which there are 
multiple low profile violators when compared to circumstances under which there are only two violators 
if both are high profile states.  Here, we can see that even though the number of violators in the two 
scenarios varies, the reputational effects and the probability of punishment do not, meaning that the 
cost of issuing a judgment does not vary either. 
Compliance Equilibrium 
If the conditions set forth in Propositions 1 and 2 are not met, we expect to see the Compliance 
Equilibrium in which states coordinate their decision not to violate human rights. This means that if the 
probability that an individual state will be punished is high, it will choose not to violate and, thus, will 
not be coordinating with other states.  However, as noted above, while the model here only explicitly 
shows an interaction between two states, this interaction is likely to be occurring between several states 
at any given time.  Thus, a single state that views the likelihood of its own punishment to be high may 
not necessarily lead to an absence of violations in the system as a whole.  In order for an individual state 
to suspect that the probability of its punishment is high, it would need to be the case that domestic 
measures for punishment are sufficiently strong or that the state's reputation in the international 
system makes its human rights behavior particularly visible.  This visibility could be due to its role in the 
issue area as a leader or as a black listed member of the international community. 
Proposition 4:  If the number of violators, n, is equal to zero or if the probability of punishment is 
sufficiently high, such that q ≥ 
 
   
, both A and D will choose not to violate human rights. 
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For the Compliance Equilibrium, the most important constraint here is that of the probability of 
punishment, q.  The rationality assumption dictates that the costs of an action must not outweigh the 
associated benefits.  If punishment is likely, violators are more likely to pay a judgment than they are to 
receive the full benefits of violation.  This means that individual states would be unwilling to consider 
violation in the first place unless they believe that the number of violators will outweigh the cost of the 
judgment.  Here, the Committee's decision of whether or not to issue a judgment does not occur. 
Model Implications 
The model identifies important characteristics of behavior surrounding human rights norms and 
illustrates the conditions under which the norms are most likely to be upheld.  In this section, I will 
discuss the model implications for each actor and use them to derive testable hypotheses. 
Human rights violations in the system are common.  The Coordinating on Violation Equilibrium 
provides an understanding of why this is the case.  Because of the low level of enforcement capabilities 
available to human rights committees, we oftentimes see that it is the case that the probability of 
punishment is low enough for states to believe that if they coordinate their behavior and violate as a 
group, they are more likely to violate with impunity.  This leads us to the first two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1:  As the probability of punishment increases, states become more likely to coordinate their 
decision not to violate human rights and violation becomes less likely. 
Hypothesis 2:  A state will only commit human rights violations when their peers are also committing 
human rights violations. 
Human rights committees prefer to issue a judgment for human rights violations when the costs 
are low.  Committees expect to pay reputational costs when violations occur and go unpunished.  
Conversely, these committees can expect to receive reputational benefits when no violations occur or 
when they occur and are punished successfully.  The cost of indictment term represents the time and 
other resources that go into the process of monitoring and the decision-making process with regard to 
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determining the punishment.  Pariah states with high levels of violations are likely to be associated with 
high reputational stakes for human rights committees.  The costs of issuing a judgment for violations 
committed by these states are likely to be low because their violations tend to be highly visible, meaning 
that the international community is not only paying attention to the fact that violations are occurring, 
but also to the actions of the relevant human rights committee.  This lowers the cost of monitoring for 
the committee and could even be argued to decrease the time and effort necessary to make a decision 
about what the punishment for these states should look like as the discussion is likely to have been 
carried out through less formal channels prior to the committee's formal deliberation. 
One might understandably expect the cost of issuing a judgment to be high when the violations 
are being committed by great powers and states with a prior record of exemplary human rights 
behavior.  When these two groups of states are the ones committing human rights violations, the time 
and effort expended in the process of issuing a judgment is likely to be great because these states are 
better able to throw a wrench in the process.  Powerful states can prolong this process due to their 
potential to influence fellow violators against implicating them in the violations.  They can further 
prolong the process due to the influence they can have as members of the committee over their fellow, 
weaker committee members.  States with good reputations for upholding human rights agreements can 
increase the costs of issuing a judgment because their in-depth understanding of human rights laws can 
allow them to engage only in behavior that falls into a legal ``gray area''.  Furthermore, like the great 
powers, these states are capable of influence over fellow violators and committee members by offering 
to trade favors and link issues in the future.  These implications lead us to the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3:  As the number of powerful and/or typically well-behaved states committing human rights 
violations increases, the Committee becomes less likely to decide to issue a judgment. 
The Compliance Equilibrium, one might argue, will be observed less frequently than the 
Coordinating on Violation Equilibrium due to the fact that we often observe a low probability of capture 
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in the international system. Because many human rights committees are unable to incentivize outside 
actors to punish violators, states can generally expect to violate with impunity.  However, we might 
expect the Compliance Equilibrium to be most likely when the majority of violations we have seen were 
being made by so-called pariah states with a long history of human rights violations.  These states' 
actions are likely to be both more closely monitored by human rights committees and the reputational 
benefits associated with the issuing of judgments and punishments are likely to be higher.  This leads 
potential punishers to be more motivated to punish human rights pariah states than they would be to 
punish great power violators or states with previously good reputations in the realm of human rights, 
thus leading to an eventual lack of violations occurring and no ability for states to coordinate violations.  
Great powers will be difficult to punish not only because their international economic and political 
power would lead the costs of bad relations with them to outweigh the reputational benefits of 
punishment, but also because their would-be punishers may be comparatively so much weaker that 
they do not have the resources for punishment in the first place.  Where the punishment of those with a 
previously good reputation is concerned, efforts may be made difficult by norms of reciprocity.  
Potential punishers could be concerned that today's actions could put them at risk down the line were 
they to ever be in a position where they could gain from committing violations. 
Hypothesis 4:  If there are no other violators or if the probability of punishment is too high, we expect to 
see a coordinated decision not to violate human rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The model presented here predicts that states will prefer to violate human rights in groups or 
not at all when the probability of domestic punishment is low.  It further predicts that international 
adjudication bodies prefer to punish when the costs to the body's legitimacy and future survival are low.  
These predictions seem, largely, to reconcile themselves with the empirical record depicted in the tables 
and figures from Chapter 1.  First, we note an increase in the number of states violating human rights 
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over time.  The number of states violating over time has likely increased due to the additional incentives 
that states have to violate when others are also violating.  Second, we tend to notice violations in states 
where there is a low likelihood for domestically-based punishment.  With the combination of a low 
likelihood for domestic punishment, ex ante, and a decreased likelihood for international punishment as 
punishment costs increase with higher numbers of violators, we expect to see the international violation 
rate increase over time. 
From the model presented in this chapter, I derive four testable hypotheses, which I test in two 
empirical chapters.  Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 are tested in the following chapter, Chapter 4.  The test for 
hypothesis 3 is in Chapter 6.  This project also includes a third empirical chapter, Chapter 5, which tests 
hypotheses that are not derived from this model but which have direct implications for the interaction 
that is explicitly modeled here.  While this model makes specific predictions about the strategic 
interaction that takes place between states considering committing human rights violations and 
international adjudication bodies, it does not model the interaction that takes place on the domestic 
level between states and the victims of the human rights violations. 
However, we might easily imagine that the domestic interaction that takes place between a 
state that would consider violating human rights and a potential victim of human rights violations 
deciding whether or not to bring a case against violators would look quite similar to the interaction that 
is explicitly modeled in this chapter.  In this interaction, the potential violator's preferences are the same 
as they are in the model above - to violate with impunity - and the costs and benefits are also the same.  
The set up of the preferences, as well as the costs and benefits, for the victim of human rights violations 
would be largely the same as those for the international adjudication body.  Thus, the hypothesis that 
we might form about when a victim will bring a case would be essentially similar to hypothesis 3.  We 
would expect a victim to bring a case when they have the time and resources to pay a lawyer to fight the 
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legal battle entailed in this process and when they are unlikely to be harmed for having brought the 
case.  The following chapter begins the empirical section of this project. 
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CHAPTER 4: FRIENDS IN LOW PLACES 
Chapter 3 develops a formal model meant, in part, to characterize the strategic choice that 
states make when deciding when to commit human rights violations.  Here, I look to test the hypotheses 
regarding potential violators' decisions to commit human rights violations derived from the model.  The 
logic developed by the model is fairly straightforward.  It makes three predictions about the 
circumstances under which states will violate human rights.  First, states are likely coordinate their 
human rights violations with peers in order to avoid the costs associated with a loss of reputation or 
with punishment.  Second, when states can coordinate their actions so as to diminish the probability of 
detection and international punishment, they are more likely than not to commit human rights 
violations.  Third, when the likelihood of punishment at the domestic level is also low, states are more 
likely to commit human rights violations. 
The logic of the formal model in Chapter 3 is based on two important assumptions.  First, states 
are rational actors and look to maximize gains while simultaneously trying to minimize losses.  The 
hypotheses illustrate this logic by predicting that states prefer to violate human rights when they believe 
all forms of punishment, international and domestic, are unlikely.  Second, states make this same 
assumption about other states.  Here, I argue that states make the assumption that potential punishers, 
both international and domestic, are also trying to maximize benefits while minimizing costs.  Thus, 
states coordinate their behavior in an effort to increase the costs of punishment for would-be punishers 
so that they are more likely to receive the benefits that they associate with human rights violations 
without being forced to pay the associated costs of committing such acts. 
It is the second assumption that differs in an important way from previous work in the realm of 
human rights.  While a great number of scholars argue that actors are rational and want to commit 
violations with impunity, the argument that they assume their potential punishers will use the same 
logic when deciding whether to punish their actions is made significantly less often.  This second 
61 
 
assumption will be directly tested in Chapters 5 and 6, but until then, its reliability will be upheld by 
testing the two hypotheses regarding states' decisions to violate human rights.  If states' ability to 
coordinate their actions do not increase the severity of violations and/or if a decreased likelihood of 
domestic punishment does not lead to the occurrence of more severe violations, the usefulness of the 
second assumption will be called into question. 
In the next section, I will begin with a discussion of the research design, followed by a section 
characterizing the data used to test the two hypotheses in this chapter. The third section will serve to 
present the results from the statistical tests employed and a fourth section will include a discussion of 
the theoretical implications of the findings.  The fifth section provides an overview of the robustness 
checks used to bolster confidence in the results. The following section provides a comparison of the 
explanatory power for the measures of coordination and punishment and a final section will conclude. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The focus of the empirical test employed in the present chapter is to determine the causes of 
states' decisions to either decrease or increase their level of respect for civil and political rights as 
defined in the UN's 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  There are three main 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 that will be tested here.  First, Hypothesis 1 predicts that states will 
choose to coordinate their behavior when faced with the possibility of punishment for their actions.  
Second, Hypothesis 2 says that states are more likely to lower their respect for human rights when they 
expect their peers to do so as well.  Likewise, it predicts that when a state's peers are improving their 
respect for human rights, the state in question will do so as well.  Next, hypothesis 4 projects that states 
are more likely to commit human rights violations when the probability of the punishment is low.  I 
directly test Hypotheses 2 and 4 in the model.  The support for Hypotheses 1 will come in the 
comparative statics for the model where I compare the effects of domestic punishment and coordinated 
behavior on state's propensity to change their human rights behavior from that of the previous year.  In 
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order to find support for this hypothesis, coordination will have to be found to play a bigger role in 
explaining changes in states' behavior than does the potential for domestic punishment.  There are 
several possible ways to measure the concepts of coordination and punishment and I discuss them and 
my choices here. 
The Unit of Analysis 
Because the phenomena of interest here is the coordinated behavior of two or more states, 
there is more than one possible unit of analysis to choose for this empirical test in this chapter.  I have 
chosen to use the country-year for this analysis as it is the most straightforward option for looking at the 
phenomenon of interest here.  While a unit of analysis such as peer-group-year might also seem like a 
good option for the unit of analysis here, its use here would provide a less straightforward test for the 
hypotheses I derive from the model in Chapter 3.  While the model ultimately makes predictions about 
what behavior will look like within relevant peer groups, its specific predictions are about the individual 
decisions made by states that result in group-based behavior. 
Thus, in order to determine whether individual states will decide to coordinate their human 
rights violations with those of their relevant peer groups, we must look at the behavior of individual 
states.  While the use of the peer-group-year would be helpful in determining the answers to questions 
of whether some peer groups are more likely to violate human rights that others or if some are more 
likely to be punished than others, answering these questions are beyond the scope of this project.  The 
use of the country-year as the unit of analysis allows us not only to look at individual state behavior and 
how that varies within peer groups, but it also allows us to step back and determine if some types of 
peer groups are more relevant than others to states faced with the decision to violate human rights.  For 
this project, the country-year is the best choice for the unit of analysis. 
 
 
63 
 
The Dependent Variable 
The type of human rights compliance that I analyze throughout the course of this project is that 
associated with civil and political rights in the context of the UN's 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.  My choice here is based on three factors.  First, the ICCPR, in addition to the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights is one of the longest standing 
international human rights treaties in force today.  From a pragmatic standpoint, the use of a treaty 
organization that has been around for a long period of time extends the length of time over which I can 
analyze state behavior.  Furthermore, because the ICCPR has been around for so long, states have had a 
significant amount of time to make sure that their practices are in line with the treaty provisions. There 
is no period of time in the data that I use in which the states included were not members of the treaty 
organization. 
Second, because the ICCPR focuses on negative human rights (i.e. the freedom from certain 
types of treatment) rather than positive rights like those protected in the ICESCR, it is functionally easier 
to determine whether governments are choosing not to comply due to the provisions of the agreement 
rather than due to a lack of governmental ability to provide certain public goods to the constituents.  
Arguably, civil and political rights are more likely to be adhered to in democracies or democratizing 
states, but this is an element that is easily controlled for.  However, this is not a human rights treaty with 
which compliance is eased significantly by the level of economic development of the state in question or 
by the strength of the welfare state.  Because ``negative'' human rights enumerate behaviors with which 
states are encouraged to abstain from, it is easier to argue in favor of the analysis of this agreement.  
Many states can reasonably argue that they do not have the capacity to initiate certain domestic 
policies, such as social security, education, or health care due to their status as lesser developed states.  
On the other hand, LDCs are no less functionally capable than developed countries when it comes to 
allowing citizens to freely express themselves, practice their own religious beliefs, or freely move within 
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or outside of the state in question.  States must merely refrain from punishing the free expression of 
these rights rather than initiating and funding whole new government programs. 
Third, the analysis of both compliance and punishment associated with the ICCPR is facilitated 
by the relative transparency of the records for the Human Rights Committee, the adjudication body for 
both the ICCPR and the ICESCR.  While other UN treaty bodies exist that deal with more specific subsets 
of the rights covered in the ICCPR, such as the Committee Against Torture or the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women associated with the 1987 Convention Against Torture and 
the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, respectively, their records 
are not very transparent.  These committees operate with the records of the interactions between the 
committee and the individual violating states being largely sealed.  While this is unproblematic for the 
chapter at hand, it becomes extremely problematic for the analyses contained in the following two 
chapters which look at the punishment behavior of the Human Rights Committee which hears cases on 
all of these subjects. 
Because I do not wish to commit the sin of omission and/or insinuate in any way that some 
forms of human rights violations are more important than others, I complete analyses in this chapter for 
three different types of human rights violations: physical integrity rights, covered in the ICCPR and the 
Convention Against Torture; empowerment rights, covered in the ICCPR; and women's rights, covered in 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.  The analysis of the compliance 
rates with regard to a number of different types of human rights serves not only the purpose of 
inclusiveness, but also the purpose of providing the reader with additional robustness checks for the 
strength of the results in the initial model. 
Defining the Term ``Peers'' 
Beginning with the concept of coordinated action and its operationalization, I limit my focus to 
the two measurement concepts that seem to be the most readily apparent.  The concept of 
65 
 
coordination is rather simple.  Action is coordinated when two or more actors agree to engage in 
behavior with a mind to reach some mutually beneficial outcome.  In order for the actors' behavior to be 
said to be coordinated in the effort of reaching this mutually beneficial outcome, the actors must be said 
to be behaving strategically.  In other words, actors must have prior knowledge of the effects that their 
behavior and the behavior of their counterpart will have on each other and on the probability that both 
actors will receive the mutually beneficial outcome.  However, developing a decision rule useful in 
determining whether two states are peers, is perhaps, more difficult. 
One way of conceptualizing of two or more states as being ``peers'' is to focus on regional 
similarities.  The surge in regionalism as an approach to understanding international politics has grown 
in the last two decades in response to the rising number of regionally-based trade agreements and 
regional governmental organizations, with the European Union being the most notable example 
(Baldwin, 1993).  While the fact that agreements can be made in a much more straightforward manner 
at the regional level than they are at the global level because decisions are easier to come by amongst 
smaller groups than they are amongst larger groups (Hermann, Stein, Sundelius and Walker, 2001; 
Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire and Chang 1992} is well-known, whether cultural and/or philosophical 
similarities across a region are a contributing factor to this phenomenon is not as well-known (Gurr, 
1993).  The amount of intra-regional and intra-state conflict that exists leads one to consider the 
possibility that geographical proximity may, in fact, magnify differences between states in the same 
region (Vasquez, 1993). 
Despite the possible shortcomings associated with considering regional ties to be a way to 
operationalize the concept of peers, there are several advantages to using this particular conception.  
When we look at actual human rights practices and the way that international law has developed in this 
issue area, the concept of human rights ``neighborhoods'' does not seem to be much of a stretch.  In 
1954, when the ICCPR was drafted, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
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was also drafted.  Said to be the product of the two opposing sides of the Cold War, these two 
agreements represented two different conceptions of what international human rights law should 
include.  To this day, many regions are argued to have less than stellar human rights records due 
primarily to the fact that many of these regions conceive of human rights in a different way than is 
currently reflected by international law.  Furthermore, a number of regional organizations exist in the 
area of human rights, including the African Commission and Court on Human and People's Rights, the 
Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights.  The 
existence of regional commissions and courts could certainly be attributed to regional similarities in 
conceptions of what human rights practices should look like. 
Alternatively, the concept of peers could be operationalized using policy similarities between 
states.  Here, rather than constraining similarities between states to their region, we conceive of peers 
as transcending physical space and as being based on a policy space.  The logic rests on the fact that 
even if states are not necessarily culturally similar, they may still engage in similar international behavior 
due to commonalities in the logic used to arrive at decisions or attempts to reach similar goals through 
their actions.  That states behave rationally is a commonly made assumption, thus it is reasonable to 
believe that commonalities in states' domestic circumstances may lead them to engage in behavior at 
the international level that is rationally justified and similar across regions. 
Because both the regional and policy-based conceptualizations of peers seem to be equally 
viable choices for use in the construction of the coordination measure, I will empirically test both in 
order to determine which (if any) does a better job of making predictions about improvements in human 
rights practices.  In the data section below, I provide a detailed description of how each coordination 
measure is constructed and the descriptive statistics.  A section that directly follows the robustness 
checks for the model evaluates the two measurement concepts for the coordination measure to explain 
what the empirical benefits of using each of these measures are. 
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Punishment 
The test of the second hypothesis requires a reliable measure of an individual state's ability to 
punish human rights violations domestically.  The logic here is that when punishment is likely at the 
domestic level, human rights violations become less likely in the first place and, in the event that they do 
occur, their effective punishment at the domestic level makes future violations less likely, thereby 
increasing states' levels of future respect for human rights.  There are a few options that could get at a 
reliable measure for the likelihood of domestic punishment.  One option that might be typically used to 
get at this concept would be the level of repressiveness of the government, but since this is inherently 
part of the dependent variable, it cannot be used here.  This leaves us with two additional ways of 
conceptualizing the likelihood for domestic punishment. 
The first of the remaining two options requires that we think about what affects governments' 
abilities to look upon human rights violations objectively.  The most obvious way to do this is to look at 
the number of and organization of existing opposition groups within a given state.  Domestic 
governments that face opposition groups that are both numerous and highly-organized are going to be 
more likely to view these groups as threatening than they would if the groups were few and had low 
levels of organization.  This is entirely due to the fact that groups that are well-organized are more likely 
able not only to raise awareness of the government's mistreatment of them, but also to be able to 
retaliate against any aggressive actions taken by the government.  Compounding the level of perceived 
threat of these groups by the government are the tactics used by the group to spread their message.  
Groups that choose to use democratic or, at least, non-violent channels in an effort to publicize their 
interests are unlikely to be viewed by governments as being as threatening as those groups that choose 
more violent means such as military action.  When groups use methods considered to be less 
threatening to the government, the government is more likely to use legitimate channels for 
punishment to the extent that any punishment is necessary.  Alternately, when groups act more 
68 
 
provocatively, it not only becomes more likely that they are engaged in activities worthy of punishment, 
but also that the government will ``fight fire with fire'', so to speak, and respond to these actions in a 
less demure way than they might otherwise have done. 
Another option for operationalizing the punishment variable is more straightforward and 
involves a measurement of how independent the domestic judiciary system is.  An independent judiciary 
is more likely to prosecute crime and mete out punishment using objective criteria.  This method for 
measuring the punishment concept allows us to determine how likely it is that justice will be distributed 
based on domestic law as opposed to external factors like the violator's ideological similarities to the 
existing government or the depth of the violator's pocketbook.  Thus, we get a good idea of how likely 
laws are to be upheld in the state regardless of the identity of the lawbreaker. 
Based on the options available for measuring the punishment concept, it seems that an index of 
the two viable options would create the most complete and thorough measurement of the likelihood for 
domestic punishment.  While states with an independent judiciary are more likely to dispense justice 
objectively, this ability may be detracted from to the extent that the government has to deal with a 
number of highly organized and hostile opposition groups.  Thus, it seems logical to subtract one 
concept from the other, resulting in a score that gets higher as the judicial independence score increases 
and as the level of hostility and organization of opposition groups decreases.  Consequently, the 
likelihood for domestic punishment would decrease when the level of hostility and organization for 
opposition groups are high and the level of judicial independence is low. 
The Empirical Method 
In order to test the two hypotheses of relevance to this chapter, I propose the use of an ordered 
logit regression, due to the fact that the dependent variable employed in the analysis cannot be said to 
be normally distributed, thereby violating the assumptions of OLS regression.  The dependent variable 
used in the analysis is ordered in that as a state moves from a low level of respect for empowerment 
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rights to a higher level of respect for these rights, it receives a higher score than if its level of respect 
were to remain the same or to decrease.  Because I have chosen to employ an ordered logistic 
regression technique for this analysis, the use of a lagged dependent variable typical in OLS time-series 
analysis is not appropriate here.  Instead, I use a series of lagged dummy variables for two of the three 
values that the dependent variable can assume in the analysis in an effort to correct for serial 
autocorrelation. 
THE DATA 
The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset contains standards-based quantitative 
information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 195 countries, 
annually from 1981-2009.  The internationally recognized human rights measured in this dataset include 
disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, torture, freedom of assembly and 
association, freedom of foreign movement, freedom of domestic movement, freedom of speech, 
electoral self-determination, freedom of religion, worker's rights, women's economic rights, women's 
political rights, women's social rights, and independence of the judiciary.  For each of these 
internationally recognized human rights, CIRI codes range from zero to two for each country-year 
included in the dataset, with a measure of zero indicating that the violation occurred frequently, a one 
indicating that it occurred occasionally, and a two indicating that the particular type of violation did not 
occur in the year in question.  I use the dataset to measure the occurrence of human rights violations 
consistent with violations defined in the United Nations' 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), but expand my use of it beyond just empowerment rights for the robustness 
checks.  The dependent variable in the fourth chapter is derived from the CIRI dataset's Empowerment 
Rights index, an additive index including scores on freedom of assembly and association, freedom of 
foreign movement, freedom of domestic movement, freedom of speech, electoral self-determination, 
freedom of religion and workers' rights.  It is trichotomous, with a rating of -1 indicating that the state's 
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respect for civil and political rights has decreased in the past year, a rating of 1 indicating the state's 
respect has increased over the course of the year, and a 0 indicating no change. 
Hypothesis 2 says that states are more likely to commit human rights violations when they 
expect their peers to do so as well.  In order to get at the first hypothesis, it will be necessary to use the 
CIRI dataset to determine whether the potential for coordination of violations in the international 
system affects potential violators' decision-making processes. We must determine whether states' 
decisions to violate are actually influenced by who is violating.  In order to do this, I will include a 
variable identifying the percentage of the state's peers that are committing human rights violations to a 
lesser degree than them for the previous year by counting the number of the state's peers receiving a 
higher score on the Empowerment Rights Index for the year in question and dividing that number by 
their total number of peers.  As discussed above, I employ two different measurements of the concept 
of ``peer groups'' amongst states. 
The first measure employed in the analysis to denote ``peer groups'' is a regional one.  I use the 
same regional classification as the United Nations, which divides states into both regions and 
subregions.  In order to achieve the highest possible level of measurement validity, I code states using 
the subregion classification system.  The UN divides states into twenty-one subregions.  The region of 
Asia is divided into Southcentral Asia, Southeast Asia, Western Asia, and Eastern Asia.  The region of 
Europe is divided into Southern Europe, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Northern Europe.  Africa 
is divided into Northern Africa, Middle Africa, Southern Africa, East Africa, and Western Africa. Latin 
America and the Caribbean are divided into the Caribbean, South America, and Central America with 
Mexico included in the Central American region. North America is both its own region and subregion.  
Oceania includes Micronesia, Melonesia, Polynesia, and Australia and New Zealand.  Once states are 
coded into subregional groups, the measurement begins to resemble that created for the policy ``peer 
group'' measure that is discussed below.  I first created a count variable of the number of other states in 
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the region that showed a higher level of respect of empowerment rights than the state in question and 
divided that number by the total number of states in the subregion.  Thus, I end up with a variable that 
denotes the percentage of states in a given state's region that are showing a higher level of respect for 
empowerment rights than the state in question. 
The second measure of ``peer groups'' is derived from Gartzke and Jo’s (2002) spatial measure 
of foreign policy similarity, which measures how close states are to one another with regard to their 
foreign policy portfolios by comparing vectors made up of observed policy choices using S values as 
conceived of by Signorino and Ritter’s (1999).  The values for this index range from -1 (least similar 
interests) to 1 (most similar interests).  I use a threshold of .75 and above as it indicates that the two 
states' choose similar policies at least 75% of the time, leaving less need to question whether the 
similarity truly makes the two states ``peers''.  The Gartzke and Jo (2002) data exists only up to 2000, 
which puts additional constraints on the sample above those set by the CIRI dataset.  Thus, my sample 
will analyze cases over the date range of 1981 to 2000.  I expect a positive relationship between this 
variable and the dependent variable, due to the fact that a high score on the dependent variable 
indicates that the state has increased their level of respect for empowerment rights in the past year and 
high score on the coordination measure indicates that a smaller percent of the state's peers are 
committing violations. 
I employ both the regional coordination measure and the policy coordination measure in two 
separate models in the following section in order to illustrate which type of coordination better predicts 
changes in a state's behavior where respect for civil and political rights is concerned.  For both of these 
coordination measures, I expect to see a positive relationship between them and the dependent 
variable as increases in both measures denote an increase in the percentage of a states' peers that are 
engaged in behavior that constitutes a higher level of respect for empowerment rights than the state in 
question.  Higher levels of coordinated respect for human rights in a state's peers, according to the 
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hypothesis should lead the state in question to follow the example and engage in better human rights 
practices themselves. 
Hypothesis 4 projects that states are more likely to commit human rights violations when the 
probability of the punishment is low.  In order to measure states' domestic capabilities to punish, I 
propose the use of an index including a measure of judicial independence found in the CIRI dataset and 
a measure of oppositional group cohesion found in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Gurr, 1993).  
CIRI's judicial independence measure is trichotomous, ranging from 0 to 2 with a zero indicating that 
judiciary is not at all independent, a one indicating that it is partially independent, and a two indicating 
that the judiciary is generally independent.  In order to arrive at the measure for the punishment index, I 
subtract the judicial independence measure to the oppositional group cohesion measure found in the 
MAR dataset. 
The oppositional group cohesion measure ranges from 0 to 5, with a measure of zero indicating 
that no political movements or organizations representing group interests are reported.  A measure of 
one is assigned when group interests are promoted by umbrella organizations (parties, unions, etc.) that 
also represent other collective interests.  A measure of two is assigned when group interests are 
promoted by one or more conventional political movements or parties that are supported mainly or 
entirely by the group in question.  A three indicates that group interests are promoted by both 
conventional political movements and parties and militant organizations.  A rating of four is assigned if 
the ratio of support between conventional and militant sources is tipped further in the direction of 
militant organizations than towards conventional organizations.  A measure of five is assigned if the 
group's interests are promoted exclusively by militant organizations.  Thus, the punishment index ranges 
from -5 to 2.  Here, I expect a positive relationship between the punishment measure and the 
dependent variable, due to the fact that a high score on the punishment variable indicates a greater 
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domestic capability for punishment and a high score on the dependent variable indicates that the state 
has increased their respect for empowerment rights. 
Subtracting the oppositional group cohesion measure from the judicial independence measure 
yields a score that is highest when the state has a high degree of judicial independence and is dealing 
with unorganized opposition groups.  It is lowest when the oppositional groups are highly organized and 
the judiciary is not independent.  The logic for measuring the probability of punishment in this manner is 
simple.  A state with a highly organized, militant oppositional group is unlikely to police its own bad 
behavior. It is likely to police any bad behavior on the part of the opposition group.  Thus, even a state 
with a high level of judicial independence is unlikely to punish itself for human rights violations because 
suffering those punishments would make it worse off relative to the opposition group.  A state with low 
judicial independence and no opposition group does not have to worry about relative losses if it receives 
punishment for human rights violations, but it does lose something by being punished, so it is better off 
than the state with the highly organized opposition group but worse off that a state that has both no 
opposition groups in terms of the likelihood that it will successfully punish human rights violations.  
States with high levels of judicial independence and no oppositional groups to worry about are most 
likely to successfully punish human rights violations because doing so would facilitate their continued 
status as a state with no oppositional groups because of their good record with dispensing justice when 
human rights violations do occur.  Because these opposition groups, however highly organized, have no 
legal and/or legitimate means of punishing human rights violations (or anything else, for that matter), 
their existence and level of organization would not facilitate punishment.  Any punishment at the hands 
of oppositional groups would constitute a human rights violation in itself. 
Controls 
In addition to testing Hypotheses 2 and 4, it will be important to introduce a few control 
variables into the analysis.  First, I include a measure of regime type, by employing the Polity IV data 
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collected under the direction of Monty G. Marshall.  Lower scores (-10 to 0) indicate that the state is 
classified as being more autocratic, while higher scores (0 to 10) indicate that the state is considered to 
be more democratic.  Here, I expect a positive relationship indicating that more democratic states tend 
to better protect their citizens' human rights, although it should be noted that some have found 
anocracies (states falling in the range of (-5 to 5) tend to have a greater respect for human rights due to 
their need to add legitimacy to new regimes (Fox and Sandler, 2003). 
Second, I include a control measure of per capitized GDP in constant US dollars, collected by the 
World Bank, due to the fact that poverty can underscore distributional conflicts at the domestic level. I 
expect the relationship between GDP per capita and the dependent variable to be positive, indicating 
that increased income should be associated with increased respect for citizens' empowerment rights.  
Finally, population density (per kilometer), collected by the World Bank, has been found to exacerbate 
problems associated with resource scarcity, increasing the likelihood for human rights violations (Poe 
and Tate, 1994).  Thus, the relationship between population density and the dependent variable should 
be negative due to the fact that higher population density would mean that the struggle for resources is 
more pronounced and a lower level of respect for empowerment rights would be expected. 
In chapter four, I estimate the models using an ordered logit regression.  Again, because it is not 
appropriate to control for autocorrelation through the use of a lagged dependent variable, I include a 
dummy variable for each value of the dependent variable indicating states' human rights practices for 
the past year in this model is a way to address the problem of autocorrelation.  Below is the regression 
equation for chapter four, followed by Table 1, which include the descriptive statistics for the 
independent and dependent variables in Chapter 4. 
VIOLATEit = β1COORDINATIONit-1 + β2PUNISHit-1 + β3LOGPOPULATIONDENSITYit-1 + β4LOGGDPPCit-1 
+ β5REGIMETYPEit-1 + β6VIOLATE(-1)it-1+ β7VIOLATE(1)it-1 
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Analyzing the Distribution of the Key Variables 
Variables  Minimum  Mean  Maximum 
Change in Respect for Empowerment Rights  -1   .205   1 
Policy Coordination  0   .280   1 
Regional Coordination  0   .112   .830 
Punishment  -5   .775   2 
Population  .095   3.998   9.702 
GDPpc  4.506   7.616   11.668 
Regime Type  -10   1.780   10 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables, 1981-2000 
Looking at Table 4.1, it is important to note that the average for both of the coordination 
measures is skewed toward the lower end of their distribution, meaning that states tend to observe 
fewer than 50% of their peers who are doing a better job of respecting empowerment rights than they 
are.  Furthermore, the punishment variable is skewed in the opposite direction, toward the higher end 
of its distribution, meaning that there is a high possibility for punishment at the domestic level in a 
majority of the cases included in the analysis.  The distribution of these two independent variables will 
be important to keep in mind when looking at the regression estimates as well as the predicted 
probabilities which are reported below. 
Table 4.1 also provides the distribution of the dependent variable over time.  The distribution of 
the dependent variable shows that states are slightly more likely to increase their respect for 
empowerment rights than they are to decrease their level of respect for these rights.  This is a trend that 
warrants hopefulness that fewer states are egregiously committing violations against citizens' 
empowerment rights over time.  Fortunately, the mean here reflects that the dependent variable does 
not seem to be highly skewed in one direction or another. 
Because the punishment variable is skewed to the higher end of its range and the expected 
relationship between it and the dependent variable is positive, we can expect more reliability in the 
predicted probabilities for higher levels of the dependent variable than at the lower end.  A higher 
probability of punishment should lead states to be more likely to increase their respect for 
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empowerment rights over time.   While the dependent variable is rather equally distributed, there are a 
greater number of cases that fit into the high categories of the punishment variable.  This means that it 
is at this end of the punishment variable's distribution that we will need to look in order to determine 
the extent to which the relationship exists. 
The relationship between the coordination variable(s) and the dependent variable will also be 
affected.  Although the dependent variable is significantly less skewed than either of the coordination 
variables, the skewness of the coordination variables will bias the strength of the relationship 
downward.  The posited relationship between the coordination variable and the dependent variable is 
positive, meaning that higher levels of coordinated respect for empowerment rights should result in 
changes toward higher respect for citizens' empowerment rights.  Since fewer states have a positive 
coordinated influence coming from either their regional or policy-based peer groups, we expect more 
reliable predictions to be made by these lower values of the coordination variable.  Thus, we expect the 
coordination variable to do a better job of predicting lower levels of the dependent variable than for the 
higher levels of the dependent variable. 
RESULTS 
Table 4.2 reports the ordered logit estimates for the Chapter 4 regression equation. The 
estimates support both of the hypotheses for this chapter.  First, the estimate for the regional 
coordination measure is highly significant and illustrates that states base decisions about today's human 
rights violations on yesterday's human rights behavior of their peers.  Second, the punishment estimate 
is also significant and positively correlated with the dependent variable, meaning that as the likelihood 
for domestic punishment increases, the likelihood of more severe human rights violations also increases.  
Another notable effect that emerges from the model is the lack of significance for the GDP per capita 
and population density control variables, which illustrate that when states see that there is safety in 
numbers from international punishment, a lack of apparent distributional conflict may not decrease (or 
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increase) the likelihood that they will decrease their level of respect for civil and/or political rights.  The 
regime type control variable is appropriately signed and significant, as expected. 
Variables   Estimates1   Standard Errors 
Coordination   1.419***2   0.24 
Punishment   0.064**   0.03 
Regime Type   0.018**   0.01 
GDPpc   -0.027   0.03 
Population Density   -0.014   0.03 
LagPR(Y=-1)   0.874***   0.11 
 LagPR(Y=1)    0.289***   0.11  
X2  = 116.99***   Log Likelihood = -2363.01   N = 2268 
1Note: All estimates are ordered logit, unless otherwise specified.  The numbers in parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors. 
2*** p≤.001; ** p≤.05; * p≤.10 
Table 4.2:  Effects of Regionally Coordinated Action on Empowerment Rights, 1981-2000 
Due to the difficulty in taking away meaningful conclusions when looking at the log odds 
estimates provided within ordered logit regressions, I provide line graphs in order to display the 
relationship between the independent variables of interest in the analysis and the predicted 
probabilities for each value of the dependent variable.  Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 illustrate the 
relationship between the regional measure for coordination and the predicted probability that an 
observation will fall into each category of the dependent variable.  Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 depict the 
same relationship using the punishment measure in place of the regional coordination measure. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates a clear downward trend in the number of cases that decrease the level of 
respect that they show for empowerment rights as the number of their peers who exhibit higher levels 
of respect than they did in the previous year increases.  This shows strong support for Hypothesis 2, 
which predicts that states will not lower their level of respect for human rights unless their peers are 
also doing so.  It is also important to note that because there are fewer cases of coordination rates 
above 50%, the 95% confidence interval gets marginally wider for these values.  However, even at their 
widest points, the confidence intervals are no higher than plus or minus 0.05, indicating that the 
predicted values should evoke a fairly high level of confidence in the ability of the regional coordination 
model to make predictions about human rights behavior. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg and 
King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.1: Coordinating Decreased Respect in the Regional Model 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.2: Coordinating Unchanged Respect in the Regional Model 
Figure 4.2 shows a fairly flat line, with a difference of only 0.07 between the highest and lowest 
points in the line.  Again, this is what we expect to see here, based on the prediction make by 
Hypothesis 2.  States that make no changes to their level of respect for human rights are unlikely to be 
states with a high percentage of their peers showing a higher or lower level of respect for human rights 
than they are.  In other words, we expect this line to be relatively flat because states that make no 
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change are likely to stay the same because their peers were engaging in human rights behavior that was 
similar to their own.  It is important to remember that the dependent variable measures a change in 
behavior and not the level of respect for human rights.  Thus, those states that have received a 0 on the 
dependent variable show very diverse levels of respect for empowerment rights. 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.3: Coordinating Increased Respect in the Regional Model 
Figure 4.3 shows the upward trend between the regional coordination variable and the 
probability that states will increase their level of respect for empowerment rights.  Again, we see 
evidence of the validity of Hypothesis 2 here.  Based on the predictions from the model presented in 
Chapter 3, we expect to see an increase in the number of states that improve their respect for 
empowerment rights as the number of their peers showing a higher level of respect increases.  Figures 
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show that states tend to emulate the behavior of their regional peers when it comes to 
their respect for empowerment rights.  These figures also show that the relationship between the 
regional coordination variable and states' behavioral changes is a strong one. 
Where the punishment variable is concerned in the regional coordination model, Figures 4.4, 
4.5, and 4.6 illustrate support for the second hypothesis.  Figure 4.4 illustrates that the probability that 
states will show a decreased level of respect for empowerment rights, PR(Y=-1), is lower when the 
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probability of punishment is high.  It is important to note that the confidence interval is larger for the 
lower range of the punishment variable due to the fact that there are a smaller number of cases that fall 
into the lower range than at the higher range.  It is also possible to discern from this graph that the 
punishment variable seemingly has a smaller effect on the dependent variable than does the regional 
cooperation variable. 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.4: The Effect of Punishment on Decreased Respect in the Regional Model 
Figure 4.5 shows the ability of the punishment variable to predict the probability that states will 
maintain their level of respect for empowerment rights from one year to the next. Here, the graph 
depicts a nearly flat line, which is expected.  We would expect that a change in the probability that 
domestic punishment will occur would result in a change in the probability that states will alter their 
level of respect for empowerment rights.  Thus, when states maintain a fairly constant level of respect 
over time, we would expect that this is, in part, due to a fairly constant probability for domestic 
punishment. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.5: The Effect of Punishment on Unchanged Respect in the Regional Model 
Figure 4.6 illustrates that the probability that states will increase their level of respect for 
empowerment rights, PR(Y=1), is higher when the probability of punishment is also high.  As was the 
case with Figure 4.4, we can see that the slope of the line is rather small, indicating that one unit 
increase in the probability of domestic punishment does not lead to a large increase in the probability 
that a state's respect for empowerment rights will also increase.  However, the positive effect is 
discernible, and this lends credence to Hypothesis 4.  Here, again, we see a wider margin in the 
confidence interval in the lower range of the punishment variable due to the smaller number of cases 
that fall into this range.  However, the margin of the confidence interval tightens as the magnitude of 
the punishment variable increases. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.6: The Effects of Punishment on Increased Respect in the Regional Model 
Table 4.3 reports the ordered logistic regression results for a model that is exactly similar to the 
model presented in Table 4.2 with one exception.  The model estimates in Table 4.3 illustrate the 
estimates derived when the policy coordination measure is used in place of the regional coordination 
measure.  There are a few noticeable differences between the estimates presented here and those 
presented in Table 4.2.  First, while the policy coordination variable is still highly significant and 
appropriately signed, the standard error is lower here and magnitude of the coefficient has increased.  
Another important difference, this time associated with the estimate for the punishment variable, is 
that the magnitude of the coefficient has decreased along with the level of significance associated with 
the prediction, while the standard error remains the same.  The final difference between this model and 
the previous one deals with the controls.  Here, the regime type estimate decreases in magnitude and 
significance from the estimates provided in Table 4.2, while the GDP per capita measure gains 
significance.  The population density measure remains insignificant to the model here.  One possible 
explanation for the differences in the effects of the control variables in the two models is that GDP per 
capita may be subject to some level of spatial autocorrelation, rendering it collinear with the regional 
coordination measure used in the model present in Table 4.2.  The variation in the estimates for the 
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regime type variable between the two models may be due to some level of multicollinearity with the 
policy coordination variable - states with similar regime types may be likely to also engage in similar 
types of policy pursuits. 
Variables   Estimates1   Standard Errors 
Coordination   1.719***2   0.18 
Punishment   0.053*   0.03 
Regime Type   0.012*   0.01 
GDPpc   -0.075**   0.03 
Population Density   0.022   0.03 
X2= $182.38***    Log Likelihood = -2244.47   N = 2189 
1Note: All estimates are ordered logit, unless otherwise specified. The numbers in parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors. 
2*** p≤.001; ** p≤.05; * p≤.10 
Table 4.3: Effects of Policy-based Coordinated Action on Empowerment Rights, 1981-2000 
 
As for the previous model, I provide line graphs that illustrate the relationships between the 
dependent variable and the policy coordination and punishment variables, respectively.  Figures 4.7, 4.8, 
and 4.9 illustrate the relationship between the policy coordination variable and each value of the 
dependent variable.  Figures  4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 show the relationship between the domestic 
punishment variables and each value of the dependent variables.  All other variables are held at their 
means and CLARIFY was used to generate the predicted probabilities depicted in the graphs (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).   I describe the implications of each 
below. 
Figure 4.7 shows that the probability that a state will decrease their level of respect for 
empowerment rights, PR(Y=-1), is higher at the lower levels of the coordination measure.  This provides 
support for the hypothesized positive relationship between the policy coordination variable and the 
dependent variable.  Further, we see that the slope of the line here is quite large, indicating that the 
relationship is a strong one.  Additionally, because the margin of the confidence interval is quite small, it 
indicates that the relationship depicted here is a reliable one. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.7: Coordinating Decreased Respect for the Policy Model 
Figure 4.8 shows a line that is slightly parabolic in shape, indicating that the states that fall into 
the middle range of the policy coordination variable are those most likely not to make changes to the 
level of respect that they show for empowerment rights.  Intuitively, this is what we expect to see for 
this value of the dependent variable based on the prediction made by the first hypothesis.  States that 
observe a very high or very low percentage of their peers behaving better than them should be making 
changes to their own behavior, whereas those that see a mixed behavior from their peer group may be 
more likely to base their decision on how to behave on some other type of information because the 
influence of their peers is unclear.  This may be a situation where states look below the level of the peer 
group to try to emulate the behavior of specific peers - perhaps their most powerful peers. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.8: Coordinating Unchanged Respect in the Policy Model 
Figure 4.9 provides further support for Hypothesis 2 for the policy coordination measure, 
illustrating that an increase in the probability of respect for empowerment rights, PR(Y=1), becomes 
more likely as the number of a state's peers that have comparably higher levels of respect for 
empowerment rights increases.  Once again, we observe a steep slope indicating that there is a strong 
relationship between policy coordination and states' decisions to improve their respect for 
empowerment rights.  Here, the confidence interval expands for higher values of the policy coordination 
variable, again, likely due to the fact that fewer observations fall into these values.  However, the 
increased margin for the confidence intervals for these higher values of the policy coordination variable 
is not cause for concern about the reliability of the estimates. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.9: Coordinating Increased Respect for the Policy Model 
The hypothesized positive relationship between the probability of punishment and the change 
towards increased respect for empowerment rights is supported in Figure 4.10 as well.   The figure 
illustrates that when the probability of punishment is low, we see a higher likelihood that states will 
show decreased levels of respect for empowerment rights, PR(Y=-1).  This illustrates that those subject 
to domestically-based punishment for their human rights violations are more likely to abstain from 
violations than those that are likely to get away with such behavior domestically.  As with the figures 
illustrating the relationship between punishment and the dependent variable for the regional 
cooperation model, we see that the confidence interval is wider for lower levels of the punishment 
variable due to the fact that fewer cases fall into this part of the variable's range. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.40: The Effect of Punishment on Increased Respect in the Policy Model 
Figure 4.11 shows that the slope illustrating the relationship between the punishment variable 
and the probability that a state will not change its respect for empowerment rights is rather low.  The 
confidence interval here is tight indicating that the relationship depicted is quite reliable.  We expect a 
low slope for this relationship for the same reasons that were explained for Figure 4.5.  States that do 
not change their level of respect for empowerment rights are unlikely to have experienced much change 
in the probability of domestic punishment.  If they had, Figures 4.10 and 4.12 illustrate that they would 
have changed their level of respect. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.51: The Effect of Punishment on Unchanged Respect in the Policy Model 
In Figure 4.12 we see that when the probability of punishment is high, the probability that states 
will increase their respect for empowerment rights, PR(Y=1) is also higher.  As was the case in Figure 6, 
we see that while the magnitude of the slope is low, there is a distinct upward trend.  This trend is 
especially apparent for the upper values of the punishment variable.  The confidence interval, again, is 
wider for lower values of the punishment variable and smaller for the higher values.  Thus, we can 
conclude with confidence that a positive relationship exists between the probability of domestic 
punishment and changes towards higher levels of respect for empowerment rights even if the 
magnitude of the relationship is rather small. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 4.6: The Effect of Punishment on Decreased Respect in the Policy Model 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
It is important to consider the robustness of the results by determining whether the effects hold 
for other types of human rights violations.  Thus, I look at the effects of the same set of independent 
variables against two additional human rights measures: women's rights and physical integrity rights.  
Both measures come from the CIRI dataset and cover the same years that the Empowerment Rights 
Index covers.  These robustness checks illustrate whether the effects of the two variables of interest 
here, coordination and the probability of punishment, are consistent across different types of human 
rights practices.  They further serve the purpose of illustrating whether the regional or policy 
coordination variable might be a more reliable measure of coordination based on one measure's ability 
to make better predictions for more types of human rights practices than the other. 
Women's Rights 
For the first robustness check, I have created an index of the three women's rights indicators 
included in the CIRI dataset, including women's economic rights, women's social rights, and women's 
political rights.  The economic rights indicator takes into consideration women's abilities to choose 
where and when they will work, to gain equal pay for their work, job security, and other related factors.  
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The women's social rights included range from the freedom from such practices as sterilization and 
genital mutilation to certain freedoms expected when entering into marriage and the right to education.  
Women's political rights taken into consideration in the index include their right to vote in elections, run 
for office, hold office for elected or appointed positions, join political parties, and petition government 
officials.  Each of the three indicators ranges from 0 to 3 with a score of 0 indicating that the rights were 
not guaranteed by law in the given year, a score of 1 meaning that the rights were guaranteed in law but 
not in practice, a score of 2 illustrating that the rights were guaranteed in law and moderately 
prohibited in practice, and a score of 3 indicating that the rights were guaranteed in law and practice.  
As with the empowerment rights models above, I employ a trichotomous dependent variable that 
measures change, with a -1 indicating a decrease in respect for women's rights from the previous year, a 
1 indicating an increase in respect shown, and a 0 indicating no change from the previous year. 
The two coordination measures used here are calculated in exactly the same way as those used 
for the empowerment rights models above.  I created a count variable of all of a given state's regional 
and policy peers who received higher scores than it did on the women's rights index in the previous year 
and divided that number by the total number of peers for that state in the given year, yielding 
percentages of both the state's regional and policy peers who showed a higher level of respect for all 
types of women's rights that it did in the year prior.  Table 4.4 provides the estimates for the first 
robustness check model, which employs the regional coordination variable.  Table 4.5 illustrates the 
estimates associated with the second step of this first robustness check by showing the estimates 
associated with the use of the policy coordination variable. 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
Variables Estimates1 Standard Errors 
Coordination 1.916***2 0.29 
Punishment 0.064** 0.04 
Regime Type 0.005 0.01 
GDPpc 0.035 0.03 
Population Density 0.001 0.03 
X2 = 236.06*** Log Likelihood = -1884.91 N = 2268 
1Note: All estimates are ordered logit, unless otherwise specified.  The numbers in parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors. 
2*** p≤.001; ** p≤.05; * p≤.10 
Table 4.4: Effects of Regionally Coordinated Action on Women's Rights, 1981-2000 
When comparing the results for the women's rights models in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 with the 
estimates for the empowerment rights in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, we notice that the estimates for both the 
regional and policy coordination measures are highly significant and appropriately signed.  Additionally, 
the punishment variable is appropriately signed and significant, although more highly in the regional 
coordination model than in the policy-based coordination model.  Neither model showcases statistically 
significant estimates for the regime type, GDP per capita, or population density variables.  The 
magnitudes of the effects for the both the coordination measures are higher here than they were for 
the respective empowerment index models.  The magnitude for the punishment estimates are virtually 
the same here as they were in the empowerment index models.  Why might this be the case? 
Variables Estimates1 Standard Errors 
Coordination 2.017***2 0.18 
Punishment 0.055* 0.04 
Regime Type 0.009 0.01 
GDPpc 0.033 0.04 
Population Density -0.036 0.03 
X2 = 316.80*** Log Likelihood = -1773.80 N = 2189 
1Note: All estimates are ordered logit, unless otherwise specified. The numbers in parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors. 
2*** p≤.001; ** p≤.05; * p≤.10 
Table 4.5: Effects of Policy-based Coordinated Action on Women's Rights, 1981-2000 
Historically, we have seen that respect for women's rights has been slower to catch on than 
have empowerment rights due to what some point to as being an inherent historical and traditional bias 
against the exercise of rights by women and girls in favor of men and boys.  Women in much of the 
world did not achieve the right of suffrage until the middle of the 20th century.  Furthermore, while the 
spread of the democratic culture has led to a higher base level of respect for empowerment rights, the 
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spread of respect for women's rights has been less even with some democracies taking longer to move 
away from endorsing the practice of freedoms being afforded to males while being openly restricted to 
women.  This also plays out in terms of some cultural understandings of the differences that exist 
between the genders in terms of their capabilities, with parents in countries such as India and China 
valuing male children over female children because of the economic benefits associated with their 
ability to work outside of the home or, at least, the fact that there are fewer economic costs (such as a 
dowry) associated with male children.  Thus, it seems likely that the spike in the magnitude of the 
relationship between the two coordination variables and the level of respect for women's rights over 
that between the coordination variables and the level of respect for empowerment rights may likely be 
caused by the incomplete spread of cultural understandings of women being equal to men across both 
regional and policy peers. 
Physical Integrity Rights 
The second robustness check uses CIRI's Physical Integrity Rights Index which is an additive 
index constructed from the individual measures of incidents of disappearance, extrajudicial killing, 
political imprisonment, and torture, each of which are scored on the same 0 to 2 scale as those included 
in the Empowerment Rights Index. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 
(full government respect for these four rights).  As with the previous models, I use a dependent variable 
that measures changes in individual states' level of respect for these rights that ranges from -1 to 1.  
Further, I employ two coordination measures which depict the percentage of a state's regional and 
policy peers with a higher score than them in previous year for their respect for physical integrity rights. 
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Variables Estimates1 Standard Errors 
Coordination 2.584***2 0.24 
Punishment -0.037 0.03 
Regime Type 0.007 0.01 
GDPpc 0.041 0.03 
Population Density -0.030 0.03 
X2 = 370.03*** Log Likelihood = -2300.83 N = 2268 
1Note: All estimates are ordered logit, unless otherwise specified.  The numbers in parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors. 
2*** p≤.001; ** p≤.05; * p≤.10 
Table 4.6: Effects of Regionally Coordinated Action on Physical Integrity Rights, 1981-2000 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show that here, again, the coordination measures are appropriately signed 
and statistically significant, illustrating that for all three types of human rights in the analysis, states take 
into consideration the behavior of their peers when making decisions about the level of respect for 
human rights that they will show.  The physical integrity rights models illustrate yet another jump in the 
magnitude of the estimates for both the regional and policy coordination variables over those provided 
for either the empowerment rights or women's rights models.  Unlike the other models in the analysis, 
the estimate for the punishment variable is not statistically significant in the physical integrity rights 
models. 
Variables Estimates1 Standard Errors 
Coordination 2.300***2 0.16 
Punishment -0.020 0.03 
Regime Type 0.017** 0.01 
GDPpc 0.098** 0.03 
Population Density -0.070** 0.03 
X2 = 476.99*** Log Likelihood = -2161.73 N = 2189 
1Note: All estimates are ordered logit, unless otherwise specified. The numbers in parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors. 
2*** p≤.001; ** p≤.05; * p≤.10 
Table 4.7: Effects of Policy-based Coordinated Action on Physical Integrity Rights, 1981-2000 
One noticeable difference between the two models presented for physical integrity rights and 
those provided for either empowerment or women's rights is that, for the physical integrity rights 
models only, the magnitude of the regional coordination estimate is larger than the policy coordination 
estimate.  Why would regional coordination have a greater effect than policy-based coordination on 
states' respect for physical integrity rights but a lesser effect than policy-based coordination on states' 
respect for empowerment and women's rights?  The answer here is likely related to the key differences 
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between physical integrity rights on the one hand and women's and empowerment rights on the other 
hand. 
States that are ``policy peers'' may share cultural characteristics based on region or they may 
share cultural characteristics that they have gained through international interactions.  Globalization 
has, in many ways, become the great equalizer of states because of the homogeneity that it has brought 
to the international community where cultural traits are concerned, causing some to backlash against 
the loss of their civilization's unique cultural identity (Barber, 1996). Furthermore, Huntington (2011) 
has argued that the rise in population and global economic strength of some regions or civilizations vis-
à-vis the West had led many to backlash against Western conceptions of what behavior in realms like 
human rights should look like.  The results above seem to indicate that Huntington's (2011) argument 
better describes behavior relating to physical integrity rights, while perhaps Barber's (1996) explanation 
better fits empowerment and women's rights. 
Physical integrity rights, the rights to be protected from political imprisonment, killing, torture, 
and disappearance, seem to be rights that are fairly basic.  Regardless of variation in cultures, these 
types of behavior seem to be generally considered wrong.  This is less so the case where women's and 
empowerment rights are concerned.  Thus, it would seem more likely that a regional coordination 
variable would do better at explaining women's and empowerment rights practices than it would at 
explaining states' practices where physical integrity rights are concerned.  However, this is not the case 
in the models presented above.  My results seem to indicate that Barber’s (1996) argument is, generally, 
more accurate.  That is, backlash against Western cultural dominance is based less in whole civilizations 
than it is spread across civilizations, affecting individuals and small groups rather than civilizations as a 
whole. Whether this variation can be explained by economic class or the level of individuals' integration 
into the global economy is uncertain.  However, it seems likely that those who show a higher level of 
respect for empowerment and women's rights do so because those practices fit into their larger policy 
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agenda.  Those who choose to violate physical integrity rights do so in an effort to preserve a domestic 
policy agenda that is at odds with international norms.  This behavior is regionally-based likely due more 
to colonial legacy than anything else.  Colonial legacy fails to determine behavior with regard to 
empowerment and women's rights because those who show respect for these rights are as likely to be 
the originators of these practices as they are to be those who inherited these domestic institutional 
practices from their colonizers. 
This same logic can be used to explain why the punishment variable is statistically insignificant in 
the physical integrity models and not elsewhere.  When states choose to commit egregious human 
rights violations by engaging in practices such as torture, it is likely due to an utter disregard for the 
importance of upholding human rights.  Alternatively, it is not as easy to conclude that when states 
choose to break international law where women's or empowerment rights are concerned, they are 
trying to interrupt the world order.  A decision to kill, torture, imprison, and/or disappear individuals 
illustrates a rampant disrespect for human life more so than a decision to extend voting rights to men 
and not women.  While choosing to deny suffrage rights to a particular subset of the population 
illustrates a lack of respect for a certain source of opinion, it does not represent a lack of respect for that 
subset of the population's right to live.  Those who show an utter disregard for human life are unlikely to 
be affected much by the prospect of domestic punishment, especially when compared to those who 
have chosen a less extreme form of human rights abuse. 
Implications for Measuring Coordination 
Looking at the results presented in the robustness checks vis-à-vis those in the initial two 
models, we see that no clear winner emerges, leaving us inconclusive with regard to the issue of how to 
best measure the concept of coordination.  Compounding this uncertainty, Table 4.8 illustrates the 
relationship between these two types of coordination measures with regard to each of the types of 
human rights practices discussed here.  We see that the degree of correlation between the measures is 
96 
 
roughly similar across the three human rights areas, giving neither measurement approach a discernible 
edge.  
 
Empowerment 
Policy 
Women's 
Policy 
Physical Integrity 
Policy 
Empowerment Regional .662   
Women's Regional  .530  
Physical Integrity Regional   .603 
Table 4.8: Correlation Across Coordination Measures, 1981-2000 
Because of the lack of clarity that emerges from the whole of the effort produced in this 
chapter, I propose that both the regional and policy-based measures of peer groups are relevant to 
states' decision-making processes about human rights behavior.  The results here suggest both 
conceptions of peers can be used to create measures of coordination that explain changes in states' 
adherence to various types of human rights treaties.  It must be noted that both forms of the 
coordination measure are statistically significant and have a large effect on human rights behavior in all 
of the models presented here.  Thus, regardless of one's choice, coordinated efforts seem to be an 
important indicator of human rights behavior.  So much so, that the inclusion of a coordination measure, 
in many cases, renders commonly-used variables like population density, GDP per capita, and regime 
type, insignificant in their ability to explain the behavior of interest. 
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION VS. DOMESTIC PUNISHMENT 
The two conceptions for the measurement of coordination seem to work equally well at 
predicting changes to states' human rights behavior, so much so that they render commonly-used 
variables insignificant in the models above.  Scholars attempting to explain states' adherence to various 
human rights treaties have long made the argument that the potential for internationally-based 
punishment has little effect on state behavior due to the enforcement issues that arise with all types of 
international organizations (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996; Grieco, 1988; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 
2005; Hafner-Burton, 2005; Mearsheimer, 1994/5}.  Substantiating the claims that domestic punishment 
can take the place of international punishment mechanisms in deterring human rights violations, the 
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domestic punishment measure included here is consistently significant in all of the models even while 
factors such as population density, GDP per capita, and regime types are not.  Thus, it seems to be the 
case that while previous work has not overlooked the role that domestic avenues for punishment can 
play in changing states' human rights practices, it has overlooked the role that coordination can play.  
Thus, we are left to discern which matters more - coordination or the probability of domestic 
punishment - when it comes to explaining changes in states' behavior. 
Figures 4.1 through 4.12 in the results section illustrate that for both the regional and policy 
coordination models, coordination has a larger effect on states' decision to change their human rights 
behaviors than does the probability for domestic punishment.  However, due to large differences in the 
ranges of these two variables, it is difficult to decisively determine by looking at these graphs whether 
the degree of difference in the effects is significant or not.  Below, I present both the percentage change 
in the odds for one unit increase in both the policy coordination variable and the punishment variable in 
Table 4.9.  Because the range of the policy coordination and punishment variables are so different, it is 
difficult to compare the effects of one unit increase in each of these variables.  The coordination variable 
only ranges from 0 to 1 and the punishment variable ranges from -5 to 2.  Thus, the easiest way to 
determine which variable has a larger effect is to compare the percentage change in odds for an 
increase of one standard deviation in each of the variables.  The standardized coefficients are presented 
on the first line and the unstandardized coefficients are presented on the lower lines.  I present both 
sets of statistics for each of the three types of human rights discussed in this chapter: empowerment 
rights, women's rights, and physical integrity rights. 
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Type of Human Rights Policy Coordination Punishment 
Empowerment 
Rights 
51.7 
(457.8) 
7.2 
(5.5) 
Women's 
Rights 
68.1 
(651.9) 
7.5 
(5.7) 
Physical Integrity 
Rights 
96.7 
(897.1) 
-2.6 
(-2.0) 
Note: The first number in each cell is the standardized coefficient.  The numbers in parentheses are the unstandardized coefficients. 
Table 4.9: Coordination versus Punishment, 1981-2000 
The coefficients presented in Table 9 provide strong support for Hypothesis 1 from Chapter 3, 
indicating that coordination has a larger effect on states' behavior than does punishment.  This 
illustrates that in the face of punishment, states choose to coordinate their behavior in an effort to 
minimize the possibility of punishment.  For each of the three types of human rights covered in this 
chapter, as the number of a state's peers that have comparably better human rights records increases 
by one standard deviation, the state's own human rights practices get significantly better.  Where 
empowerment rights practices are concerned, an increase of one standard deviation in coordinated 
respect for these rights leads to a larger than 50% increase in the odds that the state will also improve 
and the rate of percentage increase in the odds just go up from there.  Where the domestic punishment 
variable is concerned, the percentage increase in the odds that states will show greater respect for 
human rights is significantly lower in magnitude than it is for the coordination variable in any of the 
instances reported here.  Furthermore, for the physical integrity rights model, we find that an increased 
probability of domestic punishment actually results in a marginal decrease in the level of respect that 
the states show for physical integrity rights. 
We see from Table 4.9 that the most important factor for predicting increased respect for 
human rights in each of the models presented in this chapter is the percentage of peers that show a 
higher respect for the rights in question. This is not to say that punishment is not an important predictor 
of human rights behavior, but Table 4.9 illustrates that it is less important than the coordination 
measure.  Thus, we can likely conclude that the conception of states' decision-making process described 
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in Chapters 2 and 3 is accurate.  States consider a decreased likelihood of domestic punishment to be a 
gateway for committing human rights violations, but this low probability is not a sufficient condition for 
violations.  In order for violations to occur, states must be able to assess that the likelihood for domestic 
punishment is low and that their peers are also violating human rights before they will commit 
themselves to engaging in such behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of this analysis are novel in that they bring about a new way of thinking about how 
states make their decisions about the types of human rights behavior in which they will engage.  Where, 
previously, those who studied states' human rights behavior looked at it as being a decision over 
whether or not to comply with existing international human rights norms, assuming that the interaction 
of interest was that taking place between state and international institution, my results indicate that this 
is not entirely accurate.  States do not make decisions about what their behavior will look like in a 
vacuum, looking only at how the institution might respond to their behavior; they do so with knowledge 
of what they can expect to get away with based on their observations of the behavior of their peers and 
how the institution responds to those peers. 
Furthermore, the discussion regarding the relative importance of the coordination concept in 
comparison to the domestic punishment variable is of particular importance. This proves the 
coordination measure to be more important in explaining improvements in human rights practices over 
time than traditionally used concepts such as regime type, GDP per capita, and population density.  Both 
the policy-based and regional coordination measures are more useful in understanding behavioral 
changes in the realm of human rights compliance than is the domestic punishment variable.  While the 
probability of domestic punishment does have a statistically significant effect on the level of respect that 
states show for human rights, it is not as important in predicting behavior as the behavior of states' 
regional or policy peers.  This means that states care about the effect that engaging in human rights 
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behavior that diverges from that of their peer group can have on their reputations and their potential 
for linking issues with those peers in the future. 
Concluding tests of the same models for three different types of human rights practices provides 
a more nuanced understanding of how the coordination process works as well as a greater level of 
reliability for the results achieved in the initial two models.  The coordination measure remains an 
important component in the explanation of all three types of human rights practices, while the 
punishment variable loses significance for the physical integrity models.  As mentioned above, this is 
likely due to the reason why states that tend to violate physical integrity rights do so.  A desire to ``buck 
the system'', so to speak, that is so intense it requires violations of the most basic human rights is 
unlikely to be affected much by the possibility of domestic punishment as the goal is to make an 
international statement. 
The tests conducted in this chapter support the assumptions made in the model in Chapter 3.  
The likelihood of domestic punishment can be argued to affect states' calculations over whether they 
should engage in human rights offenses.  This is supported explicitly in the original model and in the 
robustness check involving women's rights, if not so explicitly in the robustness check for physical 
integrity rights.  However, the coordination hypothesis is supported throughout all six models reported, 
indicating that as the costs for punishment at the international level decrease, the severity of violations 
increases.  Thus, the first assumption is supported by the empirical tests, at least in part.  The same 
evidence supports the second assumption, which provides that states assume that their potential 
punishers are rational actors.  The fact that states increase the severity of their violations after their 
peers have done so, lends credence to the assumption that states use the assumption of an increased 
cost of punishment being associated with coordinated action when deciding the degree to which they 
will violate human rights. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE COURAGE TO COMPLAIN} 
Chapter 3 served to set up a formal model of interactions between multiple states and an 
international adjudication body where human rights behavior is concerned.  Chapter 4 served to test the 
first two hypotheses that came out of the formal model in Chapter 3 and found support for the 
hypotheses that states coordinate their human rights behavior and that the possibility of domestic 
punishment decreases the likelihood that states will coordinate their behavior on decreased levels of 
respect for human rights.  The third hypothesis derived from the formal model in Chapter 3 will be 
tested in the following chapter, Chapter 6.  Here, in Chapter 5 I look to illustrate the step that comes in 
between the states' decisions to increase or decrease their respect for human rights and international 
adjudication bodies' decisions to issue a judgment on cases that are brought before them.  Specifically, I 
answer the research question regarding the causes of variation in individual complainants' decisions to 
bring cases before an international adjudication body, given that violations occur in the country-year.  
Further, I look to determine whether or not the premise upon which this project is based, that states are 
``safer'' when they violate in together, has merit. 
Before turning to the discussion of the research question, it is important to identify who the 
relevant actors for this chapter are.  The UN's Human Rights Committee can receive complaints from 
two different sources: states and individuals.  States can issue complaints against other states through 
the establishment of an ad hoc Conciliation Commission only if both state parties have declared that 
they recognize the competence of the Committee to receive and consider such complaints. As of 2012, 
only 48 states have made such a declaration. To date, however, no interstate complaint has been 
submitted to the HRC. Because no interstate complaints have ever been issued, I focus on the cases 
brought by individual complaints that are enabled to bring cases under the First Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR which entered into force in 1976.  For citizens of states that have ratified the First Optional 
Protocol, bringing complaints against their own governments before the HRC is an option for them to 
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seek justice against the violators.  For citizens whose governments have not ratified the Protocol, no 
such option exists. 
The prosecution behavior of victims of human rights violations is not explicitly modeled in 
Chapter 3, but has important implications to the overall decision-making process on the parts of both 
the states choosing to violate human rights and the adjudication bodies' decisions to issue a 
punishment.  Based on the international record thus far, a decision by a complainant to bring a case 
against violating states has been a prerequisite for any type of international response to violations.  
Without this action, a state stands a nearly 100% chance of getting away with human rights violations 
with no costs, greatly increasing the incentives to commit such violations.  Further, without this action, 
the international adjudication bodies can have no hope to carry out their mandate.  Without explicitly 
modeling the preferences of individual complainants, I cannot formally derive hypotheses about their 
behavior, but it seems that thinking about the costs associated bringing cases in front of the 
international level would be an intuitive way to start.  In order to begin to understand what causes some 
complainants to bring cases against their violators and others not to do so, I begin by making a few 
assumptions and setting up the logic for the hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter.  I then move 
on to discuss the research design.  A third section characterizes the empirical test and a fourth presents 
robustness checks for the initial results in this chapter. A fifth section identifies the implications of these 
results.  A final section concludes. 
Assumptions 
The first assumption that I make is that complainants are likely to be skeptical of the domestic 
adjudication process, creating a barrier to their decision to bring a case against the state at the domestic 
level (which is necessary prior to bringing a case at the international level).  I make this assumption 
based on the fact that because the government is the alleged violator in these cases, victims are unlikely 
to expect that a government-based body like the courts will award justice to the complainant at the 
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expense of the government.   I make this claim for a few key reasons. First, states often violate human 
rights because of institutional capacity issues that prevent them from being able to distribute public 
goods evenly amongst the population (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  Second, it is commonly held that 
democracies are less likely to commit human rights violations than autocracies because of the 
disproportionate size of the winning coalitions for these different regime types (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al., 1999a, 2002, 2005).  Finally, governments incapable of equitable public goods distribution (either 
due to institutional capacity issues or regime type) are strategically motivated to commit human rights 
violations in an effort hold on to power, making them unlikely to weaken themselves relative to those 
groups that they marginalize by punishing themselves for their own human rights violations.  This, I 
argue, is the reason why so many of the states in which human rights violations occur never have cases 
brought against them at either the domestic or international level.  Complainants are unlikely to feel as 
though winning their case is a likely outcome. 
The second, and related, assumption is that states are aware of their ability to create domestic 
barriers to prosecution, disincentivizing complainants to bring cases against them at the domestic or 
international levels.  States have a strategic option to create barriers to prosecution at both the 
domestic and international levels which benefits them both materially and reputationally.  They benefit 
reputationally when they are able to prevent the international recognition of their human rights 
violations by other states, the international media, transnational advocacy networks, and other 
interested parties.  This effect is explicitly connected to the material benefits in that states can 
oftentimes preserve trade relationships or common policy-based interests with other states when these 
states view them favorably. 
The types of barriers to prosecution that states can create in order to preserve their reputation 
and the associated material benefits generally involve efforts to stall the process at the domestic level.  
These can be legal tactics used by the state's attorneys to buy time by not being forthcoming with 
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relevant evidence or by flooding the interested parties with motions to have important evidence thrown 
out or for continuances.  States can also insulate themselves through the legislative process by dragging 
their feet to bring domestic laws into compliance with international human rights laws and/or norms.  
For example, states such as the United States or Jamaica who have not yet ratified the Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR and still use the death penalty oftentimes have cases brought against them at the 
domestic level consisting of legitimate legal arguments for why it should not be practiced by member 
states.  Jamaica, which has signed and ratified the First Optional Protocol has enabled its citizens to 
bring cases against it on this matter at the international level (the US has not) and its death row inmates 
do so in droves.  Because these countries are not parties to the Second Optional Protocol, they are not 
held to its standards, but this does not stop individual complainants from disagreeing with the practice.  
These legal ``gray areas'' can significantly slow down the adjudication process at the both the domestic 
and international levels. 
My final assumption, which I also make in the following chapter in my analysis of international 
adjudication bodies' decisions, is that complainants are aware of how little influence international 
adjudication bodies can have over state behavior, even if the case is decided in favor of the 
complainant.  This fact is spelled out in the language of the treaties themselves, in which no 
enforcement body is formally tasked with making sure that punishments issued at the international level 
are carried out upon issuance.  Furthermore, simply looking at past precedent of cases decided by the 
Human Rights Committee illustrates that punishments, even if carried out, tend not to be severe.  HRC 
decisions typically only request that the victim is recompensed for the wrongs done to them, but in no 
specific terms.  These decisions for punishment are typically not the types that are strong enough to 
disincentivize the government in question from engaging in the same types of behavior in the future.  As 
so few cases are prosecuted, a rational government knows ex ante that the likelihood of them being 
punished for their behavior is low and that even if punishment occurs, it is unlikely to be severe.  The 
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logic here is somewhat circular in that potential complainants, being aware of the lack of severity in 
punishment, may be disincentivized to engage in a lengthy legal battle if they do not feel that the 
punishment issued (if they were to win the trial) would fit the crime. 
The assumptions that I make in this chapter are consistent with the fundamental assumptions 
made in creating the formal model in Chapter 3.  They are based on the assumption of complete 
information being possessed by all of the relevant actors.  States can observe the incentives (and 
disincentives) that complainants have for bringing a case at the international level just as they can 
observe the costs and benefits to the international adjudication body for issuing a decision or deeming a 
case to be inadmissible.  International adjudication bodies are also aware of the costs and benefits that 
they and the state impress upon complainants and of the costs and benefits that a state can expect 
when deciding whether or not to commit human rights violations.  In this same way, complainants are 
aware of the payoffs for states and adjudication bodies where their respective decisions are concerned.  
The addition of the time-series analysis in each of the empirical chapters allows me to actually work this 
assumption of complete information into the empirical analysis because it allows each of the actors to 
make decisions about today's actions based on their observations from the previous year. 
Hypothesis Development 
There are three main hypotheses that I seek to develop and test in the course of this chapter.  I 
will develop and discuss each in turn here.  The first of these is that as the perceived legitimacy that 
international adjudication bodies have decreases, the likelihood potential complainants will choose to 
bring cases in front of the international courts tasked with making decisions on them will also decrease.  
The second hypothesis is that as the costs of complaining increase, many potential complainants will 
refrain from lodging complaints.  The third hypothesis seeks to answer the question that motivates the 
project as a whole: Is there safety in numbers for violating states?  This hypothesis projects that when 
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states coordinate their actions, prosecution and, necessarily, the probability of punishment, will 
decrease. 
The Perception of Legitimacy 
Over the time period of 1981 to 2000, the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights database contains 
4,487 country-years.  Of these, violations of the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
took place in 4,256 country-years, meaning that for 95% of country-years in the CIRI database there 
were violations of civil and political rights as defined by the UN.  However, the rate at which these 
violations were prosecuted was nowhere near the rate at which they occurred.  In only 5% of the 
country-years covered in the CIRI database for this time period was there a case brought before the 
Human Rights Committee against the violating state, and in only 2% of the country-years that 
experienced violations was a decision issued in favor of the complainant.  For a full 2.6% of the country-
years in which human rights violations occurred, were cases brought that ended with a decision of 
inadmissibility.  With a record like this, one can easily understand why there may be a disincentive to 
bring cases in front of an international adjudication body1. 
As I will show in more detail in Chapter 6, international adjudication bodies must take into 
consideration a number of diverse interests when it comes to prosecuting human rights violations and 
only one of these is that of the complainant for the case.  This is an issue that complainants are aware of 
ex ante and must consider as part of their decision over whether or not to bring a case in front of an 
international adjudication body.  This issue is further compounded by the costs associated with doing so, 
an issue I discuss in greater detail below.  In order to further explicate the dynamic of the complainant's 
decision over whether to bring a case, it is necessary to explore the concept of one's perception of the 
international adjudication body's legitimacy and how this perception is formed. 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that many of these states could never have had cases brought against them due to the fact 
that they had not yet ratified the First Optional Protocol for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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The occurrence of human rights violations brings about the desire in victims to seek justice 
against those who committed the violations.  While it is likely that victims think of human rights 
violations on a somewhat sliding scale (i.e. incidence of extrajudicial killings may seem more egregious 
than, say, a denial of the right to peaceably assemble) in terms of the urgency with which they will seek 
justice, it also seems likely that interpretations of the egregiousness of a human rights violation may be 
relative to the behavior that one is accustomed to observing from their government.  We might imagine 
that those who live in countries where the right to peaceably assemble is always denied (either because 
of law or custom) will be less likely to see this as an egregious violation of their human rights than for 
those whose governments generally allow such behavior.  This is not to say that human rights violations 
should be systematically looked at through a lens of cultural relativism but, rather, that the victims may 
look at the human rights violations that they suffer through the lens of their own cultural and 
institutional understandings. 
Having established that we might expect a citizen of a democracy to be more outraged by a 
violation of their right to peaceably assemble than, perhaps, a citizen of an autocracy, it is possible to 
see why the rate of human rights prosecutions may be uneven across time and space.  Despite this 
unevenness, we still see prosecution efforts across a wide variety of human rights violations, indicating 
that there does not seem to be a collective perception by victims of human rights violations that certain 
types of cases have more merit in the international adjudication process than others.  However, the fact 
that so few instances of human rights violations are prosecuted at the international level seems to 
indicate that victims are either receiving justice at the domestic level or are stopping short of bringing 
cases at the international level due to a perception that they will not receive the justice that they seek at 
that level.  This is likely due to the fact that of the 456 cases brought to the Human Rights Committee 
between the years of 1981 and 2000, only 39.6% were deemed admissible and decided in favor of the 
complainant. 
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Thus, the question really becomes one of why individuals select themselves out of the running 
for a decision in their favor at the international level.  I argue that because 47% of the cases heard are 
ruled as being inadmissible by the Human Rights Committee, potential complainants are likely to 
perceive that there is a rather steep climb on the road to justice at the international level.  Further, 
those who have had their human rights violated by their government are unlikely to feel empowered in 
a fight against ``the system''.  For many of these people, a decision of inadmissibility by the Human 
Rights Committee is akin to a decision in favor of the state.  Thus, the large number of cases that are 
deemed inadmissible are likely to be just as discouraging to potential complainants as are decisions that 
fall in favor of the state.  This logic brings me to the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1:  As the percentage of cases decided in favor of the complainant increases, the rate at 
which potential complainants bring cases will also increase. 
The Cost of Complaining 
The average number of years between when a violation occurs and when an admissibility 
decision is made by the Human Rights Committee is 6.1 years.  The maximum amount of time in the 
cases that occurred between 1981 and 2000 was 19 years.  Further, the maximum time span that takes 
place between a decision of admissibility and a case decision is 4 years and the average time period is 
1.32 years.  This means that most people can expect to wait a full 6 years between the time that their 
human rights are violated and the time that they find out whether their case will even be decided at the 
international level.  Once an admissibility decision is made, the complainant can expect to wait (on 
average) another 16 months before they receive a decision.  Thus, bringing a case at the domestic level 
and then bringing it to the international level can be time consuming and, as a result, costly. 
What factors into the costs that a complainant must incur in the adjudication process?  Here, I 
am specifically referring to the opportunity costs associated with bringing a case.  Attorneys must be 
paid to take the case, file motions, and compile evidence to be presented to the Committee.  
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Complainants may have to take time off work due to the procedures associated with carrying out the 
due process.  Thus, the longer the time between the violation and the decision at the international level, 
the more costs will be incurred by the complainant.  Because of this, the time and money required to 
engage in a lengthy legal battle can, in many cases, be prohibitive to those who might choose to bring a 
case at either the domestic or international level to the extent that the process is a drawn out one. 
Hypothesis 2: As the average anticipated length of time between the occurrence of a violation and the 
Committee's admissibility decision for past cases increases, potential complainants become less likely to 
bring a case to the international level. 
The Coordination Hypothesis 
The larger motivation for this project is to determine whether there is, in fact, safety in 
numbers.  When states violate together, are they more likely to get away with their violations?  Chapter 
4 finds that states tend to be concerned about their reputation amongst members of their peer group 
and, as such, tend to mimic the violation behavior (or lack thereof) of their peers.  In the present 
chapter, I look to determine whether or not coordinated actions lessen the probability of detection by 
the international adjudication body.  Chapter 4 suggests that states care more about their reputation 
amongst their peers than they do about even the probability of punishment at the domestic level.  
However, this begs the question of whether we can say that coordination occurs in an effort to decrease 
the probability of punishment at the international level.  The test in this chapter will provide some 
insight as to whether states coordinate in an effort to minimize the likelihood that they will be punished 
at the international level for their violations. 
The answers from the fourth chapter are, in some ways, difficult to reconcile with rational 
choice theory.  After all, if states are, in fact, self-interested entities looking to maximize their material 
gain in all of their actions, why would they be so greatly concerned with reputation over the prospect of 
the material punishment that they could receive at the domestic level?  Perhaps we can explain the 
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disconnect between the rational choice assumption and the findings of Chapter 4 with the proposition 
that the material costs of violation are tied to the reputational effects that such actions have on the 
violator.  A loss of reputation can have a number of effects (nearly all of which are difficult to observe 
and measure) on a state's ability to realize its self interest in the international system, including loss of 
trade and/or an unwillingness on the part of former allies to act in their interest in international affairs.  
If this were the case, we would expect that states coordinate in an effort to limit the likelihood of 
international detection because the costs of not doing so could be much more costly to them than any 
formal punishment exacted at the domestic level.  Because international adjudication bodies cannot 
prosecute cases without complainants bringing their case before the body, the only way to determine if 
coordinated action minimizes the probability of detection and/or punishment by the international 
adjudication body is to determine if coordination minimizes the likelihood that an individual 
complainant will bring their case before the international body.  Thus, I propose the third and final 
hypothesis used to test this logic below. 
Hypothesis 3: There is safety in numbers.  Potential complainants are less likely to issue a complaint if 
the violating state's actions are coordinated. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In an ideal world there would be unlimited access to data on human rights violations and 
prosecutions.  The best case scenario would involve case-level data.  For this analysis, we are not in an 
ideal world living out the best case scenario.  Detailed case-level data does not exist for cases that are 
never prosecuted, making it difficult to systematically compare the cases that are prosecuted with those 
that are not prosecuted.  Because of a number of systematic data limitations where case-specific 
information is concerned, the research design for this analysis differs in a number of ways from that of 
the other chapters.  However, this is necessary in order to obtain a sufficient level of confidence in the 
causal relationships established by the tests completed in the analysis.  Because case-level data does not 
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exist, I am unable to test my hypotheses at the level of individual cases.  In what follows, I explain in 
detail the unit of analysis, my conception of the dependent variable, and the empirical method 
employed in the analysis for this chapter. 
The Unit of Analysis 
Although I would ideally look at the country-violation-year as the unit of analysis, such fine grain 
data does not exist.  Thus, the unit of analysis for this chapter is the country-year.  The use of the 
country-year unit of analysis allows us to compare the count of cases that are prosecuted at the 
international level across space and time while controlling for rough estimates of the number of 
violations that occurred for the country-year in question.  While this does not allow us to gain a fine 
grained understanding of the individual decision-making processes that underlay the prosecution 
process, it does allow us to understand the country level and system level circumstances that facilitate 
prosecution.  Furthermore, the use of the country-year unit of analysis allows us to compare the effects 
that countries have on potential complainants' willingness to bring a case rather than on the individual 
merits of the case itself.  In order to make clear how this level of analysis can illuminate the aggregate's 
decision to bring cases to the international adjudication body, I now turn to a discussion of the 
dependent variable. 
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this analysis will consist of a count of the cases brought in each 
country-year.  In order to refrain from selecting on the dependent variable, I include all observations for 
which the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database collects data, for which the country is a member 
of the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, and for which there is nonmissing data for the other 
variables of interest in the analysis.  Between the years of 1981 and 2000, 96 countries had ratified or 
acceded to the First Optional Protocol.  That said, the CIRI Human Rights database provides rough 
ranges of the number of human rights violations that occur in a country-year, suitable for using to create 
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a control for the rate at which human rights violations occur in a given country-year.  Countries receiving 
a measure of 1 for a given violation type in the year have committed 49 or fewer violations in that year.  
Those receiving a measure of 0 for the given violation type in the year have committed 50 or more 
violations in that year.  This allows me to create a control for the analysis based on potentially different 
numbers of violations that have occurred based on whether or not the CIRI Database rates the state as 
one in which fewer human rights violations have occurred. 
Because I am interested in state behavior with regard to a great variety of human rights 
behaviors and due to the broad nature of the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, I 
include controls for state behavior with regard to a range of human rights behavior.  The human rights 
included in the analysis are both what the CIRI Database refers to as physical integrity rights and 
empowerment rights as these are the rights covered by the UN's ICCPR.  Physical integrity rights include 
the rights not to be subjected to torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and/or 
disappearance.  The empowerment rights include the freedoms of foreign movement, domestic 
movement, assembly, association, religion, electoral self-determination, and workers' rights. 
The CIRI database codes states' human rights behavior using the US State Department's Human 
Rights Country Reports and Amnesty International Country Reports.  Both organizations use UN-based 
criteria to define human rights and the behavior that constitutes violations of these rights.  Thus, the 
CIRI data are coded using the same criteria to determine what constitutes a violation as the HRC uses in 
order to determine whether the complaint issued is based on both human rights law that is under its 
purview and whether the behavior engaged in by the country in question constitutes an instance of 
violation.  The CIRI index is important to include because controlling for the rough number of violations 
that occur for each country-year allows us to control for the variation between countries' potential to 
have complainants bring cases against them.  I discuss the precise measurement for this control variable 
in the data section below. 
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The Empirical Method 
In order to test the hypotheses in this analysis, I propose the use of an extradispersed Poisson 
model which is meant to model count variables such as the one employed here when the dependent 
variable is overdispersed, meaning that the majority of the variation falls into the lower range.  This 
particular approach is specially formulated for understanding variation in count data when the variation 
of the dependent variable is concentrated in the lower ranges.  The dependent variable for this chapter 
is a count of the total number of cases brought before the HRC in a given country-year.  For the 
observations included in the analysis, only 160 of the total 1,012 observations take on a nonzero value, 
meaning that variation of the dependent variable is highly skewed toward the lower end of the 
variable's range.  Despite the fact that a choice to bring a case before an international adjudication body 
is a rare event, it is still an event that is highly relevant and important to the broader understanding of 
human rights compliance. 
Poisson models are uniquely suited for explaining what are called Poisson distributions - those in 
which variation pools at one end of the range of the variable.  However, there are two fairly restrictive 
assumptions made when using a straightforward Poisson model.  The first of these is that the Poisson 
distribution assumes that the mean equals the variance.  After looking at the variance in comparison to 
the mean for the dependent variable for most of the explanatory variables, I find that the variance is, in 
nearly every case, significantly larger than the mean.  The second of these is the assumption that the 
events that make up the Poisson distribution are independent of one another.  This assumption also 
leads me to choose the extradispersed Poisson model over the more commonly used Poisson model.  
Not only are the data used in this analysis time-series in nature and, thus, likely to be related over time, 
they are also likely to be related within a given country-year in that one individual's decision to bring a 
case in a particular country-year may be made more likely if the same decision is being made by one or 
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more other people in the given country-year.  I discuss the precise regression equation at the end of the 
following section. 
THE DATA 
I collect data on cases heard by the Human Rights Committee during the years in which the 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database measures the degree to which violations are occurring and 
in which there is data from Gartzke's Affinity measure to compile the policy coordination measure, 
limiting my purview of HRC cases from 1981 to 2000.  This data includes the dates in which the 
violations occur, the year in which the communication was brought before the HRC, the year in which 
the HRC made the admissibility decision, the year in which the final decision was made by the HRC, what 
that final decision was if it was made.  I use the data I collected from the HRC records in conjunction 
with data from the CIRI Dataset, the World Bank, the Polity IV project, the Correlates of War Project, and 
Erik A. Gartzke's Affinity data in order to complete the hypotheses tests in this chapter.  Further, I 
include in my analysis only country-years in which the state in question was a ratified member of the 
First Optional Protocol of the UN's ICCPR.  I discuss the measures used in the analysis in greater detail 
below. 
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this analysis is a count of the number of cases per country-year that 
were brought before the UN's Human Rights Committee.  As I mentioned previously, in an effort not to 
select on the dependent variable, I include all observations included in the CIRI database, rendering 
nonzero values of the dependent variable to be rather rare.  In fact of the total 1,012 observations 
included in the analysis, only 160 observations for the dependent variable take on nonzero values.  This 
means that only 15.8% of the cases have nonzero values and that the dependent variable is not normally 
distributed and is, in fact, an example of overdispersion.  Further, because the measurement of the 
dependent variable does not take under consideration variation in a state's potential to be tried for 
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violating human rights, it is necessary to control for this on the right side of the regression equation.  I 
discuss this control variable here rather than in the section in which I discuss the other control variable 
due to its importance to the measurement of the dependent variable and to the model in general. 
The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database employs a measure ranging from 0 to 2 for a 
number of human rights practices.  For this analysis, I focus on state behavior with regard to eleven 
types of human rights practices governed by the UN's ICCPR.  Four of these rights are what the CIRI 
Database refers to as physical integrity rights and seven of them are empowerment rights, which I listed 
above.  By adding the scores for all eleven of the human rights included, I derive a score ranging from 0 
to 22 to use in controlling for country-year variation in the number of human rights violations that 
occur.  For this analysis, I do not include measures of country-years in which the country in question 
received a score of 22 for the human rights control variable as a score of 22 indicates that no violations 
of that right occurred in the country-year and I am interested only in country-years for which cases 
could potentially be filed.  This means that for a country receiving a 1 on the CIRI scale for any of the 11 
human rights I consider, somewhere in between 1 and 49 instances of violations of that particular right 
occurred.  For states receiving a 0 on the CIRI scale for any of the 11 human rights, there were more 
than 50 violations of that right in the country-year.  It is important to note that there is no upper bound 
for the number of violations that could occur in a country receiving a rating of 0 in the CIRI Database. 
The Courage to Complain 
Hypothesis 1, stated above, requires a measurement capturing the evidence of the legitimacy of 
the Human Rights Committee in order to provide a way to think about how potential complainants' 
perceptions of the Committee's legitimacy affect their willingness to bring their cases to that venue.  The 
logic here is that when potential complainants perceive the HRC as having a low level of legitimacy, they 
are less likely to bring cases because they may feel that they are less likely to receive justice as a result 
of their efforts.  In order to capture this concept, I propose to look at the percentage of cases brought by 
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complainants in a single country-year that result in a judgment for the complainant.  Because of the 
transparency of the HRC's adjudication process, potential complaints have access to this information 
and can therefore decide whether they think that their ability to receive justice at the international level 
is worth the time and effort required by this type of endeavor.  Thus, I would expect a positive 
relationship between this variable and the dependent variable as a high value of the independent 
variable indicates a high perception of legitimacy and a high value for the dependent variable indicates 
and percentage of cases being prosecuted. 
While some might reasonably make the argument that this measurement for the legitimacy of 
the institution does not take into consideration individual merits of the potential complainants' cases in 
relation to the merits of the individual cases receiving judgments, I would point out that people's 
perceptions of institutions tend not to be based on very nuanced information.  For example, shortly 
after the US invasion of Iraq, which occurred without the permission of the UN, US public opinion 
tended to be in favor of the US' actions and decidedly against the UN Security Council's decision against 
the US' proposed actions.  Furthermore, even after the information about the existence of WMDs in Iraq 
turned out to be false, opinion of the UN did not really seem to improve.  Despite the fact that the 
judgment of the UNSC was, in fact, based on the facts and international law, the public seemed to 
continue to resent the decision against the US.  In fact, even the international relations literature points 
out the skepticism that many have with regard to the effectiveness and efficiency of international 
institutions (Mearsheimer, 1994/5).  Although many international regimes are crippled by their own 
design elements, they are unable to escape or avoid the international scrutiny that results in people 
judging them to be wholly ineffective.  Thus, I contend that individual perceptions of institutional 
legitimacy are not based on the merits of individual cases nor on institutional design, but are instead 
based only on the observable results of institution's behavior. 
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The second hypothesis requires an accurate measure of the costs associated with issuing a 
complaint at the international level.  The hypothesis is based on the logic that as the costs of 
prosecution increase, they will become prohibitive to potential complainants.  Because data doesn't 
exist to measure the legal costs associated with specific cases or countries or to measure lost wages 
incurred because of the legal process, I propose a slightly less precise measure.  While legal costs may 
vary across countries and cases, so does the length of time that can lapse between when a human rights 
violation takes place and the time when an admissibility decision is made by the Committee.  As the 
legal costs or the costs associated with lost wages are driven by the length of time over which the case is 
active, I propose this as a mechanism of catching variation across cases. 
However, because I use the country-year as the unit of analysis for this chapter, it is unnecessary 
to measure the variation across countries.  Instead, I measure the average length of time that passes 
between when the human rights violation takes place and when the admissibility decision is made by 
the Committee for all years prior for each country.  This measure is based entirely on cases brought 
before the HRC.  This means that for country-years in which no cases were brought (even if violations 
occurred), the average length of time that can elapse between violation and admissibility decision is 0 
years.  Violations for which no case is brought incur no costs for prosecution and do not create any 
observable behavior for potential complainants to use in their decision-making process.  This 
measurement approach allows us to capture variation across space and to make statements about the 
conditions in a particular state in a particular year that either facilitate or prohibit international 
prosecution.  I expect the relationship here to be negative, in that as the costs of prosecuting increases, 
fewer will choose to prosecute. 
The third hypothesis requires a measure of coordination in an effort to determine whether or 
not coordinated action diminishes the likelihood of detection.  The measure that I employ here is, in 
many ways, similar to the coordination measure used in Chapter 4.  The measure from Chapter 4 was a 
118 
 
percentage of the state's peers who were behaving better than the state in question for the year prior 
to when the state's violation behavior was measured.  The concept of peers was measured both 
regionally and based on policy similarities, as measured by Erik A. Gartzke's Affinity measure.  Because 
these measures are so strikingly similar to one another, I employ only a policy version of the measure for 
my purposes here with two slight alterations that are important to note.  For this chapter, the policy 
coordination variable measures the percentage of a state's peers who are behaving worse than it in the 
year prior for ease of interpretation.  Further, the coordination variable used here is also an averaged 
value of coordination with regard to two types of coordination - empowerment rights and physical 
integrity rights.  Thus, the measure remains a proportion of the number of state's peers behaving worse 
than it to the total number of peers and ranges from 0 to 100% because I have added the two 
percentages together and averaged them in order to capture variation in the levels of coordination for 
both of the types of human rights violations that the ICCPR was created to protect.  Because the 
measure captures the percentage of peers behaving worse than the state in question, I expect for it to 
share a negative relationship with the various measures of the dependent variable as the test is based 
on the premise that a higher number of coordinated violators makes the state more likely to get away 
with its own violations. 
The Controls 
In an effort to ensure that other causal factors are not driving the results in the analysis, I 
include a few key control variables in the analysis which were also included in the previous chapter in 
addition to the CIRI violation rate control variable that I discussed earlier.  The logic for the inclusion of 
these three variables is two-sided.  As discussed in Chapter 4, when states are incapable of distributing 
public goods to the population due to scarcity or capacity issues, they are more likely to experience 
human rights violations within their borders at the same time that complainants are unlikely to think 
that they can receive justice through the exercise of due process.  Thus, factors such as a low GDP per 
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capita, a high level of population density, and autocratic regimes are at the same time more likely to 
commit human rights violations as they are to be viewed as places where victims are unlikely to receive 
justice. 
I include a logged measure of GDP per capita collected by the World Bank.  This measure is 
meant to capture the effect that being a less-developed country can have on citizens' views of their own 
efficacy in the system.  The GDP per capita measure will, I suspect, also capture the fact that when 
citizens are poor and hungry, they may be more concerned with meeting basic needs than with receiving 
a sense that justice has been done.  Further, while the cost of complaining may be prohibitively high if 
the adjudication process can be expected to drag on for an extended period of time, a low GDP per 
capita would likely put further restrictions on potential complainants.  Even those with the time and the 
willingness necessary to bring a case may, in some cases, not have the financial wherewithal to do so.  
Capturing the level of development in the country will help to capture variation between and within 
countries over time with regard to the people's ability to pay for legal services and to take off time from 
work to engage in the adjudication process. 
I include a logged measure of population density from the World Bank in the analysis so as to 
control for variation in potential complainants' perception of the depth of the collective action problem 
that occurs in response to human rights violations.  Because a high level of population density can 
highlight the inequitable distribution of public goods, human rights violations become increasingly likely.  
Further, when these violations occur in densely populated areas, it becomes more likely that the 
number of victims will be greater than if the area where the violations occur is sparsely populated.  
Thus, when human rights violations occur as more than simply isolated instances, there is likely to be a 
free rider effect amongst victims, each assuming that someone else will prosecute first.  I include the 
measure of population density in an effort to control for the eventuality that this free rider effect occurs 
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because, if it does, it is likely to detract from the effects of the four independent variables of interest 
discussed above. 
Third, I include a measure of regime type collected in the Polity IV project.  There are several 
important reasons to control for the effects of regime type.  The first of these is the fact that violations 
are less likely to occur in democracies in the first place.  So, if fewer violations occur, the pool of 
potential complainants is smaller and the likelihood of a case being brought decreases.  The second 
reason is the fact that democratic institutions tend to have a greater need to be perceived as legitimate 
by their winning coalition, meaning that when cases are brought before them, they are more likely 
willing and able to dispense justice in a way that satisfies the complainant than are their autocratic 
counterparts.  Third and finally, the presence of a democratic culture is likely to raise the sense of 
efficacy felt by potential complainants, making them more likely to bring cases when their human rights 
are violated than citizens of autocracies are, ex ante. 
Finally, I must address yet another data weakness that affects the test conducted in this chapter.  
Ideally, I would include as a control the number of cases that are brought before domestic courts for 
each country-year.  However, like data for the exact number of violations that occur in each state for 
each year, this data is unavailable.  Because of this lack of data, I instead include a slightly different 
version of a measure used in the previous chapter.  The measure of the likelihood of domestic 
punishment captures the presence of a factor that would be conducive to a fair trial for complainants at 
the domestic level.  It is a measure of the level of judicial independence as measured in the CIRI Human 
Rights Database.  High values of this variable indicate a higher likelihood for a fair trial at the domestic 
level and I expect for it to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable as those who receive a 
fair trial at home are more likely to be satisfied and less likely to want to incur the costs of a hearing at 
the international level. 
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The two important differences between an extradispersed Poisson model and an OLS regression 
are that the extradispersed Poisson is a log-linear model and that it allows for overdispersion of the 
dependent variable.  Therefore, coefficients must be exponentiated in order to be fully interpreted.  I 
predict linear relationships between the explanatory variables discussed in the data section and the 
dependent variable and the hypothesized relationships between all of the independent variables and 
the dependent variable are specified in the previous sections.  I used these hypotheses to develop the 
regression equation for the extradispersed Poisson model, which I have included below. 
COUNT OF CASES BROUGHTit = β1PERCEIVED LEGITIMACYit-1 + β2COST OF PROSECUTIONit-1 + 
β3COORDINATIONit-1 + β4GDP PER CAPITAit-1 + β5 POPULATION DENSITYit-1 + β6REGIME TYPEit-1 + 
β7DOMESTIC PUNISHMENTit-1 + β8COUNT OF CASES BROUGHTit-1 + β9CIRI INDEXit-1 
Analyzing the Distribution of the Key Variables 
The descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the analysis for this chapter are depicted 
in Table 5.1, below. The most important aspect of this table is the distribution of the dependent 
variable.  While the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 22, the vast majority of the cases fall into the 
zero category of the dependent variable, skewing the distribution of the variable to its lower end.  It is 
for this reason that OLS or regular Poisson are inappropriate modeling choices for the analysis of this 
chapter. 
Variables Minimum Mean Maximum 
Count of Cases (DV) 0 0.408 22 
Cost 0 0.907 19 
Legitimacy 0 0.070 1 
Coordination 0 0.430 1 
GDP per capita 4.87 7.56 11.23 
Population Density 0.367 3.60 7.106 
Domestic Punishment 0 1.03 2 
Regime Type -10 0.044 10 
CIRI 0 12.15 21 
Table 5.10: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables, 1981-2000 
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Additionally, the cost, legitimacy and coordination measures are also skewed towards their 
lower ranges, albeit the coordination variable is less skewed than the other two.  Because the 
dependent variable is also skewed to the lower end of its range and of the hypothesized positive 
relationship between these explanatory variables and the dependent variable, I expect that the 
confidence intervals will be tighter for the slopes closer to the zero end of the two variables and will 
rapidly widen after passing their middle ranges.  This means that predictions about the effects that 
lower levels of legitimacy and coordination have on lower levels of prosecution will be more reliable 
than predictions made about the relationship at the upper bounds of these to variables. 
THE RESULTS 
I report the results for the extradispersed Poisson model in Table 5.2.  There are a few 
important things to note about the results beyond just their reliability.  The first of these is that the 
results for the control variables, for the most part, are not significant.  The likely reason for this is that 
universe of cases is truncated in important ways by the fact that only country-years in which prosecution 
is possible are included in the analysis, thereby decreasing the variation in the GDP per capita, 
population density, regime type, and judicial independence measures.  The only exception here is the 
CIRI measure.  Of course, we expect the CIRI measure to share a statistically significant relationship with 
the dependent variable due to the fact that the number of violations that occur drives the number of 
cases that can be brought before the international adjudication body.  Results in which the relationship 
between these two variables was not statistically significant would be inherently suspicious.  The 
positive relationship indicates that prosecution becomes more likely as the number of violations 
committed in a country-year decrease.  This is rather interesting and confirms the logic that citizens are 
more likely to be outraged and shocked when violations occur to people who are not accustomed to 
them than when they are committed against people routinely. 
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   Coefficients1   Standard Errors 
Costs   -0.311***2   0.018  
Legitimacy   1.05***   0.257  
Coordination   -1.748***   0.563  
GDP per capita   0.006   0.085  
Population Density   0.094   0.055  
Judicial Independence   -0.186   0.196  
Regime Type   0.000   0.030  
CIRI   0.154***   .046  
Lag DV   1.538***   .193  
1/df Deviance    Log Likelihood   N 
.501   -295.80   1012  
1Note: All estimates are derived from an extradispersed Poisson regression unless otherwise noted. The standard errors for this 
model are scaled using the square root of the deviance-based dispersion. 
2*** p≤.001; ** p≤.01; * p≤.05 
Table 5.2: Determinants of Prosecution Rates in the HRC, 1981-2000 
Second, and most importantly, we see from the results that there is support for all of the main 
hypotheses presented in this chapter.  The first hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between the 
legitimacy of the HRC and the likelihood that complainants will bring a case.  The second hypothesis 
predicted a negative relationship between the costs of bringing a case and the number of cases that will 
be brought against the country in a given year.  The third hypothesis suggested that when states 
coordinate their violations with peers, they are more likely to get away with them, meaning that fewer 
cases will be brought against them at the international level. 
Third, these findings are extremely illuminating in that they confirm the logic that connects the 
dissertation as a whole - when states coordinate, they are more likely to be able to get away with 
violations because they render individual complainants less likely to bring cases against them.  Other 
factors at work are the overall legitimacy of the international adjudication body, in this case the HRC, 
and the temporal costs associated with prosecuting at both the international and domestic levels.  
However, before putting too much stock in these findings, it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
relationships that exist between the independent variables of interest and the dependent variables. I 
124 
 
include graphs depicting the relationships between the three independent variables of interest and the 
dependent variable in an effort to illustrate the strength of these relationships. 
The graphs for the extradispersed Poisson model illustrate the relationship between the three 
variables of interest in the analysis - the legitimacy of the adjudication body, the costs associated with 
bringing a case, and the level of coordination that exists between the state in question and its peers - 
and the expected count of cases brought before the HRC for the entire range of each explanatory 
variable.  I begin my discussion with Figure 5.1, which depicts the relationship between the measure of 
the legitimacy of the international adjudication body, in this case the Human Rights Committee, and the 
expected count of cases brought before it.  Figure 5.1 illustrates that as institutional legitimacy 
increases, complainants become increasingly likely to bring cases against the state, which supports 
Hypothesis 1 from above. 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 5.1: The Effects of Legitimacy Perception on the Rate of Prosecution 
Figure 5.1 contains the graphed relationship between the costs of prosecution and the expected 
count of cases brought at the international level. We see here that that while the slope is initially quite 
steep, it decreases dramatically, illustrating that when potential complainants can expect to wait three 
or more years between being the victim of a human rights abuse and getting the admissibility decision 
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for their case, they become drastically less likely to bring their case to the international level, supporting 
Hypothesis 2 from above which states that high costs of prosecution will diminish its occurrence. 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 5.2: The Effects of the Cost of Punishment on Prosecution Rates 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 5.3: The Effects of Coordination on Prosecution Rates 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between the level of coordination in which the state is 
involved and the number of cases that are brought against it.  The graph shows a noticeably negative 
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relationship, indicating that an increase in the percentage of a state's peers with whom it is coordinating 
its human rights violations leads to a significant decrease in the likelihood that complainants will bring a 
case against it.  The graph shows substantial support for Hypothesis 3, which is the underlying logic of 
dissertation, namely, that there is safety in numbers for violating states.  In the following section I move 
on to present the results of the robustness checks and to discuss the difference in the various 
measurement and modeling techniques and which provides the better fit. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In order to be more certain about the robustness of the model produced above, I report results 
from three models here that employ alternate measures for the perception of institutional legitimacy 
variable and the cost of prosecution variable.  One employs an alternate measure for legitimacy while 
retaining all of the same covariates as the original model.  The second includes an alternate measure for 
the costs of prosecution concept with all other covariates from the original model included.  The third 
model is estimated using both of the two new measures in place of the originals from the model 
presented in Table 5.2.  I will first discuss these alternate measures before producing the results for the 
three alternate models in Table 5.3.  I will then move on to discuss the differences between these 
models and the initial model.  I begin this section with a discussion of the alternate measure for the 
institutional legitimacy concept. 
In the initial model, I employ a measurement of legitimacy that looks at the percentage of cases 
in a single country-year for which a decision is made by the HRC in favor of the complainant.  This, 
arguably, provides a fairly tough test for whether individual complainants' perceptions of the HRC as 
being legitimate matters in their decision-making process over whether or not to bring a case.  If 
complainants only view decisions in favor of their fellow complainants as being evidence of the 
legitimacy of the body and the HRC cannot feasibly issue a decision in favor of the complainant for every 
admissible case, the burden of proof is even that much harder for the HRC to meet.  These are 
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circumstances under which we would expect even fewer complainants to bring cases forward due to the 
fact that their expectations for the role that the HRC should play are extremely high. 
The only possible way to make this hypothesis test any tougher is to lessen the possibility for the 
HRC to be judged as legitimate to an even greater degree.  In order to do this, I create a new measure of 
legitimacy that is systemic in nature.  For this measure, I look at the number of cases decided in favor of 
complainants for a given country-year in relation to the total number of cases brought forward for the 
system year.  Thus, while the original legitimacy measure conceived of legitimacy perceptions as being 
based on the probability that one would receive a decision in their favor in comparison to their fellow 
citizens, the new legitimacy measure approaches the concept as being a function of the probability that 
one will receive a decision in their favor in comparison to all potential complainants in the system.  The 
logic behind the original measure was that complainants in some countries may have more of an 
advantage in the aim of receiving a judgment in their favor if they happened to be from a country for 
which cases are regularly heard by the HRC.  The logic behind the new measure (and the reason why it is 
a tougher test for the hypothesis) is that it regards all complainants as equal - no complainant is 
advantaged it its pursuit of justice because it is from a country with a bad reputation where respect for 
human rights is concerned. 
The costs of prosecution variable in the initial model is measured as the average length of time 
for all previous country-years (in their country of residence) that potential complainants can anticipate 
waiting from the time that their rights are violated until the time that the HRC issues an admissibility 
decision for their case.  The idea here is that potential complainants can look to the precedents set by 
their fellow complainants in order to form expectations about what their own costs will be, were they to 
decide to bring a case.  This measurement is fairly straightforward in that we might reasonably expect 
that individual complainants would have access to this information and that they would use it in their 
decision-making process.  While the measurement is, in many ways, intuitive, it may not provide the 
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most difficult test for the hypothesis.  It is for this reason that I propose and test an alternate measure 
here. 
In an effort to employ a slightly different understanding of this concept that may provide a 
tougher test of the second hypothesis from above, I take a similar approach to altering the measure as 
that used for the new version of the perception of institutional legitimacy measure above.  The primary 
issue with the cost variable from the initial analysis is that it takes on the value of zero for any country-
year in which no cases have been previously brought against the state in question.  The problem with 
this is that just because no other complainants have come forward against a given country does not 
mean that an individual complainant can expect to pay no costs!  Thus, I propose the use of a system 
average which illustrates the average length of time that all complainants who have previously brought 
cases (regardless of their country of origin) have had to wait between the violation year and the 
admissibility decision.  This means that the cost variable varies by year and not by country in the results 
reported in the right-most column of Table 5.3, below. 
The three independent variables of interest in the model are significant in every version of the 
model that has been tested.  However, when comparing the estimates generated for each of the four 
models estimated here, we notice that there is some divergence in the magnitude of the estimates.  
Where the cost of prosecution variable is concerned, we notice that the magnitude of the estimate for 
the newer measure is bigger than the original measure used in the initial model and in the model which 
includes only the new measure for legitimacy.  The same is true for the legitimacy measure, with the 
estimates for the newer measure being larger in magnitude than those for the older measure were.  
Finally, although the coordination measure is the same throughout all of the models, its magnitude is 
smaller in the original model than in any of the models included in the robustness checks.  In order to 
determine which of these models is the best fit for the data used in this chapter, I compare their ability 
to predict the probability that cases will take on a value of 0 for the dependent variable.  As this is where 
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the majority of the observations fall in the distribution, there is a tighter confidence interval for 
predictions at this end of the variation. 
  Systemic  
 Legitimacy1  
 Systemic   NEW 
  Costs    Model 
Costs   -0.168***2   -0.529***   -0.411*** 
  (0.024)   (0.038)   (0.046) 
Legitimacy  
 3.69***  
 (0.321)  
 0.512**  
 (0.197)  
 2.46*** 
 (0.414) 
Coordination  
 -2.266***  
 (0.567)  
 -2.104***  
 (0.594)  
 -1.86*** 
 (0.587) 
GDP per capita  
 -0.137  
 (0.093)  
 -0.261***  
 (0.095)  
 -0.309** 
 (0.098) 
 Population Density  
 0.087  
 (0.056)  
 0.054  
 (0.055)  
 0.013 
 (0.057) 
Judicial Independence  
 0.215  
 (0.217)  
 0.179  
 (0.218)  
 0.244 
 (.224) 
Regime Type  
 0.008  
 (0.029)  
 -0.018  
 (0.028)  
 -0.013 
 (0.028) 
CIRI  
 0.154***  
 (0.048)  
 0.209***  
 (0.048)  
 0.180*** 
 (0.049) 
Lag DV  
 0.641***  
 (0.173)  
 0.527**  
 (0.175)  
 0.535** 
 (0.171) 
 1/df Deviance   0.368   0.341   0.620 
Log Likelihood   -246.31   -236.33   -223.29 
N   1012   1012   1012 
1Note: All estimates are derived from an extradispersed Poisson regression unless otherwise noted. The standard errors for this model are 
scaled using the square root of the deviance-based dispersion. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates for the two 
models. 
2*** p≤.001; ** p≤.01; * p≤.05 
Table 5.3:  Robustness Checks for Prosecution Rates in the HRC, 1981-2000 
The original model predicts that 91.6% of cases will fall into the zero category, whereas the 
model including the new legitimacy measure predicts that 93.4% will take on a value of zero.  The model 
employing the use of only the new cost measurement estimates that 93.8% of cases will be cases in 
which no complaint is made at the international level.  The final model reported, which includes both 
new measures, predicts 94.3% of cases will take on a value of zero.  When one compares this to the 
actual values of the dependent variable we see that the original model provides the best fit for the data 
as it yields the estimate closest to 87.23%, which is the percentage of actual cases that take on a value 
of 0 in the data.  Thus, I submit that the original model provides both a tough test for the hypotheses 
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and a fairly accurate understanding of the decision-making process in which individual complainants 
decide whether or not they will bring a case before the HRC. 
DISCUSSION 
The results for the analysis in this chapter represent important discoveries about prosecution 
behavior.  First, we notice that all three of the hypotheses for this chapter are supported in all of the 
models.  Not only do we now know that institutional legitimacy has an effect on the rate at which 
prosecution occurs, but we have also discovered that the costs of bringing a case to the international 
level can be prohibitive for many potential complainants.  This has a large effect on the cost-benefit 
analysis that states engage in when deciding whether or not to violate human rights as we see in the 
results for Chapter 4.  When potential complainants have no faith in the international adjudication 
process, they are unlikely to bring cases at that level and, thus, states are unlikely to weigh the material 
costs of punishment associated with violations as heavily as they weigh the effects that such behavior 
has on their international reputation.  Cases that are never brought to the international level cannot 
affect states' international reputations, thus making this potential cost somewhat of a non-issue in 
states' decision-making processes. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the statistical significance of the coordination variable in the 
model provides support for the logic that underlies the dissertation as a whole.  Because states are 
concerned about their reputation and the reputational costs associated with the international 
adjudication process, as we learned in Chapter 4, they tend to focus their efforts on coordinating 
violations in hopes of ducking under the radar.  The statistical significance of the coordination variable 
indicates that this is the case.  Coordinated action on behalf of states decreases the likelihood that cases 
will be brought against them at the international level.  This finding not only confirms the suspicion that 
states have reason to violate together, but also that their decision to violate together is warranted and 
does make them significantly less likely to get caught behaving badly. 
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Standardized 
Coefficient 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Legitimacy 0.788 1.05 
Cost of Prosecution 1.96 0.311 
Coordination 1.44 1.75 
Table 5.4: Comparative Statics for Key Explanatory Variables, 1981-2000 
Due to the fact that the ranges of the independent variables are quite different from one 
another, I present in Table 4 the standardized and unstandardized coefficients estimated in the 
extradispersed Poisson model in an effort to illustrate the comparative statics.  The standardized 
coefficients here represent the change in the expected count of cases brought before the UN's Human 
Rights Committee for one standard deviation increase in each of the explanatory variables of particular 
interest for this chapter.  Table 5.4 illustrates that, of the three, the costs of prosecution exact the 
largest change in terms of the rate at which cases will be brought for a given country-year, followed 
closely by the coordination measure.  One standard deviation increase in the coordination variable 
represents a change of slightly less than one and a half cases per country-year being brought before the 
HRC.  How does the interpretation of these standardized coefficients affect our understanding of the 
theoretical and empirical implications of the results for this chapter? 
First, we note that the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 22 and that it only ranges from 1 to 
22 in 160 cases.  The fact that the occurrence of one or more cases being brought before the UN's HRC 
makes it exceedingly difficult to gain a detailed understanding the degree to which individual 
complainants take these factors into consideration.  However, the use of the extradispersed Poisson 
model helps us to do this.  Although one unit increase in a dependent variable that ranges from 0 to 22 
may not seem like much, when one takes into consideration the overwhelming number of cases that 
take on the value of zero in this analysis, an increase in one case is certainly a noticeable effect.  In some 
country-years, an increase of one case means that the number of cases brought in the year is actually 
doubled.  For a great many country-years, one case is the difference between the state having to pay 
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some price (whether material or reputational) for violations committed and getting off without so much 
as a slap on the wrist. 
Second, looking at the relative effects of the three variables, we notice that the legitimacy 
variable has the smallest relative effect.  However, this effect is still notable in the sense that potential 
complainants' perceptions of the legitimacy of the HRC tend not to vary much over time.  This means 
that we have relatively stable perceptions of legitimacy that lead to fairly stable levels of respect (or 
disrespect) for the HRC over time.  Because the variation in the legitimacy variable over time is 
somewhat limited, this minimizes the size of the effect that the legitimacy variable can have on the 
number of cases brought before the international adjudication body.  The fact that a standard deviation 
increase in this variable still manages to bring about an increase of nearly one additional case is certainly 
notable, even when compared with the other two variables of interest. 
Finally, a one standard deviation increase in the coordination and costs variables represent a 
rather large effect on the value of the dependent variable.  Taken all together, this likely means that 
individual complainants are certainly aware of the states that are in their home states' peer group and 
the human rights behavior in which these states engage and take this into consideration in their decision 
over whether to bring their case to the international level. However, it also means that they are even 
more greatly affected by the personal costs that they will incur by bringing a case to this level.  This 
resonates with our understanding of individuals as rational actors engaged in self-interested behavior.  It 
seems that individuals are primarily concerned with the temporal and material costs associated with 
long legal battles and consider factors such as international human rights coordination and institutional 
legitimacy in their decision insomuch as these factors affect the costs that they will pay in order to seek 
justice at the international level. 
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CONCLUSION 
The results of this analysis are novel in that they bring about a new way of understanding and 
thinking about individual prosecution behavior.  Admittedly, this is because I do not study this behavior 
as an end in and of itself, but rather as a mechanism for understanding the behavior that states and the 
international institutions created to regulate their behavior engage in where the issue area of human 
rights are concerned.  Thus, the analysis here is used instrumentally to help provide a more nuanced 
look at the processes which states are observing when deciding whether or not to commit human rights 
violations.  States, like any individual, are capable of engaging in an action, observing the response, and 
then learning from this observation in order to do better next time so as to elicit a more favorable 
response.  It is just this sort of behavior that I am positing that states are engaged in.  The analysis in this 
chapter shows the process that states observe - individual complainants choosing whether or not to 
bring cases against the state based on systemic and country-level factors that they can observe. 
The relative importance of the variables in their ability to explain variation in the number of 
cases brought to the international level illustrates not only the presence of rationally-based thinking on 
the part of potential complainants, but is also indicative of a larger process at play here.  Because the 
measure of the cost of prosecution variable is measured as a function of the length of time that passes 
between a violation and when the admissibility of the case concerning the violation is ruled on, we see 
that the importance of this variable in the model is fueled by a number of processes.  First, states that 
are the subjects of these cases have the opportunity to delay the adjudication process at the domestic 
level, thereby deterring would-be international complainants from issuing their complaints at the 
international level because of the length of time associated with this process.  Second, as I will show in 
Chapter 6, the international adjudication body is also trapped in this cycle of trying to work both for and 
against the states due to its reliance on key states for its own continued survival and its need to prove its 
legitimacy to the international audience.  Thus, in these bodies' attempts to restore their international 
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legitimacy by making decisions quickly and justly, they are hampered by states' efforts to slow the 
process and by the bodies' own interests in keeping interested states appeased so that they can 
continue to operate in the international system without states deciding to put further constraints on 
their already limited power. 
Finally, it is important to point out that the model in this chapter provides some support for the 
assumptions made in Chapter 4.  The assumptions made there were that states are rational and violate 
only when all forms of punishment are unlikely and that they make this same assumption about their 
counterparts.  The analysis here illustrates that states are engaged in concerted actions not only to 
violate when punishment is unlikely, but also to act in ways so as to further diminish the likelihood that 
punishment will occur.  The assumptions that are made here, in Chapter 5, are based in part on the 
findings of Chapter 4, but will also gain support found in the findings for Chapter 6.  It is in Chapter 6 
that I move on to provide further tests to determine if the assumptions made throughout this project 
are reasonable and to show the degree to which the behavior of the HRC is affected by the constraining 
behavior of states as well as its continued effort to remain relevant and legitimate in the international 
system. 
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CHAPTER 6:  THE BATTLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
Having established in Chapter 3 three formally derived hypotheses to test and testing the first 
two in Chapter 4, I now set out to test the third and final hypothesis from Chapter 3.  Before doing this, 
it is important to note the implications that the findings from Chapters 4 and 5 will have for the results 
of the analysis in the present chapter. Chapter 4 illustrated both that states coordinate their violation 
behavior with that of the states that they regard to be either policy or regional peers and that the 
possibility of domestic punishment increases the likelihood that states will coordinate toward improved 
human rights behavior.  However, of these two findings, the effects of coordination are the most 
notable.  The underlying logic throughout these analyses has been that states rely on the prospect of 
``safety in numbers'' - that violating in groups will make individual states more likely to get away with 
the violations free from punishment. 
As complainants select themselves into the analysis for the present chapter, it was important to 
engage in an analysis of the causes of complainants' decisions to bring cases at the international level 
before trying to understand why cases get decided in the way that they do at that level.  Chapter 5 
illustrates that the legitimacy of the international adjudicating body, in this case the UN-based Human 
Rights Committee, significantly affects the likelihood that individual complainants will bring cases.  
When the body is not viewed as one that is effective and efficient at carrying out its mandate, individual 
complainants are less likely to bring cases before it.  Furthermore, when the costs of bringing a case are 
sufficiently high, potential complainants will choose not to bring their case before the body so as not to 
risk paying high costs for little return.  Finally, Chapter 5 illustrates that when states coordinate their 
violation behavior with peers, complainants are less likely to bring cases before the HRC, indicating that 
states are safer from punishment when they violate together.  This is due to the fact that the HRC has no 
hope of punishing violations for which a case has not been brought before them. 
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In addition to making predictions about violation behavior, the model presented in Chapter 3 
develops a hypothesis concerning the prosecution behavior of the adjudicating bodies pertinent to 
international human rights agreements and this chapter will serve to test the hypothesis derived from 
the model.  The hypothesis from Chapter 3 relevant to the prosecution behavior of adjudication bodies 
is the third hypothesis and predicts that as the cost of prosecution increases, the Committee becomes 
less likely to decide to prosecute.  This hypothesis and, indeed, the model itself is based on two 
assumptions, one of which is pertinent to the behavior of the adjudication body and one involving the 
behavior of member states. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
First, I assume that international organizations are capable of exerting very little pressure on 
individual member states in the form of material costs and benefits for violating.  Although international 
human rights adjudication bodies are capable of issuing a judgment, they can only do so if a case is 
brought before them.  In the event that a case is brought, they must then choose to decide against the 
violator and, because they have no independent enforcement mechanism, the likelihood of the 
judgment that they issue being carried out is low.  Furthermore, even if an international adjudication 
body knows that violations are being committed in one of its member states and a victim brings a case 
before the body, a punishment can only be issued if all domestic options for prosecution have been 
exhausted.  The barriers that this rule causes for individuals considering the option of international 
prosecution are numerous. 
The first of these barriers is a financial one.  Not all victims of human rights violations may have 
the time and money to engage in a lengthy domestic and international legal battle to get justice, even if 
they do have the inclination to do so.  Legal fees can be high, knowledge of the domestic and 
international legal system can be costly to come by, and the loss of work associated with a lengthy legal 
battle can all be formidable financial barriers to seeking retribution for human rights violations.  The 
137 
 
costs associated with bringing a case all the way to international level are, in many ways, related to the 
second barrier to international prosecution: the domestic process. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I discussed in some detail what can cause the strength of these domestic 
legal barriers to vary when I discussed measurement strategies for the domestic punishment variable.  
States that have relatively independent judiciaries are more likely to provide complainants with case 
outcomes that prevent international prosecution because of the perception that justice has already 
been achieved domestically.  In addition to this, the independence of the domestic judicial system plays 
a role in explaining the variation in the length of the prosecution process.  States without an 
independent judiciary are likely to be able to stall and draw out the legal process in order to prevent a 
prosecutor from exhausting all domestic options and, thus, preventing them from receiving justice at 
the international level.  While it should be noted that the presence of an independent judiciary does not 
necessarily guarantee the prosecutor the right to a speedy trial, it does increase the likelihood of the 
perception of a just outcome to the process. 
My second assumption is that violators and victims considering prosecution of violations are 
aware of the inability of international organizations to take action toward ensuring that punishments are 
carried out.  This disenchantment with the international process may cause even those who know that 
they would likely receive a judgment in their favor at the international level (after exhausting all 
domestic options first, of course) to stop short of pursuing the case to that point.  The reasoning here is 
that because the international organization in question has no independent means of punishment, they 
cannot credibly commit to carrying out punishment for any of their judgments which, ultimately, 
decreases the probability that violations will be costly to those who commit them and the probability 
that victims will feel as though they received retribution for the wrongs that were done to them.  
Furthermore, Chapter 4 illustrated that states are likely to care more about the costs to their 
international reputations for committing violations than about the material costs that may or may not 
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come from a judgment issued by an international court.  Thus, there is some empirical justification for 
this assumption on the part of the violating state. 
In addition to this, Chapter 5 provides further support for this second assumption in that it 
illustrates the importance of the institution's perceived level of legitimacy in complainants' decisions to 
bring cases.  This essentially means that, over time, the adjudication body can spiral lower and lower in 
its ability to constrain state behavior because its past (in)action affects its future performance.  As its 
level of perceived legitimacy decreases, fewer will choose to bring cases in front of it, leading it to issue 
fewer judgments, and, ultimately, decreasing its perceived level of legitimacy even further.  Thus, a low 
level of perceived legitimacy can actually be reinforcing, causing the institution's legitimacy to decrease 
through no real fault of its own.  Individual complainants, when venue shopping for an international 
body to hear their case, may actually legitimize one institution at the cost of another. 
Having identified the hypotheses to be tested and the underlying assumptions, Chapter 6 
proceeds as follows.  I first engage in a discussion of the research design, which includes a discussion of 
the statistical methods used to test the hypothesis and a discussion of the measurements used to 
operationalize the relevant concepts.  I then move on to a discussion of the empirical results.  A 
discussion of the implications for the findings follows.  The final section concludes the chapter. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The focus of the empirical test employed in the present chapter is to determine the causes of 
the Human Rights Committee's decisions to issue a judgment against violators of civil and political rights 
as defined in the UN's 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  The main hypothesis 
developed in Chapter 3 that will be tested here predicts that as the cost of prosecution increases, the 
Committee becomes less likely to decide to prosecute.  I discuss the methods and approach that I will 
use to test this hypothesis below. 
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The Unit of Analysis 
Because the actor of interest in this chapter is the Human Rights Committee, the unit of analysis 
that will be used in this chapter is the case-year.  I include observations for every case that was brought 
before the Human Rights Committee between the years of 1981 and 2000 in the analysis, including the 
cases which were deemed inadmissible by the Committee.  I include cases for violations that occur prior 
to 1981, dating back to 1967, because the cases were brought before the HRC during the time period of 
interest.  Thus, there are multiple observations for some country-years as countries may have had 
multiple cases brought against them in a year.  This also means that there are many country-years for 
which there are no observations.  There are also some cases with multiple observations as some cases 
are brought before the Committee, deemed inadmissible, and then brought back before the Committee 
again to have their admissibility ruled on again. 
I choose to use the case-year as opposed to the conventionally used country-year for a few key 
reasons.  The first of these is that the use of the country-year as the unit of analysis renders the 
instances in which a case is brought in front of the Committee a rare event, which makes obtaining 
reliable results with the lowest possible standard errors considerably more difficult.  Compounding on 
this is the second reason that I choose the case-year as my unit of analysis, which is that the inclusion of 
country-years in which no case is brought provides no analytical leverage for understanding the 
behavior of the HRC.  Country-years in which no case is brought do not help us to understand the HRC's 
decision-making because there is no decision for the HRC to make in these instances.  The final reason 
for the decision to use the case-year is that it raises the number of observations relevant to the analysis 
and it avoids the issues associated with selecting on the dependent variable by including cases deemed 
to be inadmissible by the HRC. 
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The Dependent Variable 
The United Nations' Human Rights Committee is one of nine UN-linked human rights treaty 
bodies and is responsible for upholding the rights outlined in the UN's International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).  The ICCPR upholds a number of rights including the rights to physical 
integrity, liberty and security of the person, procedural fairness and the rights of the accused, individual 
liberties, and political rights.  These rights are to be upheld for all persons regardless of race, ethnicity, 
sex, gender, age, or creed.  Thus, the purview of the ICCPR covers a broad view of human rights, 
meaning that the HRC has the potential to hear cases concerning the alleged violation of a number of 
human rights.  This means that the results of this analysis are specific to the Human Rights Committee, 
but they are generalizable to a number of different human rights practices governed by the HRC. 
I choose the Human Rights Committee for the context of this analysis for mainly pragmatic 
reasons.  The first and foremost of these is the fact that that records of decisions and judgments issued 
by the HRC are a matter of public record, making it easy to collect my own data on every case that was 
heard by the Committee between the years of 1981 and 2000.  Unlike, for example, the Committee 
Against Torture which issues its decisions to the countries in question privately, the decisions of the HRC 
are posted annually on the United Nations' website for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.  None of the records are sealed, meaning that I know that my data contains a comprehensive list 
of all cases heard by the HRC between the date range included in my analysis.  Second, as I mention 
above and in the previous two chapters, the use of the Human Rights Committee as the subject for my 
analysis provides me with the ability to look at the decisions for cases that address a variety of different 
human rights violations, increasing the generalizability of the results. 
In the analysis I include even the cases that I coded for which the HRC did not issue a judgment.  
These are cases which the HRC has deemed to be inadmissible, typically because the HRC has assessed 
that the complainant has yet to exhaust all domestic recourses for punishment.  In these instances, the 
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case recurs in the data as a separate case-year as this is the way in which the case is dealt with in the 
HRC.  For the repeated versions of these cases, the year in which the initial communication from the 
complainant was received remains the same, but all other information for the observation is unique to 
that particular observation.  The inclusion of both types of cases, those which were deemed to be 
inadmissible and those which were decided, provides us with a more complete understanding of the 
types of cases with which the HRC is confronted. 
Because there are essentially two stages of the decision-making process for the HRC, I look at 
each as a separate dependent variable.  The first dependent variable represents the HRC's admissibility 
decision.  It is dichotomous, with a value of 1 indicating that the case was deemed admissible and a 0 
indicating that it was not.  The second dependent variable represents the HRC's final decision either in 
favor of the state or the complainant.  Here, a value of 1 indicates that a decision has been made in 
favor of the complainant and a 0 indicating that the decision has been made in favor of the state.  I 
model each decision as separate stages of the process.  Figure 6.1, below, illustrates the dynamics of this 
series of decisions. 
 
Figure 6.1: The Effects of Bringing a Case 
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The Empirical Method 
In order to test the hypotheses of relevance to this chapter, I propose the use of two logistic 
regressions, due to the fact that both of the dependent variables employed in the analysis are 
dichotomous and not ordered, traits which do not lend themselves to the use of OLS regression.  The 
dependent variables used in the analysis are not ordered in that the Human Rights Committee's 
decisions for admissibility and against a state or a complainant are assigned nominal values.  Logistic 
regression is an appropriate choice here because it does not make any assumptions of normality, 
linearity, or homogeneity of variance for the independent variables.  Because it does not impose these 
requirements, it is preferred here to alternate types of analysis when the data does not satisfy these 
assumptions. 
It is important to note that a choice not to issue a decision in the analysis goes against the 
interests of the Committee in some cases because it means that they are unable to fulfill their mandate 
to issue judgments on human rights violations and that, in many cases, they are unable to do so because 
of the claim that their hands are tied by treaty language or due to the fact that they were 
outmaneuvered by powerful international interests.  The decision to decide in favor of the state is also a 
decision that could be viewed as reputationally costly for the institution in that states are, oftentimes, 
tried in the court of public opinion before the case makes it to an international adjudication body.  This 
means that even if the state's case has merit and a decision in their favor by the international 
adjudication body is perhaps justified based on the evidence, the international audience may not see it 
as such because of the information disseminated by international media sources or transnational 
advocacy networks.  Victims' rights tend to be strongly revered and upheld by international audiences, 
making decisions on behalf of victims less controversial than any other action that the Committee might 
take. 
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Although the analysis here looks at HRC decisions over time, the analysis is not a time-series in 
nature because the cases included in the analysis do not include an observation for every country-year 
for the duration of the HRC's existence.  Rather, the cases included here are an exhaustive list of all 
cases brought before the HRC.  Thus, I do not employ any lagged values of the dependent variable in the 
analysis here. 
THE DATA 
Cases brought before the UN's Human Rights Committee are catalogued on the organization's 
website and I use these files to collect a great deal of data. Included in the data collected from the HRC's 
case files are the dependent variables for Chapter 6, which are dichotomous, ranging from 0 to 1.  The 
first regression in the analysis employs a measure of the admissibility decision which gets a rating of 0 if 
the case is deemed to be inadmissible and a 1 if it is deemed admissible.  The second regression in the 
analysis employs a measure of the Committee's final decision in which a case receives a 0 if a judgment 
is rendered in favor of the alleged state violator and a 1 if the judgment is found to be in favor of the 
complainant.  The measure includes cases heard under the purview of the Human Rights Committee 
from the years of 1981 to 2000, of which there are 456.  In order to test the hypotheses of interest here, 
it is necessary to conceive of an appropriate measure for the Committee's costs of prosecution.  There 
are several possible ways to measure the cost of prosecution and I discuss them and my choices here. 
The Cost of Issuing a Judgment 
One of the independent variables of interest in this analysis is the Committee's cost of 
prosecution, which can be thought of in two different ways: the cost of not issuing a judgment and the 
cost of issuing a judgment.  The first of these really refers to legitimacy costs incurred by the Committee 
when it is seen as not fulfilling its mandate in a timely manner.  From the time that a violation occurs, 
the clock starts ticking.  Every day, week, month, and year that violators are able to go without a 
judgment against them, costs the issuing court some standard of legitimacy.  The hypothesis tested in 
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this chapter predicts that as the cost of prosecution increases, the Committee becomes less likely to 
decide to prosecute.  We can test the hypothesis as is, which I discuss below, but we can also look at the 
mirror image of this hypothesis by thinking about what the behavior of the Committee would look like if 
not prosecuting became costly to it.  Both the alleged violators and the alleged victims have a stake in 
the outcomes of these judicial proceedings, so it is necessary to think about the costs that the 
Committee pays to the alleged victims and to the alleged violators: the costs of not prosecuting as well 
as those for prosecuting. 
Where the decision-making process of the adjudication body is concerned, the interests of the 
alleged violators and of the complainants result in the adjudicating body being stuck in between the 
proverbial rock and a hard place.  The Committee's initial decision over admissibility is even more 
difficult than its decision over whether to decide in favor of the complainant or the state.  A decision of 
inadmissibility benefits the state at the expense of both the complainant and the adjudicating body 
because the complainant receives no decision and the adjudicating body is likely to be perceived by the 
international audience as dragging its feet and delaying any ultimate decision.  However, a decision in 
favor of the state means that the complainant and any interested parties are likely to perceive the 
adjudicating body as being unfairly influenced by the state in question, whereas a decision on behalf of 
the complainant stands the possibility of negative repercussions from the losing state either because the 
state can choose to rescind its membership or it can simply interfere in the adjudicating body's affairs in 
such a way as to make future decision-making processes more difficult.  Thus, there may likely be 
circumstances under which the adjudication body could benefit from weeding these cases out by 
deeming cases in which powerful states are involved inadmissible. 
In order to measure the concept of costs for not prosecuting human rights violations, I turn to 
data that I collected from the HRC case files.  The Committee's website includes information on the 
violation year and communication year for each case brought before it, as well as the year in which the 
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Committee decided on the admissibility of the case.  In every case, the Committee makes an 
admissibility decision.  I include in the analysis the multiple iterations of a case brought by a 
complainant.  This means that a case's admissibility may be decided multiple times by the HRC before it 
is ultimately deemed admissible and a decision is issued or the complainant gives up and the case is 
never decided at the international level. 
Once a case is deemed admissible, this decision indicates that the Committee will issue a 
decision either in favor of the complainant or the alleged state violator.  The maximum time span that 
takes place between a decision of admissibility and a case decision is 4 years and the average time 
period is 1.32 years.  However, nearly half of the cases in the analysis are deemed inadmissible by the 
court, including the cases whose admissibility is decided more than once.  Thus, in order to employ a 
measure of the cost to the Committee's legitimacy that applies to all cases in the analysis, I conceive of 
the relevant time period during which the Committee can incur reputational costs as being the time 
between the year in which the violation occurs and the year in which the Committee issues its 
admissibility decision.  Including in the analysis cases whose admissibility is decided multiple times takes 
into consideration the fact that some cases may present more difficult decisions for the adjudication 
body than others.  The longer the time span between the occurrence of the violation and the 
admissibility decision, the more likely it is that the details of the case make that particular case more 
difficult to decide and that the adjudication body decided the admissibility more than once.  This means 
that the legitimacy measure used here captures the variation between cases in terms of the difficulty of 
making decisions about them. 
Once a case is deemed admissible by the Committee, a decision is imminent, so I do not include 
this time span in the measure.  While this measurement does not reflect tangible losses to the court, it 
does get at the concept of lost legitimacy that comes as a result of roadblocks to effective enforcement.  
Even cases for which the decision-making process about the admissibility is difficult and lengthy are 
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likely to count against the Committee's legitimacy.  In other words, even if the HRC has a good reason 
for taking a long time to decide whether the case is admissible, the international audience is unlikely to 
factor this information into their judgments regarding the legitimacy of the Committee.  Public opinion 
seems to lack nuance in many cases, meaning that even inadvertent acts can reflect badly on an actor.  
Thus, I argue that the time lapse between violation and the admissibility decision accurately reflects the 
costs likely to be paid by the adjudicating body, leading me to the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: As the costs to the courts legitimacy, or the costs of not prosecuting increase, it will be 
more likely to deem the case inadmissible. 
The way to think about the cost associated with prosecuting is to think about the power status 
of the states against which complainants are bringing cases.  International adjudication bodies must take 
into consideration the interests which perpetuate their continued existence.  The states that create an 
institution are essential to its continued relevance in the international system.  Furthermore, even states 
that have become more powerful than they were at the institution's origin hold sway with the 
institution as they too have relevance to the continued survival of the institution.  This means that the 
powerful states of yesterday and today may be unlikely targets for internationally-based prosecution 
and, when they are, they may be the states that are least likely to receive a judgment against them 
because a judgment against them is costly to the regime. 
In order to capture this concept, I employ the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
score as collected by (Singer, 1987).  The CINC score is an index of annual values for total population, 
urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military 
expenditure of all state members, currently from 1816-2007.  This measure is computed by summing all 
observations on each of the six capability components for a given year, converting each state's absolute 
component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the six components.  While 
it could be argued that this measure is a less appropriate way of measuring this concept than simply 
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using a dichotomous measure of whether or not the state in question is a major power, I take the 
position that the CINC score gives a more precise measure of the concept as it includes a comparison of 
the state in question to others in the system.  Furthermore, the CINC measure provides a greater 
amount of variation and, because of this, it gives a more in depth understanding of the relationship that 
exists between states' power statuses and the likelihood that a judgment will be issued against them. 
Hypothesis 2:  When the costs of prosecution are high (i.e. the power status of the state in question is 
high), the Committee will be most likely to deem the case inadmissible. 
It will also be necessary to include a measure for whether the case is one in which coordination 
took place.  The first hypothesis derived in Chapter 3 indicates that states will choose to coordinate their 
human rights violations in order to avoid punishment.  If this is true, states will be less likely to be 
punished if they coordinate their violations.  The reason for this is that it is necessary to determine if 
there is, indeed, power in numbers for violating states.  States may expect that violating together will 
minimize the likelihood of ever being punished, but it is important to the broader analysis to determine 
if this is actually the case.  This measure will identify how many of the state's peers are behaving better 
than it at the time when the state in question decided to commit human rights violations and is derived 
using Gartzke's measure of regime similarity from the year in which the violation took place.  The 
measure is the same as that employed in Chapter 5, indicating the percentage of a state's policy peers 
(who also have cases being brought against them in the country-year) that were illustrating a lower level 
of respect for physical integrity and empowerment rights in the year prior to the one in which the case 
was brought before the Committee.  I expect that this variable will share a negative relationship with the 
dependent variable measuring the HRC's final decision because a state who is coordinating its violations 
with peers will represent a higher capability to influence and constrain the Committee, making it more 
likely to experience judgments in its favor.  This brings me to Hypothesis 3. 
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Hypothesis 3:  When states coordinate their violations, the Committee will be most likely to decide in 
favor of the state. 
The Controls 
Two control variables are necessary in the analysis.  The first of these is the measure of domestic 
punishment used in the previous two chapters.  The domestic punishment measure must be included 
here because domestic prosecution must occur before an international adjudication body can deem a 
case admissible.  Thus, this variable serves as a control for determining the cause of why a case is 
deemed inadmissible by the HRC.  States with weak domestic punishment mechanisms are likely to have 
victims bring cases in front of the international adjudication body that are deemed to be admissible 
because the domestic institutions are unlikely to be able to effectively resolve the issues surrounding 
the case.  Further, because of this domestic inability to resolve the issues, I would also expect that low 
levels of judicial independence will lead the Committee to issue a final decision in favor of the 
complainant. 
Finally, I include a measure of regime type.  As in previous chapters, I use the Polity IV measure 
in order to understand the relationship between regime type and the dependent variable.  The reason 
for the inclusion of this measure is that democracies are traditionally considered to be less likely to 
commit human rights violations in the first place and are considered to be more likely to be able to 
punish the violations that do occur at the domestic level.  Thus, I include the measure because it is likely 
to have important effects both on the likelihood that each case will be deemed in admissible and on the 
likelihood of whether the adjudication body will decide in favor of the complainant or the state.  Here, I 
expect that a strong positive relationship will exist between the regime type variable and the dependent 
variable measuring decisions in favor of the complainant.  I expect a negative relationship between 
regime type and the measure for the decision of inadmissibility.  Below are the regression equations for 
Chapter Six. 
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ADMISSIBILITY DECISIONit = β1COORDINATIONit + β2LEGITIMACY COSTSit + β3POWER STATUS it + 
β4DOMESTIC PUNISHMENTit + β5REGIME TYPEit 
 
FINAL DECISIONit = β1COORDINATIONit + β2LEGITIMACY COSTSit + β3POWER STATUSit + β4DOMESTIC 
PUNISHMENTit + β5REGIME TYPEit 
Analyzing the Distribution of the Key Variables 
Variables Minimum Mean Maximum 
Admissibility Decision 0 0.532 1 
Final Decision 0 0.252 1 
Legitimacy Costs 0 6.317 20 
Policy Coordination 0 .408 1 
Power Status -13.12 -6.83 3.01 
Domestic Punishment -3 1.575 2 
Regime Type -9 8.471 10 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables, 1981-2000 
Looking at Table 6.1, it is important to think about how the distribution of some of the variables 
may affect the results of the analysis.  First, we notice that the dependent variable measuring the 
Human Rights Committee's decisions over admissibility looks to be fairly evenly distributed.  However, 
the HRC's final decision looks to be somewhat unevenly distributed in that the majority of the decisions 
are in favor of the complainant.  It is important to note here that, of the 455 cases heard by the HRC, 
only 61 cases resulted in a decision made in favor of the state.  This means that the distribution is 
somewhat skewed.  However, the use of the two separate logit models render this distribution 
unproblematic as estimates are given for each stage of the HRC's decision-making process. 
The distribution of the independent variables is, for some, quite skewed.  The policy 
coordination and power status variables are the only independent variables that are close to being 
normally distributed.  The HRC's cost of decision measure is skewed toward the lower ends of its 
distribution, while the domestic punishment and regime type variables are fairly skewed toward the 
upper ends of their distributions.  This means that we will expect the legitimacy cost variable to be 
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better able to explain the cases that fall into the lower ends of its distribution and the domestic 
punishment and regime type variables will do a better job of predicting that cases that fall into the 
upper ends of their distribution.  This will be largely represented in the width of the confidence intervals 
seen in the figures below. 
RESULTS 
Table 6.2 first illustrates the logit regression estimates for the HRC's admissibility decisions.  The 
results illustrate support for both of the hypotheses presented above.  The legitimacy variable shares a 
positive relationship with the dependent variable, indicating that as the costs to the Committee's 
legitimacy increase, it will be more likely to deem the case admissible.  The coefficient for the power 
status measure shares a negative relationship with the dependent variable.  This shows that the 
Committee is more prone to deem a case inadmissible when the state in question is powerful and could 
potentially exact costs on the institution as a result of reputational losses that are associated with the 
publicity that comes from an international trial.  Finally, we see that the regime type estimate is 
negatively correlated with the dependent variable.  This is likely due to the fact that democracies are 
more likely to show respect for human rights and more likely to have independent judiciaries.  This 
means that democracies are more likely able to dispense justice for human rights violations that do 
occur at the domestic level, resulting in a decreased need for trials in the international context. 
Table 6.2 also reports the results of the logit regression for the HRC's decisions on admissible 
cases.  Here, only one variable reaches statistical significance.  The coordination variable is negatively 
related to the dependent variable, indicating that the Committee is less likely to punish states when 
their human rights violations are part of a coordinated action.  This lends further support to the first 
hypothesis derived from Chapter 3, indicating that when states act in groups, they are more likely to get 
away with their violations.  The fact that no other variables reach statistical significance in the analysis 
explains the dynamic here in even greater detail.  That is to say, that the Committee takes into 
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consideration the effects that a case will have on its legitimacy and the power status of states when 
making admissibility decisions, but not when making final decisions on cases it has deemed admissible.  
This means that the Committee uses admissibility decisions as a way to select itself out of sticky 
situations in which it might be forced to issue a decision that goes against its larger interests.  However, 
by doing this, the Committee then must focus not purely on the merits of the individual case when 
issuing the final decision, but on the level of coordination exhibited by the violating state.  There are a 
couple of important implications to draw from here, which I will discuss further in the next section. 
Variable Coefficient1 Standard Error 
Admissibility Model 
Legitimacy Costs -0.074**2 (0.039) 
Power Status -0.203*** (0.069) 
Domestic Punishment 0.186 (0.180) 
Policy Coordination 0.211 (1.01) 
Regime Type -0.204** (0.075) 
Intercept -0.614 (1.01) 
X2 = 53.11*** Log Likelihood = -178.44 N = 300 
Decision Model 
Legitimacy Costs -0.110 (0.121) 
Power Status -0.432 (0.384) 
Domestic Punishment 0.779 (1.03) 
Policy Coordination -16.00** (8.67) 
Regime Type 0.544 (0.611) 
Intercept -5.575 (6.412) 
X2  = $15.76*** Log Likelihood = -26.45 N = 119 
1Note: All estimates are derived from a logit regression unless otherwise noted. The numbers in parentheses are panel-corrected 
standard errors. 
2*** p≤.01; ** p≤.05; * p≤.10 
Table 6.2: The Effects of Judgment Costs on International Prosecution: 1981-2000 
Because the results of any type of logistic regression are rather difficult to interpret, I include 
below figures that illustrate the relationships between the three variables of interest to the chapter (i.e. 
power status, legitimacy costs, and coordination) and their relationships to the dependent variables.  
The graphs below illustrate how likely a case is to be deemed inadmissible based on the power status of 
the state and the legitimacy costs to the institution and to be decided in favor of the state based on the 
level of coordination in which the violating state is involved.  In order to get these estimates, all other 
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variables are held at their means and CLARIFY was used to generate the predicted probabilities depicted 
in the graphs (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). I will discuss each of 
the graphs in turn. 
 
Note:  Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg and 
King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 6.2:  Legitimacy Costs and a Decision of Inadmissibility 
In Figure 6.2, we see that as the costs to the institution's legitimacy increase, the regime 
becomes increasingly likely to deem the case inadmissible.  The length of time that the Human Rights 
Committee waits to issue a ruling on the admissibility of the case from the time that the alleged 
violation occurs illustrates the Committee's unwillingness to issue a final decision.  This is likely due to 
the fact that as time goes on, the case begins to be heard in the international court of public opinion.  
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) in the realm of human rights, such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, are in the business of publicizing wrongs committed by states to the 
international audience.  Keck and Sikkink (1998) point out that, oftentimes, these networks are 
responsible for bringing pressure upon international governmental organizations that are responsible 
for constraining state behavior and then punishing such behavior to carry out their mandate and pursue 
justice.  By putting international pressure on these organizations, TANs can add strength to the voices of 
victims of human rights violations who otherwise, might go unheard or unnoticed.  Because of this 
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pressure and the naming and shaming that TANs can exact on Committee, its best option is to deem 
such cases inadmissible and use as an excuse the limits of its mandate rather than to incur further 
legitimacy costs when it inevitably would have to issue a decision in favor of the powerful states rather 
than their victims. 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg and 
King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 6.3: Power Status and a Decision of Inadmissibility 
Figure 6.3 illustrates that as the power status of the state involved in the litigation increases, the 
likelihood that the case will be dismissed and deemed as being inadmissible by the international 
adjudication body increases.  This provides clear support for the hypothesis tested in this chapter - that 
as the costs of issuing a decision increase, the likelihood that the Committee will issue a decision 
decreases.  A decision of inadmissibility is really the best case scenario for both the state in question and 
the international adjudication body when the state in question is very powerful.  This is due to the fact 
that the state and the international adjudication body are tied together in important ways when the 
state is a powerful.  The state desires not to be labeled a human rights violator on the international 
stage and the international adjudication body desires not to be deemed as being ``in the pocket'' of 
powerful interests in front of skeptical members of an international audience.  Thus, a non-decision 
prevents either of these scenarios from occurring by attacking the merits of the case, the evidence 
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available, or the institutional design mechanisms that prevent a decision without putting the 
accountability in the hands of any of the interested parties. 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the figures below were generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King, 2003; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). All other variables are held at their mean. 
Figure 6.3: Coordination and a State Decision 
Figure 6.3 provides the final confirmation of the hypothesis from Chapter 3 which suggests that 
states which coordinate their violations are more likely to get away with them without punishment.  
Here, we see that the fear of increased costs to legitimacy in the final decision-making phase lead the 
international institution to issue a decision in favor of the state when violations are coordinated, 
illustrating the fact that the institution is concerned about the effect that groups of powerful states (or 
groups made up of states with various amounts of power) can have on its continued existence and, thus, 
its long-term relevance to the international community.  This concern seems to trump all others in the 
Committee's final decision-making process.  It is important to note the sharp increase in the likelihood 
associated with coordination value of 0.6 and higher.  This illustrates that, while these cases are rare 
(indicated by the width of the confidence intervals), states with a particularly large percentage of peers 
violating human rights increase the likelihood of receiving a decision in the favor drastically over those 
with only a few peers emulating their behavior.  In the following section, I compare directly the effects 
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of power status, legitimacy costs, and coordination on the Human Rights Committee's decisions in an 
effort to determine whether the adjudication body is more concerned with its international reputation 
or the interests of its most powerful members in the adjudication process. 
DISCUSSION 
The range of the legitimacy costs variable, coordination, and the power status variables are very 
different, 0 to 20, 0 to 1, and -13.12 to 3.01, respectively.  In order to get a better understanding of the 
relative effects of these three variables on cases' propensity to fall into a particular category of either of 
the dependent variables, I report standardized coefficients which represent the percentage change in 
the odds of a case being deemed admissible or being decided in favor of the state associated with one 
standard deviation increase in each of the independent variables.  This allows us to determine the 
answer to the very important question of whether or not the institution is more concerned with its own 
reputation or with the pressure exerted on it to fulfill its original mandate.  I report the standardized 
coefficients in Table 6.3. 
 Power Status Legitimacy Costs Coordination 
Admissibility 
Model 
-27.7*** 
(-39.05***) 
-38.4*** 
(-0.089***) 
0.05 
(0.028) 
Decision 
Model 
-84.4 
(-421.18) 
-40.8 
(-0.138) 
-93.8** 
(-17.04**) 
Note: The first number in each cell is is the standardized percentage change in odds.  The numbers in parentheses are the unstandardized 
coefficients. 
Table 6.3:  Comparing the Effects of Power and Reputation on the HRC 
We see in Table 6.3 that one standard deviation increase in the power status variable leads to a 
27.7 percent decrease in the odds that the case will be deemed admissible.  This illustrates that a state's 
power status has an important effect on the institution's decision either not to prosecute.  However, the 
effect of the power status variable on the decision over whether to decide in favor of the state or the 
complainant does not reach statistical significance.  Thus, though it may seem to be affected a great deal 
by the power status variable, the lack of statistical significance here means that we have little 
confidence in the result which says that powerful states are 84.4 percent less likely to receive decisions 
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against them in admissible cases.  These results seem to indicate that the HRC's prerogative is to rule 
out cases in which the power status of the state is high in an effort to prevent future legitimacy costs 
that it would likely pay if it had to reach a final decision on the cases involving powerful states. 
An increase of one standard deviation in the legitimacy costs variable seems to lead to a 38.4 
percent decrease in the likelihood that the case will be deemed admissible. Much like the power status 
variable, the legitimacy costs estimate does not reach statistical significance for the second model 
explaining the Committee's final decisions over cases, meaning that the estimate of a nearly 41 percent 
decrease in the likelihood that the Committee will decide in favor of the complainant is not an estimate 
in which much stock can be put.  However, the fact that the legitimacy costs variable reaches statistical 
significance in the first model and not in the second even further illustrates that the Committee's goal is 
to weed out difficult cases with the admissibility decision. By choosing not to decide cases in which it has 
already experienced high costs to its legitimacy and in which the state party will likely exact more costs if 
the decision does not go its way, the Committee is better off deeming the case inadmissible if it displays 
these characteristics so as to avoid steeper costs in the final decision-making phase of the case. 
For one standard deviation increase in the coordination measure, we see a 93.8 percent 
decrease in the likelihood that a case will be decided in favor of the complainant.  The effect of one 
standard deviation increase in the coordination measure has almost no effect on the admissibility 
decision and the estimate for the relationship with the admissibility measure does not reach statistical 
significance.  This result is notable not only for its magnitude, but also for its implications.  Because 
coordinated action on the parts of states means that fewer complainants in these coordinating states 
bring cases forward (as illustrated in Chapter 5), the effect of the coordination variable is suppressed in 
this model.  However, this begs the question: Why does the estimate for this variable achieve statistical 
significance in the second model explaining final decisions made by the Committee and not the 
admissibility decisions?  I argue that this is because so few cases involving coordinated violations by 
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states ever reach the Committee.  Individual complainants act as barriers in this way, meaning that the 
Committee can afford to focus most on the legitimacy costs that it faces when deciding on admissibility.  
However, once the Committee reaches the stage where it must issue a final decision on the case, the 
coordination variable becomes its primary focus.  At this stage, the Committee seems to base its 
decision entirely on whether violation is a result of coordinated action.  This means that the Committee 
will decide in favor of the complainant every time, due to the fact that this decision results in the fewest 
reputational costs for it, unless the violation is the result of states' coordinated actions. 
There are three very important implications to draw from the analyses in this chapter.  The first 
of these is that coordination not only decreases the likelihood that an individual will bring a case before 
the HRC, but also that it decreases the likelihood that the state will lose its case in the international trial.  
This provides the final piece of support necessary in order to illustrate that the overarching logic of this 
project is supported by the empirical evidence.  There is safety in numbers for states that want to violate 
international human rights law.  Thus, the extent to which states mirror the level of respect shown by 
their peers for human rights directly affects the likelihood that cases will be brought and the likelihood 
that, once brought, a case will be decided in favor of the complainant.  Thus, we can conclude from this 
that states prevent material costs for punishment by avoiding international reputational costs. 
The second important implication rests on the fact that states' power statuses seem only to 
matter in the Committee's admissibility decision.  This means that powerful states essentially get 
selected out of the running for a final decision in the admissibility phase because the Committee wants 
to avoid the legitimacy costs associated with deciding in favor of a powerful state in the final decision 
phase or the decision costs associated with deciding in favor of the complainant in this phase.  This 
shows that states do exercise a certain amount of control over the Committee's decision-making 
capacity in that they are able to use their power to prevent cases that would upset the power balance 
from being decided against them.  However, this also shows pragmatism on the part of the Committee 
158 
 
in that the body chooses cases from which it benefits in issuing a decision.  This means that the 
Committee does have some control over the behavior of states, once we control for the power status of 
the states.  It also illustrates the fact that the Committee's behavior is not entirely controlled by the 
powerful states that created it.  The third implication of the analysis shows the extent to which this is 
the case. 
The third important implication to take away from the analysis here is that there is no such a 
thing as a principled court in the international system.  The fact that the coordination variable is the only 
one in the analysis of the Committee's final decision that achieves statistical significance illustrates that 
only once states have accounted for the states whose actions are coordinated, are they then free to 
make their final decision based on the merits of the individual case.  This means that there really is not a 
sincere desire for international adjudication bodies to make an effort to make decisions based on merit, 
rather than on the political costs of issuing a judgment in favor of the state that acts alone.  When 
actions are coordinated, the costs of deciding against the state increase, whereas only when the actions 
are not coordinated can the Committee focus on the evidence before it in and make an effort to make 
the least biased and most responsible decision that it can. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of this analysis are novel in that they bring about a new way of thinking about how 
international adjudication bodies make their case decisions.  Where, previously, many would have 
argued that state power alone would be sufficient in explaining decisions made by international 
adjudication bodies, the analysis here shows that this is not necessarily the case.  Where Chapter 4 
illustrated that states base their human rights behavior on concerns for their reputation amongst their 
peers, Chapter 6 shows that reputation matters to states and institutions alike.  Further, it shows that 
institutions work to preserve their own reputations in addition to those of their powerful member states 
by refraining from issuing a decision when they can do so without being viewed as favoring the state 
159 
 
unfairly.  Because institutions have the outside option of issuing no decision at all, they make an effort 
to preserve themselves from accepting most of the blame for making a decision that could be perceived 
as unjust in favor of a guilty state party while at the same time protecting the state's reputation from 
the scar that would result from a decision in favor of the complainant. 
All of this illustrates that while international organizations are not necessarily the most 
exogenous cause of international behavior, they are certainly an important intervening variable after 
power is considered as Keohane and Martin (1995) point out.  After controlling for power, the effect of 
legitimacy costs - the costs of not issuing a judgment - still have an important effect on the Committee's 
behavior.  This means that the Committee issues decisions that illustrate its desire to put its own 
interests above those of the state.  This process may manifest itself as the institution bowing to the will 
of powerful states, but we see from the models of the two stages that the Committee, while constrained 
by state power, the decisions of complainants over whether to bring cases, and the coordinated actions 
of states, ultimately makes its decisions based on its considerations of how all of these constraints will 
affect its own legitimacy.  Thus, the interests of the institution itself cannot be said to perfectly align 
with those of powerful states or even those of complainants but, rather, its own ability to continue to 
survive and thrive in the international system. 
Finally, the tests conducted in this chapter support the assumptions made in the model in 
Chapter 3.  International organizations are not capable of bringing large material costs to bear on their 
member states - even when they issue a judgment against them.  States, while capable of bringing 
reputational costs against the institution, are not as capable of doing so as are the complainants.  
However, the costs to reputation that both the international adjudication body and the complainant can 
bring against the state are nontrivial.  Of the cases that are deemed to be admissible, the majority are 
decided in favor of the complainant.  The second assumption, which suggests that states and 
complainants are aware of the institutional weaknesses of the relevant adjudication body also seems to 
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be supported by the analysis as we see that those complainants who show resolve in the adjudication 
process are likely to get justice and that the powerful states are typically capable of swaying the 
Committee in their favor through power-based mechanisms, as long as the legitimacy costs for the 
Committee are not prohibitively high. 
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
The overarching goal of this project was to determine, first, the degree to which states 
coordinate their human rights behavior and, second, the effects that this coordinated behavior has on 
the victims of human rights violations and the international adjudication body tasked with punishing 
such behavior.  The empirical chapters in the analysis provide resounding support for the hypotheses 
formally derived in Chapter 3, illustrating that states tend to emulate the human rights behavior of their 
peers, whether regional or policy-based, and that such coordinated action renders the victims of 
violations less likely to bring a case against the state at the international level and renders the 
international adjudicating body less likely to issue a decision in favor of the complainant.  In what 
follows, I look to also define and point out various other conclusions reached in the analysis of these 
behaviors which are less central to the project but of equal theoretical and empirical importance to the 
study of international human rights compliance. 
This project has shed light on compliance in the issue area of human rights by analyzing the 
behavior of the states who commit violations, the victims of violations in their choice to bring a case at 
the international level, and on the response of the UN's Human Rights Committee to cases brought.  The 
approach to understanding the behavior of the relevant actors is novel in that it has assessed the issue 
of human rights compliance behavior and the reactions of those involved as being a result of 
coordinated actions on the part of states.  In order to better understand why and when states 
coordinate their human rights behavior, Chapter 3 served to develop a formal model of the interaction 
that takes place between states and between states and an international adjudication body.  Chapter 4 
included a model meant to explain why states exhibit changes in the level of respect that they show for 
human rights from year to year and to test the second and fourth hypotheses developed in Chapter 3.  
In Chapter 5, I develop and test hypotheses meant to explain the rate at which individual complainants 
bring cases before the international adjudication body, one of which is the first hypothesis developed in 
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Chapter 3.  Finally, in Chapter 6 I test the third hypothesis from Chapter 3 which makes predictions 
about the circumstances under which an international adjudication body will issue decisions over 
admissibility and, then, on behalf of either the state or the complainant. 
The three empirical chapters included here test the implications of the formal model with 
regard to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966.  Because 
membership in the ICCPR is universal, it is possible for me to consider all states in the system for the 
analysis in Chapter 4.  The adjudication body for the ICCPR is the UN-based Human Rights Committee 
and the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 focus on cases brought before this body in particular.  The 
universal membership of the ICCPR, the transparency of its case files, and the nature of the human 
rights that are under its purview make it a particularly pragmatic choice for the analyses in these 
chapters. 
This final chapter proceeds as follows.  I begin by summarizing the findings of individual chapters 
and then drawing connections between all of the individual parts of the project.  The following section 
serves to discuss potential future projects that would serve to illuminate more of the dynamic that I 
have identified over the course of working on this project.  A third section discusses the research 
implications for the project and identifies the other treaties and types of international cooperation to 
which the findings here can be applied.  The fourth and final section of the chapter will discuss the policy 
implications of the work as a whole in an effort to illustrate that knowledge supplied here has important 
implications for decision-makers in states and international adjudication bodies. 
A LOOK AT THE MOVING PARTS 
The formal model in Chapter 3 presents a lens through which we can analyze both interactions 
between states and between groups of states and international adjudication bodies in the issue area of 
human rights.  The model is based on the preferences of states and those of the international 
adjudication body.  The states prefer to violate human rights with impunity, simply put.  The 
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international adjudication bodies prefer that no violations take place but that, if they do, the body will 
be able to successfully punish those committing the violations.  These preferences simultaneously 
illustrate the common goals of states where human rights behavior is concerned and the interests of the 
international adjudication bodies that conflict with the goals of states.  Because of these conflicting 
interests, states and the international adjudication body must act strategically so as to maximize the 
likelihood that their preferences will be met.  It is this strategic interaction that is the focus of the entire 
project. 
The model in Chapter 3 sets forth four hypotheses, formally derived, and meant to be tested in 
the later empirical chapters.  The first hypothesis derived from the model indicates that states prefer to 
violate when the probability of domestic punishment is low, meaning that we should see fewer 
instances of violation under circumstances in which the state's domestic adjudication process is 
independent from the state itself and when there is a strong rule of law in the state.  The second 
hypothesis predicts that individual states will choose to violate human rights when their peers are also 
doing so.  This hypothesis is based on the logic that if states want to decrease the likelihood of any 
punishment by acting in a group so as to increase the costs of punishment for any adjudication body.  
The third hypothesis advances the notion that the power and influence of violating states negatively 
affects the adjudication body's willingness to try the case or to decide in favor of the complainants.  
Here, we see that the adjudication body's concern is not just the number of states violating, but also the 
power identity of the states violating.  The fourth and final hypothesis predicts that states will refrain 
from violating human rights when the probability of punishment is sufficiently high and/or when their 
peers are not violating human rights.  This hypothesis indicates that, while states are concerned about 
how their peers perceive them, they are also concerned about the material costs that they may have to 
pay individually. 
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Summarizing the Empirical Findings 
In order to empirically test the hypotheses derived from the model in Chapter 3, I begin in 
Chapter 4 by analyzing the first step in the strategic interaction that occurs in the violation process - that 
of states' decisions over whether to increase or decrease their level of respect for civil and political 
rights as defined by the ICCPR.  Predictions over this decision are found in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 in the 
formal model.  Chapter 4 yields support for all three of these hypotheses, illustrating statistically 
significant estimates for the effects of coordinated action as defined by both policy peers and regional 
peers and for the effects that the probability of domestic punishment has on state action with regard to 
physical integrity rights, empowerment rights, and women's equality rights (all of which are covered by 
the UN's ICCPR).  This provides support for the first and second hypotheses from the formal model in 
Chapter 3.  Furthermore, analyzing the comparative statics of the model sheds further light on the 
fourth hypothesis.  Namely, I find that when a state is making a decision over whether to increase or 
decrease their level of respect for civil and political rights, the behavior of their policy and/or regional 
peers is a more important element in the process than is the consideration of the possibility for 
domestic punishment. 
There are a few important implications that arise from the Chapter 4 findings.  First, it would 
seem that states care more for their reputation amongst their peers than they do about any material 
costs of violation that they may pay after adjudication at the domestic level.  This may seem, initially, to 
contrast with rational choice assumptions that would have us predict that states are looking out only for 
their own best interests and focusing most on short term and/or relative gains, leaving us to wonder 
whether this finding has negative implications for the rationality assumption.  Second, the fact that 
states seem to care so deeply about their international reputation directly contradicts arguments such 
as those made in selectorate theory, which suggest that human rights violations are entirely 
domestically-based calculations that rely on states' increased ability to consolidate domestic power 
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when they suppress the rights of minority groups.  Third, these results beg the question of whether 
states coordinate their behavior in an effort to avoid punishment as a result of collective action or if 
they do so in an effort to ``keep their friends close'' in order to continue to benefit from positive 
interactions with peers in the international context.  These questions and others are answered in 
subsequent chapters. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 addresses Hypothesis 1 from the formal model along with two 
additional hypotheses that are not formally derived. It also serves to provide additional insight to the 
results found in Chapter 4.  Here, I analyzed the effects of coordination, institutional legitimacy, and the 
costs of prosecuting on the rates of international prosecution in each country-year.  The analysis 
provides support for Hypothesis 1 from the formal model, indicating that the coordinated efforts by 
states to violate civil and political rights decreases the number of cases brought against them at the 
international level.  Because a case must be brought by individual complainants in order for there to be 
any chance that an international adjudicating body can hear and/or decide on the case, individual 
complainants are key to the international punishment process.  In order for us to decisively determine 
that coordinated action diminishes the probability of punishment at the international level, it must be 
the case that coordination decreases the rate at which individual complainants bring cases.  The results 
in Chapter 5 illustrate that this is the case. 
Furthermore, I develop in Chapter 5 two additional hypotheses regarding the decisions of 
individual complainants to bring cases at the international level.  The first of these predicts that as the 
level of perceived legitimacy of the UN's Human Rights Committee for a given country-year decreases, 
individual complainants will be less likely to bring their case before the body.  The second hypothesis 
developed in this chapter projects that as the costs of prosecution increase (measured as the length of 
time over which legal fees and other material costs would accrue), the rate at which individual 
complainants bring cases before the HRC will decrease.  I find substantial support for both of these 
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hypotheses in Chapter 5.  Although, the comparative statics for the chapter indicate that institutional 
legitimacy and prosecution costs affect the rate at which international prosecution occurs to a lesser 
degree than does coordination.  This means that from an individual standpoint, at least, complainants 
adhere more strictly to evaluations of the material costs of prosecution than they do to more normative 
concerns associated with their sense of justice. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I determine the effects that the power identity of violating states has on 
the decisions made by the UN's Human Rights Committee, pertaining to Hypothesis 3 from Chapter 3.  
The tests in Chapter 6 provide support for the hypothesis that powerful states are more likely to get 
away with violations at the international level.  In fact, the results from this chapter illustrate that for 
powerful states, the HRC is most likely to deem the case inadmissible and decide not to issue a judgment 
either way in the case.  Because the HRC has little to no control over what cases are brought before it, 
its only option once a case is brought is to deem the case inadmissible, meaning that it does not have to 
issue a final decision, if it wants to retain legitimacy by not issuing a judgment in favor of powerful states 
in every instance.  The reasoning behind this is that such behavior would turn international public 
opinion against and decrease the legitimacy of the institution. 
The lack of control that the HRC is capable of exerting over the circumstances under which it is 
placed by the combined actions of individual complainants and member states can make things very 
uncomfortable for the body.  As I discuss in Chapter 3, international adjudication bodies' first preference 
is that no human rights violations occur.  This is due to the fact that when no violations occur, the body 
gains the perception amongst members of the international audience that it is a competent 
organization, which ultimately means that it is not put into the difficult position of having to disappoint 
someone by deciding against them in the legal proceedings.  The underlying process at work here is the 
HRC's need to appease the state interests that formed it and allow for its continued existence and its 
need to appease the interests of the international community by upholding and fulfilling its mandate.  
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The problem arises in the fact that these interests are nearly always opposed, meaning that when the 
HRC makes a decision, it is necessarily lowering the opinion that either the state or the international 
community have of it.  It is for this reason that the admissibility decision is such an important 
component for the HRC.  A decision of inadmissibility means that it does not have to issue a decision 
that is starkly at odds with international public opinion or state preferences.  However, a decision of 
inadmissibility can also lend credence to claims that the institution is epiphenomenal and does not really 
uphold international justice. 
Pulling It All Together 
In an effort to bring all of the findings in the various chapters into one cohesive message, it is 
necessary to discuss here the implications that the findings from each of the chapters have for each of 
the other chapters.  In order to do this effectively, it is necessary to boil down the specific findings into 
their most basic conclusions.  The findings from Chapter 4, put simply, raise the question over whether 
states' coordinated actions indicate that they care more about their international reputation or about 
the individual costs associated with violating human rights.  Chapter 5 serves the purpose of illustrating 
that not all institutional inefficiency that we observe is a product of the behavior of the institution itself.  
In fact, the institution's hands are tied in such complex ways by the actions (or inaction) of complainants 
and states that concerted behavior on its part is exceedingly difficult.  This segues into the findings of 
Chapter 6 which illustrate the institutional response to such constraints. 
The central questions that arise after reading each chapter, as I see them, are as follows.  First, 
which do states care more about where the issue area of human rights are concerned: their 
international reputation or the possibility of punishment at any level?  Second, to what extent do 
individual complainants constrain states' future violation behavior?  Third, how do international human 
rights adjudication bodies affect the behavior of both states and potential complainants?  In order to 
answer each of these questions, it is essential to look at the intersections of the three empirical 
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chapters.  In looking at these connections, it becomes possible to see how the larger picture comes 
together and to draw implications for future research as well as for the theoretical and policy 
implications of the project. 
When addressing the first question, it is necessary to pull from the results of all three empirical 
chapters.  Chapter 4 illustrates, specifically for states, coordination has a larger effect than does the 
possibility of domestic punishment.  This finding may lead us to the conclusion that states care more 
about their reputation than they do about punishment, in general, whether it is at the domestic level or 
the international level.  However, I suspect that answering this question accurately requires a bit more 
caution than this.  The findings in chapter 4 refer only to domestic avenues of punishment and don't 
speak at all to the possibility of international punishment.  Because we cannot draw conclusions about 
the effects of international punishment from the results of this chapter (since states cannot know ex 
ante that the circumstances could lead to international punishment), we must turn to the results from 
Chapter 6 which illustrate that powerful states tend not to be punished by the HRC in the unlikely event 
that a case is brought against them at that level.  This is information that states have ex ante in that they 
know their power identity when they commit the violations and that huge shifts in power identities tend 
not to occur over short time spans.  Thus, we might draw the conclusion that reputation matters only 
after states consider their power identity and the effect that this will have on the adjudication body. 
However, drawing a conclusion at this point would be premature because if we look to Chapter 
5, we see coordination has an effect on the rate at which individual complainants bring cases against a 
state.  However, regime type and GDP per capita also have sizable effects and these are, in many ways, 
indicative of the requisites for state power today. This may, when taken in conjunction with the findings 
of Chapters 4 and 6, indicate that for powerful states, power is all that matters, but that for weaker 
states, coordination is their only chance to get away with violations.  This means that we could expect 
for powerful states, in this context, to be the ``first movers'' where human rights coordination is 
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concerned and answers the question of who it is that begins these coordinated movements of human 
rights violations.  There are important policy implications for this and I will address them in the final 
section of this chapter. 
Where the second question is concerned, it is important to think about the relative weakness of 
individual complainants in relation to states and the international adjudication body.  This relative 
weakness might very well lead us to believe that these mere individuals can have little to no effect on 
the states that commit human rights violations.  However, the findings of this project indicate that this is 
not necessarily the case.  Individual complainants do seem to have an important effect on states, albeit 
indirectly.  The analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 provide substantial evidence to the contrary, with only 456 
instances of cases being brought out of the 4,256 country-years included in the analysis.  If so few 
human rights violations are ever prosecuted, how is it possible to say that the complaints of individuals 
affect states? 
The answer here is fairly straightforward.  As I discuss in Chapter 5, states are aware of the fact 
that very few human rights violations are ever brought to trial at the international level.  In order for 
cases to be brought at the international level, they must first be brought at the domestic level, as the 
rules of the HRC are that all domestic courses must be exhausted before a case can be deemed 
admissible at the international level.  This means that states have some control over which cases get 
brought to the international level.  For those cases in which the complainant does not receive what they 
perceive to be justice at the domestic level, there is an increased likelihood that they will choose to 
bring their case to the international level.  While this may seem to be evidence to illustrate the control 
that states can exercise over victims, it is important to note that the control can flow both ways.  If 
states coordinate their actions in an effort to avoid material and/or reputational costs, it is possible that 
this is an effort to prevent cases from being taken from the domestic level to the international level. 
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I discussed in Chapter 5 the extent to which states have an incentive to stall the domestic 
judicial process in order to increase the costs to individual complainants for bringing cases.  It is also 
quite possible that there may be incentives for states to expedite the process in cases for which the 
costs at the domestic level would be lower than they would be at the international level.  What do these 
costs include?  Punishment at the domestic level is likely to consist of monetary remuneration to the 
individual(s).  Punishment at the international level is at the same time more complex and more difficult 
to observe.  When individuals bring complaints, regardless of what the results of the admissibility 
decision are, this becomes a blight on the state's reputation.  When states are party to international 
agreements with human rights conditions or when violations are perceived to be particularly egregious, 
this blight on their record can be much more materially costly than if the domestic or international 
adjudication body were to issue a decision in favor of the complainant.  Remunerations to victims of 
violations are a drop in the proverbial bucket in comparison to lost trade or the inability to shape 
international relations in any way because of a new status of being a human rights pariah state. 
Having established the fact that states and complainants have an important effect on the 
behavior of the adjudication body in that both actors can work to tie the hands of the institution, I now 
turn to the effects that the adjudication body has on these two actors.  Because the interaction between 
these three actors requires that all must take the anticipated behavior of the others into account when 
deciding what their own actions should look like, answering these questions leads us to turn first to the 
findings in Chapter 6.  Legitimacy costs to the HRC and the regime type and power status of the violating 
are the three variables which share a statistically significant relationship with the HRC decisions over 
admissibility.  While power status and regime type are certainly important to the analysis of this 
chapter, the measure of the legitimacy costs associated with the institution's decision are key to 
understanding the way that the institution's actions affect the behavior of both states and potential 
complainants. 
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As I have discussed previously, international adjudication bodies receive more benefits from 
some decisions than from others.  The extent to which they receive benefits from some decisions over 
others is captured, in part, by the notion of legitimacy costs as measured in Chapter 6.  This measure 
from Chapter 6 is based on the length of time that passes between when a violation occurs and when an 
admissibility decision is issued and captures the length of time that the institutions can force the states 
and the complainants to wait for a decision.  However, there is another element here that is important - 
the traits of individual cases. Individual complainants and states must meet certain evidentiary and 
adjudication standards in order to have a chance at receiving a decision from the HRC that is in their 
favor.  This means that the HRC, in many ways, set the ``rules of the game'' by which states and 
complainants must play in order to receive justice from the institution. 
For states, this essentially equates to making efforts to ensure that the adjudication process at 
the domestic level gives the complainant little incentive to take their case to the international level 
either because the complainant believes that justice has been served at the domestic level or because 
aspects of the country-year are prohibitive to international adjudication.  Chapter 5 indicates that 
complainants are less likely to bring cases if the state against which they would bring a case has 
coordinated its human rights violations with peers.  This means that the potential for the international 
adjudication body to hear and decide on a case influences states' decisions to coordinate their violation 
behavior.  This fact speaks not only to the effect that international adjudication bodies have on states 
and complainants, but also to the first question posed in this chapter over whether states care more 
about reputation or the material costs of punishment.  When we synthesize the results of all three 
empirical chapters, we see that reputation and the material costs of punishment are inextricably linked. 
Where the complainants are concerned, the influence of the international adjudication body is 
more explicit as these effects were directly tested in Chapter 5.  Complainants must take into 
consideration the fact that the costs to bring cases in front of an international adjudication body are 
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compounded by the fact that prosecution must happen at the domestic level as well, increasing the 
overall length of time that the adjudication process spans.  Furthermore, Chapter 5 indicates that 
complainants are influenced by the HRC's record of decisions that find in favor of complainants.  This 
means that the effect of the international adjudication body on the complainants is a direct one. 
The answer to this third question illustrates the rather complex nature of the interaction that 
takes place between these three actors such as it is not completely illustrated in the game presented in 
Chapter 3.  Each individual actor has the potential to exact costs on each of the other actors.  Thus, 
there are a number of moving parts in these interactions, all of which each of the counterparts must 
consider in their individual decision-making processes.  This fact has interesting theoretical and policy 
implications, which I will discuss in later sections.  I turn now to a discussion of how to move forward 
with this particular line of research. 
Moving Forward 
While the empirical analysis in this project answers a great many questions heretofore 
unanswered, it also brings forward a great many more questions to be answered.  I identify three topics 
here which I think are key to shedding additional light on the research completed herein and to moving 
forward with this project.  The first of these addresses the role that the domestic adjudication process 
plays in the process.  It is important to determine how the costs of domestic punishment affect states 
and how the costs and effects of domestic prosecution affect the international adjudication process.  
Second, the merit of individual cases is not included in the analysis here.  There is a wealth of data to be 
collected on subject matter and evidence presented for each individual case brought forward to the HRC 
that could be brought to bear to understand the decisions of both the adjudication body and the 
individual complainants' decisions to bring cases.  Finally, I would be interested to determine how these 
models work to understand the interactions that take place between states, complainants, and regional 
173 
 
organizations.  Does the coordinated effort on the part of states affect the adjudication process for 
regional human rights courts? I discuss each of these topics in turn below. 
Turning first to the role that the domestic adjudication process plays in all of this, the primary 
research question that surfaces is: What efforts do states make to either stall or expedite the 
adjudication process at the domestic level and how do these efforts affect the likelihood of international 
prosecution?  As I have discussed extensively throughout this project, there are a number of ways that 
states can work to either stall or facilitate the adjudication processes at both the domestic and 
international levels.  These methods include, but are not limited to, state efforts to bribe or coerce 
judicial officials, reach a settlement with the complainant, issue a formal apology for the violation(s), 
and/or continue committing the same types of human rights violations that got them into trouble in the 
first place.  Do states' decisions to use these types of efforts during the domestic adjudication process 
affect the propensity for individual complainants to bring cases and/or the probability that cases, once 
brought, will be decided for the state or deemed inadmissible?  I suspect that the sincerity with which 
states make efforts to rectify past violations will decrease both the likelihood that individual 
complainants will bring cases to the international level and the likelihood that, if brought, these cases 
will be decided in favor of the complainant. 
Moving on to the second topic for future research, individual case characteristics, I pose two 
research questions.  The first of these asks what effects the individual case characteristics have on the 
domestic adjudication process.  The second question asks about the effects of individual case 
characteristics on the international adjudication process that follows.  The analysis in the current project 
overlooks the effects of individual case characteristics because collecting the data on these 
characteristics was beyond the scope of the project.  However, in order to gain a more complete 
understanding of how the merits (or lack thereof) of these cases affect the propensity for individual 
complainants to get justice at the domestic level and to look at the effects of how attaining justice at the 
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domestic level affects the rate at which cases are both brought and decided in favor of the complainant 
at the international level would draw a more complete picture of the interaction studied here.  This 
would entail the use of data collected in the country-violation-year unit of analysis and would involve a 
significant data-collecting undertaking, but it would allow us to more fully understand both whether 
individual case merit matters in complainants' decisions to bring cases at the international level, the 
decisions reached at this level, and whether or not the merits affect states' decisions over how to either 
stall or expedite the judicial process that occurs at the domestic level.  My hypotheses here are that as 
the merit of the complainant's case increases, the state will be more likely to appease at the domestic 
level in an attempt to prevent international adjudication, the complainant will be more likely to seek 
international adjudication, and the international adjudication body will be more likely to decide in favor 
of complainant (controlling for the power status of the state, of course). 
Finally, addressing the topic of regional human rights organizations and courts, I propose one 
broad research question that mirrors the motivating question for this project: Do states' efforts at 
coordinating human rights behaviors decrease the likelihood of detection and punishment by regional 
organizations?  Here, the two conceptions for the coordination measure in Chapter 4 would have to be 
collapsed.  Because regional organizations do not have jurisdiction outside of the region, their decisions 
are unlikely to be affected by states' decisions to coordinate their behavior with states outside of the 
body's jurisdiction.  Thus the coordination measure would need to be redefined as regionally-based 
policy coordination so that the policy measure is truncated by regional affiliation. 
Naturally, this broader question breaks into the same component questions as the current 
project does with the application shifting to regional organizational contexts. The modified coordination 
measure would be used in the analysis for each of the three component research questions and the 
hypotheses would be the same as they are in the current analysis.  First comes the question over 
whether regional policy coordination affects changes in the level of respect for human rights for the 
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state in question.  Second is the question over whether these regional policy coordination efforts 
minimize the likelihood that complainants will bring cases before the regional organizations.  Finally, 
there is the question of whether regional policy coordination minimizes the instance of judgments in 
favor of the state.  My suspicion here is that the regional nature of these courts may provide more 
modest support for these hypotheses than does the HRC which has universal membership.  My 
reasoning behind this is that coordination tends to happen in both the policy and regional senses, 
meaning that there is likely to be less variation in this measure in the context of regional organizations. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
What are the theoretical implications of these results for other treaties and other international 
cooperation efforts?  I see two important theoretical implications of the results in this analysis.  First, 
the research has implications for the way that we conceive of rationality where human rights 
compliance is concerned.  Scholars frequently dismiss institutional effects of human rights treaties 
because, as they point out, the punishments issued by these organizations are typically either non-
existent or weak.  However, if the actions of international adjudication bodies actually cause states to 
change their violation strategies, this presents a new way of conceiving of the effects that these bodies 
can have on individual states' (as well as groups of states') behavior.  Second, scholars typically approach 
issues of institutional compliance with human rights treaties as being akin to Prisoners' Dilemma-like 
problems. The results of this analysis indicate that this is wrong.  I will discuss each of these in more 
detail here. 
The (Non?)Effects of Punishment 
Many scholars writing under the liberal tradition have argued that states generally sign onto 
international agreements expecting to comply with them, but may fail to do so as a result of limited 
domestic institutional capacity (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008; Neumayer, 2005). Thus, 
compliance primarily becomes an issue of institutional design features. Others have argued that states 
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are more likely to comply with rules if they were socialized to believe that non-compliance is a norm 
violation (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).  Still others take the position that non-compliance is avoided by 
states if they believe that such actions would lead to adverse reputational effects (Davis, 2004; Lipson, 
1991). Finally, some have argued that compliance is more likely if material incentives exist that outweigh 
the benefits of non-compliance (Grieco, 1988; Powell, 1994).  Despite the progress that has been made 
with the use of these approaches, a large majority of the work has been driven by a genuine concern 
with securing compliance. This has led to researchers focusing overwhelmingly on cases in which 
compliance is relatively strong and violations are notably absent (Checkel, 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998; Haas, 1998; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Hafner-Burton, 2005; Moravcsik, 2003; Poe and 
Tate, 1994; Slaughter, 1995). 
In strong contrast to this flawed approach, I focus on cases in which compliance is relatively 
weak and violations are notably present.  My findings illustrate that some synthesis of these divergent 
understandings of institutional compliance is necessary in order to understand why states comply (or fail 
to do so).  My findings provide considerable support for the supposition that states look to avoid 
adverse reputational effects and that they are more likely to comply if the material incentives to do so 
outweigh the benefits of non-compliance.  Whether these actions are a result of the level to which 
states have internalized international norms against human rights violations is not entirely clear, but the 
results do seem to indicate that limited domestic capacity to deal with violations can greatly affect the 
rate at violations take place.  Thus, ultimately, it seems to be the case that while states are certainly 
concerned with their reputations at the international level, it is certainly likely that the reason for this is 
because of the implications that a diminished reputation might have on their ability to avoid the 
material costs associated with violations. 
This leads me to suggest that, perhaps, the best way for scholars to approach questions of 
compliance is to make an effort to try to better understand the intersection of reputational and material 
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costs by answering a couple of key questions.  First, how can reputational costs and benefits be directly 
measured?  It can be difficult to see changes in states' reputations as they occur because it's difficult to 
measure perception.  Because of this same difficulty, the question of whether states are aware of the 
risks to their reputation prior to engaging in any particular behavior is also a difficult one to answer.  It 
seems that the best way to go about this is to engage in process-tracing by observing acts that go 
against international laws and norms and then to trace responding states' responses to these actions 
while looking into the responding state's own behavior with regard to the law or norm. 
In an effort to determine whether the findings here can be applied to compliance rates with 
other human rights organizations and to compliance in other issue areas, it is necessary to identify the 
differences between both the HRC and other human rights treaty bodies and the differences between 
compliance in the issue area of human rights and other issue areas.  The HRC does not really differ in 
any significant way from the adjudication bodies of any of the other human rights treaties with universal 
membership.  However, it does differ from regional adjudication bodies in that there is wider cultural, 
institutional, and wealth distribution amongst member states in institutions with universal memberships 
like the HRC than within regional organizations such as the European Union.  I discussed in the previous 
section the ways that the decreased variation in the key indicators would affect the results if the analysis 
were extended to regional organizations.  Because of the differences between the HRC and regional 
organizations, assessing the effects that states' concerns with reputational costs will have to be 
measured in a slightly more direct way than they have been here, but the logic should be the same.  In 
fact, it seems reasonable to make the argument that being tried by a regional adjudication body leads to 
even higher reputational costs than being tried by a body like the HRC.  I say this due to the fact that if 
peer states will decide against each other, this is likely to send a stronger message to the international 
community than if non-peer states decided against each other. 
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There is one important difference between the issue area of human rights and others.  Decisions 
over whether to comply with human right regimes more closely resemble what Stein (1983) refers to as 
dilemmas of common aversions in which actors have a common interest in avoiding a particular 
outcome (such as punishment), as opposed to a dilemma of common interests in which actors have an 
interest in ensuring a particular outcome.  Issue areas other than human rights, such as trade, the 
environment, or facilitating development are examples of dilemmas of common interests.  For these 
issue areas, states have the common interests of increasing the quality and decreasing the costs of 
goods where trade is concerned, decreasing behavior leading to global climate change, or increasing the 
percentage of the people in the world capable of interacting in the international economy.  However, 
these differences are not entirely important where the effects of reputational costs are concerned.  
Defection from any type of international regime is likely to garner judgment from members of the 
international community, regardless of the type of dilemma that the regime was created to address.  
Measuring this judgment and its effects, however, is going to be equally difficult, regardless of the issue 
area. 
Coordination vs. Cooperation 
As I have discussed at length in Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Prisoners' Dilemma is commonly 
used to model compliance with international regimes.  However, due to the difference between the 
issue area of human rights and all others, the Prisoners' Dilemma does not help us to understand 
compliance (or the lack thereof) with human rights regimes.  The results of this project illustrate that 
states' levels of compliance with international human rights regimes is based mainly on their efforts to 
emulate the behavior of their peers and to avoid the risk of international punishment by seeking safety 
in numbers.  With this distinct difference between human rights and other issue areas, how would the 
coordination measure used in this project apply to state behavior in other issue areas?  I submit that the 
causal mechanism would work in other issue areas in a somewhat different way than it works here. 
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The results from the analyses in this project illustrate that coordinated action is a function of the 
fact that states strive to coordinate their human rights behavior in an effort to fly under the radar of the 
possibility of international punishment.  Although I do not explicitly test whether or not states also gain 
the advantage of avoiding related costs such as lost trade benefits or a decreased number of voting 
partners in the UN context as a result of not coordinating their behavior, this has been done elsewhere 
(Hafner-Burton, 2005).  It is this same mechanism that would be at work where the coordination 
measure is concerned with other issue areas.  This follows the logic of work done by Lipson (1991) and 
Davis (2004). 
For example, many have argued that, in the context of the EU, states with previously 
questionable human rights records may actually improve their human rights behavior in an effort to gain 
admission to the European Union and, thus, gain the economic benefits of membership as a result 
(Baldwin, 1993; Haas, 1998).  Another way to look at this is illustrated by the complications that Turkey 
has been experiencing for past 25 years while trying to gain membership in the EU.  Turkey's record with 
regard to a number of EU principles and norms has been called into question, but it has been alleged 
somewhat popularly that the EU has used Turkey's human rights record (where Kurds and the conflict 
with Cyprus are concerned) as an excuse to bar it from membership while Turkey's income inequality 
catches up to its current levels of growth.  The fact that Turkey has not coordinated it human rights 
behavior with that of the EU has provided continued excuses on the part of EU member states to bar its 
membership. 
We can think about this mechanism at work even where human rights behavior is not 
concerned.  Where the issue area of the environment is concerned, we can look to the example of 
countries such as China.  China's effort throughout the course of the years of talks over global climate 
change has been focused on affiliating itself with the peer group of LDCs in an effort to lessen its own 
responsibility to lower its rate of greenhouse gas emissions.  By using both rhetoric and actions to 
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affiliate itself with this peer group, it has managed to escape responsibility with regard to lowering its 
level of carbon emissions and has surpassed the US as the largest emitter of fossil fuels while 
experiencing none of the detriments associated with efforts to curb emissions or with efforts to 
continue emitting at the same rate (or higher) than it always has.  Although it is certainly true that China 
is held to no standard of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions in any of the current international 
environmental agreements and/or negotiations, it has avoided this by a concerted effort to align itself 
with a group of countries with whom alignment clears it of all responsibilities.  This is an excellent 
example of a state's efforts to emulate the behavior of a chosen peer group in order to avoid the costs 
associated with defecting from what are now starting to become international norms. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The implications of the results for actual policy are rather bleak in that it seems as though there 
is not much that will be done in order to bring down the overall level of human rights violations.  States, 
it would seem, have all of the power here.  Although their decisions are certainly influenced by the 
responses that they anticipate from the complainants and the international adjudication bodies, they 
are the actors with the greatest amount of power in these interactions as they are the ones that have 
control over the continued survival of the adjudication bodies which are the only actors that can work to 
facilitate efforts by potential complainants to bring cases forward. Without a widespread initiative by 
states to reform the requirements for cases brought before the adjudicating body or to improve their 
own human rights behavior in an effort to inspire their peers to do so as well, change in the rate of 
human rights violations seems unlikely. 
However, of the actors involved in the analysis, the complainants are those with the greatest 
capacity to lower the rate at which countries commit human rights violations, particularly in democratic 
countries.  While we observe that democracies are countries in which cases are most likely to be 
brought to the international level and that they are also most likely to win these cases and/or see them 
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deemed inadmissible, it is also the case that many of these countries are the ones least likely to pay 
reputational costs for their human rights behavior because democracies tend also to be more 
economically powerful states.  These are the states that are the ``first movers'' in the coordination 
process, bringing less powerful states on board with them and giving these weaker states the power to 
violate with less probability of detection and/or punishment.  This is illustrated by the significance and 
the strength of the relationship between the power status variable and the dependent variable in 
Chapter 6.  Thus, we might reasonably expect that as countries transition to democracy, they become 
more likely to have cases brought against them at the international level at the same time as the 
likelihood that cases will be decided in their favor is likely to remain unchanged.  Simply achieving a 
state of democracy is unlikely to result in an increased power status, making these countries more 
susceptible to punishment at the hands of the international adjudication bodies before which 
complainants are bringing cases against them. 
Although it seems yet too early to tell, my suspicion is that this is how things will play out with 
the ongoing Arab Spring.  Due to the increased and, in some cases, egregious human rights violations 
that some governments chose to exercise against their citizens while these movements were in full 
swing along with the number of transitions toward more democratic methods of governance, I would 
predict that in the coming years, once domestic steps have been exhausted, we will begin to see cases 
brought against these governments at the international level.  At this point, even as already powerful 
countries may still have incentives to commit human rights violations, the number of other countries 
that have such incentives will begin to diminish because these countries will find themselves with less 
ability than their economically powerful counterparts to pay the material and/or reputational costs of 
punishment.  Ultimately, this will mean that the percentage of peers committing human rights violations 
in a given country-year should diminish over time and that, as a result, we may eventually reach a point 
where there are no longer enough states behaving badly to hide one another.  We can only hope, after 
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looking at the high rate at which violations occur and the low rate at which they are punished, that the 
trends move in this direction.  In the world's anarchic state international adjudication bodies and 
complainants can, at most, hope to alter the incentive structure for states considering committing 
violation.  It is, ultimately the states that must police themselves and each other if prevention of 
violations is the goal. 
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APPENDIX A 
COORDINATING ON VIOLATION EQUILIBRIUM 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Both A and D are confronted with a decision of whether or not to violate human 
rights in the game.  We start by holding the strategies of the other two players constant.  If D violates 
human rights and the Committee issues a judgment, A receives q(-j/n) + (1 - q)1 in exchange for its 
violation and it receives 0 if it does not commit human rights violations.  In order for A to prefer 
coordinating its violations with D, it must be the case that q(-j/n) + (1 - q)1 ≥0.  A prefers to violate here 
when n>0 and when q ≤ 
 
   
, meaning that their must be at least one other violator in order for A to 
violate.  The same conditions stand for D's decision to commit human rights violations. 
The question that remains, however, is concerned with whether A will violate alone.  If D 
chooses not to violate and the Committee issues a judgment, A receives q(-j/n) + (1 - q)1 for violating 
and 0 for abstaining from violations (as above).  Again, in order for A to prefer to violate here, it must be 
the case that q(-j/n) + (1 - q)1 ≥0.  The circumstances that must be met here in order for A to violate are 
the same as above.  Because the number for violators, n, must be greater than 0 in order for A to violate 
under these circumstances, it becomes clear that A would need a third state to violate in order for it to 
choose violation here. 
Up to this point, we have looked at A's decision to violate holding the Committee's strategy of 
issuing a judgment constant.  If the Committee does not issue a judgment, A receives 1 for violating 
human rights and 0 for not violating, regardless of whether D violates human rights or not.  Thus, by 
definition, when the Committee will not issue a judgment, A strictly prefers to commit violations. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. When the Committee will not issue a judgment, A or D will always prefer to 
violate human rights.  Proposition 1 illustrates that in order for A or D to violate when the Committee 
will issue a judgment, it must be the case that n>0.  However, as stated above, it must also be the case 
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that q ≤{
 
   
} in order for A or D to violate if the Committee chooses to issue a judgment.  This condition 
is most easily met when the cost of the judgment, j, is low and the number of violators, n, is sufficiently 
high.  Thus, the Coordinating on Violations Equilibria becomes increasingly likely as the number of 
violators increases.  Not only does this help to meet the condition that n>0, but it also help to meet the 
condition for the probability of capture, q, in that it inflates the value under which q must fall.  The 
number of violators must be large in its own right, but it also must be large in order to deflect the 
amount of the judgment that any one violator must pay. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Proposition 3 sets a cutpoint for the cost of issuing a judgment, k.  If both A and 
D commit violations, the Committee receives q[n(r - k)] + [(1 - q)(-n k)] for issuing a judgment and -nR if 
it chooses not to issue a judgment.  In order for the Committee to prefer to issue a judgment it must be 
the case that q[n(r - k)] + [(1 - q)(-n k)] ≥-nR.  The Committee's payoffs are the same if there is only one 
violator (A or D), so the same condition must be met here.  If any violations occur, the Committee will 
prefer to issue a judgment when k < qr + R.  This condition is most easily met when the associated 
reputational effects and the probability of capture are large.  Thus, when a violation occurs, the Court is 
most likely to issue a judgment for high profile cases and/or cases where the probability of capture is 
large.  This can be attributed to the Committee's desire to continue to appear to be legitimate in the 
international community. 
COMPLIANCE EQUILIBRIUM 
Proof of Proposition 4. Proposition 4 simply states that when the conditions for n and q, which are 
proven above for Propositions 1 and 2 are not met, A and D will choose not to violate human rights.  
Thus, if no violations are occurring and/or if the probability of capture is sufficiently high, the utility of 
violating does not outweigh the costs of doing so. 
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APPENDIX B 
Country 
Violation 
Year 
Communication 
Year 
Admissibility 
Year 
Decision 
Year 
Decision Notes 
Zaire 1980 1983 1985 1986 2 
 
Uruguay 1983 1983 1984 1986 2 
 
Venezuela 1977 1983 1984 1986 2 
 
Zaire 1979 1983 1985 1986 2 
 
Canada 1967 1981 1986 . 0 
 
Canada 1977 1982 1986 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1983 1984 1986 . 0 
 
Finland 1983 1984 1985 . 0 
 
France 1979 1984 1986 . 0 
 
Madagascar 1982 1983 1985 1987 2 
 
Netherlands 1980 1984 1985 1987 2 
 
Netherlands 1981 1984 1985 1987 1 
 
Netherlands 1979 1984 1985 1987 2 
 
Uruguay 1985 1985 1987 1987 1 
 
Canada 1982 1985 1987 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1983 1986 1987 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1980 1986 1987 . 0 
 
Uruguay 1973 1983 1985 1987 2 
 
Colombia 1981 1983 1985 1987 2 
 
Bolivia 1983 1984 1985 1987 2 
 
Dominican Republic 1984 1984 1986 1987 2 
 
Sweden 1984 1985 1987 1988 1 
 
Zaire 1985 1985 1986 1987 2 
 
Sweden 1985 1985 1987 1988 1 
 
Netherlands 1975 1985 1987 1988 1 
 
Italy 1981 1986 1987 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1984 1986 1988 . 0 
 
Norway 1987 1987 1988 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1974 1987 1988 . 0 
 
France 1985 1987 1988 . 0 
 
Canada 1982 1987 1988 . 0 
 
France 1987 1987 1987 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1987 1987 1987 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1984 1987 1988 1988 0 
Jamaica 1979 1987 1988 1988 0 
Netherlands 1986 1987 1988 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1985 1988 1988 1988 1 
Jamaica 1988 1988 1988 1988 0 
Uruguay 1985 1983 1985 1988 2 
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France 1982 1985 1987 1989 2 
 
Peru 1980 1986 1987 1988 2 
 
Peru 1978 1986 1987 1988 2 
 
France 1979 1986 1987 1989 1 
Jamaica 1979 1986 1988 1989 0 
Netherlands 1979 1989 1988 1989 1 
Jamaica 1981 1987 1989 1989 2 
 
Ecuador 1982 1987 1988 1989 2 
 
Finland 1987 1987 1988 1989 2 
 
Netherlands 1983 1984 1988 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1982 1986 1989 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1985 1987 1989 . 0 
France 1987 1987 1989 . 0 
 
Italy 1987 1987 1989 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1983 1988 1989 . 0 
 
Costa Rica 1987 1988 1989 . 0 
 
Finland 1987 1988 1989 . 0 
 
Finland 1987 1988 1989 . 0 
 
France 1985 1988 1988 . 0 
 
Canada 1988 1988 1989 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 1989 1989 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1989 1989 1989 . 0 
 
Canada 1980 1984 1987 1990 1 
Colombia 1982 1984 1988 1989 2 
 
Dominican Republic 1985 1985 1988 1990 2 
 
Colombia 1984 1985 1988 1990 2 
 
Canada 1978 1986 1988 1989 1 
 
Netherlands 1983 1986 1988 1990 1 
 
France 1984 1986 1989 1990 1 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1982 1987 1989 1990 2 
 
Zaire 1986 1987 1988 1989 2 
 
Jamaica 1985 1987 1989 1990 2 
 
Finland 1987 1988 1989 1990 2 
 
Finland 1986 1988 1989 1990 1 
 
Netherlands 1983 1988 1989 1990 2 
 
France 1984 1987 1989 . 0 
 
France 1987 1987 1989 . 0 
 
Colombia 1987 1987 1989 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1987 1987 1990 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1981 1987 1989 . 0 
Jamaica 1984 1987 1990 . 0 
Jamaica 1983 1987 1990 . 0 
Jamaica 1984 1987 1990 . 0 
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Trinidad and Tobago 1987 1987 1989 . 0 
 
Argentina 1984 1988 1990 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1985 1988 1990 . 0 
Jamaica 1984 1988 1989 . 0 
Jamaica 1984 1988 1989 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1984 1988 1989 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1983 1988 1990 . 0 
 
Colombia 1988 1988 1990 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1985 1988 1990 . 0 
 
Argentina 1987 1988 1990 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1984 1989 1989 . 0 
 
Italy 1988 1988 1990 . 0 
 
Finland 1988 1989 1990 . 0 
 
France 1985 1987 1989 1991 1 
 
Jamaica 1983 1987 1988 1991 1 
 
Jamaica 1983 1987 1989 1991 1 
 
Jamaica 1981 1987 1989 1991 2 
 
Sweden 1988 1988 1989 1990 1 
 
France 1988 1988 1989 1991 1 
 
Jamaica 1985 1987 1991 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1987 1987 1990 . 0 
Trinidad and Tobago 1983 1987 1990 . 0 
Jamaica 1979 1988 1990 . 0 
Jamaica 1986 1988 1991 . 0 
 
Spain 1984 1988 1991 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1983 1988 1991 . 0 
Jamaica 1984 1988 1990 . 0 
Finland 1984 1988 1991 . 0 
 
Canada 1979 1988 1991 . 0 
 
Mauritius 1981 1989 1990 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1984 1989 1990 . 0 
 
Hungary 1986 1989 1990 . 0 
 
France 1984 1989 1990 . 0 
 
Italy 1989 1990 1990 . 0 
 
Finland 1989 1990 1990 . 0 
 
Canada 1991 1986 1990 1991 1 
 
Jamaica 1984 1987 1990 1991 2 
 
Jamaica 1983 1987 1988 1991 2 
 
Jamaica 1984 1987 1989 1992 2 
 
Jamaica 1983 1987 1989 1992 1 
 
Jamaica 1978 1988 1989 1992 2 
 
Jamaica 1985 1988 1989 1992 2 
 
Jamaica 1980 1988 1989 1992 1 
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Ecuador 1986 1988 1990 1992 2 
 
Jamaica 1984 1988 1989 1991 2 
 
Panama 1984 1988 1989 1992 2 
 
Jamaica 1987 1988 1989 1992 1 
 
Ecuador 1987 1988 1990 1991 2 
 
Bolivia 1987 1988 1991 1991 2 
 
Jamaica 1983 1989 1990 1992 2 
 
Netherlands 1987 1990 1991 1992 1 
 
Hungary 1986 1990 1991 1992 2 
 
Austria 1984 1990 1991 1992 2 
 
Jamaica 1986 1987 1991 . 0 
Colombia 1987 1988 1991 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1982 1988 1991 . 0 
Jamaica 1987 1988 1992 . 0 
Jamaica 1985 1988 1992 . 0 
France 1987 1988 1991 . 0 
 
France 1987 1989 1991 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1983 1989 1992 . 0 
 
Canada 1985 1989 1991 . 0 
 
France 1983 1989 1992 . 0 
 
Canada 1987 1989 1991 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1980 1988 1992 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1981 1989 1992 . 0 
Jamaica 1987 1989 1992 . 0 
 
France 1986 1990 1992 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1985 1990 1992 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1985 1990 1992 . 0 
 
Denmark 1988 1990 1992 . 0 
 
Finland 1984 1990 1992 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1987 1990 1991 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1987 1990 1991 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1980 1990 1992 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1988 1989 1992 . 0 
 
France 1990 1990 1991 . 0 
 
Canada 1988 1991 1991 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1985 1990 1991 . 0 
 
Libya 1989 1991 1991 . 0 
 
Zaire 1990 1991 1991 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1985 1991 1992 . 0 
 
Canada 1991 1992 1992 . 0 
Australia 1986 1991 1992 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1988 1988 1990 1993 2 
 
Uruguay 
 
1988 1992 1994 2 
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Nicaragua 1980 1988 1992 1994 2 
 
Jamaica 1985 1988 1992 1994 2 
 
Jamaica 1983 1988 1992 1994 1 
 
Jamaica 1983 1988 1992 1994 2 
 
Jamaica 1981 1989 1990 1993 1 
 
Jamaica 1986 1988 1992 1994 2 
 
Jamaica 1980 1989 1992 1994 2 
 
Zaire 1989 1989 1992 1993 2 
 
Jamaica 1986 1989 1990 1993 1 
 
Jamaica 1978 1989 1992 1994 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1990 1992 1994 2 
 
Finland 1987 1990 1992 1994 2 
 
Equatorial Guinea 1988 1990 1992 1994 2 
 
Spain 1990 1990 1992 1994 1 
 
Netherlands 1987 1990 1992 1993 1 
 
Netherlands 1986 1990 1993 1994 1 
 
Central African Republic 1989 1990 1992 1994 2 
 
Libya 1989 1990 1992 1994 2 
 
France 1989 1990 1993 1994 1 
 
Jamaica 1979 1991 1993 1994 2 
 
Dominican Republic 1990 1990 1993 1994 2 
 
Norway 1987 1990 1993 1994 1 
 
Canada 1988 1991 1993 1994 2 
 
Sweden 1984 1991 1993 1994 1 
 
Cameroon 1988 1991 1992 1994 2 
 
Equatorial Guinea 1987 1991 1992 1993 2 
 
Canada 1991 1991 1993 1993 2 
 
Netherlands 1989 1991 1993 1994 1 
 
Australia 1988 1991 1992 1994 2 
 
Finland 1990 1991 1992 1994 1 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1980 1989 1993 . 0 
 
France 1988 1990 1994 . 0 
 
Finland 1990 1990 1994 . 0 
 
Spain 1989 1990 1994 . 0 
 
Panama 1990 1990 1994 . 0 
 
France 1987 1990 1994 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1981 1991 1994 . 0 
 
New Zealand 1988 1991 1994 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1986 1991 1994 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1985 1991 1994 . 0 
 
Uruguay 1990 1991 1994 . 0 
 
Barbados 1985 1992 1994 . 0 
Zaire 1988 1991 1994 . 0 
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Czech Republic 1986 1991 1994 . 0 
 
Barbados 1987 1992 1994 . 0 
 
Barbados 1986 1992 1994 . 0 
Netherlands 1987 1992 1993 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1984 1992 1993 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1988 1992 1994 . 0 
 
Hungary 1983 1992 1994 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1986 1992 1993 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1988 1992 1993 . 0 
 
Canada 1986 1993 1993 . 0 
 
Finland 1981 1993 1993 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1987 1993 1993 . 0 
 
Canada 1990 1993 1994 . 0 
 
Italy 1993 1993 1994 . 0 
 
Mauritius 1987 1993 1994 . 0 
 
Germany 1985 1993 1994 . 0 
 
Canada 1990 1993 1994 . 0 
 
Senegal 1982 1989 1991 1994 2 
 
Argentina 1989 1990 1992 1995 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1987 1989 1994 1995 2 
 
Netherlands 1988 1991 1993 1994 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1991 1994 1995 2 
 
Panama 1990 1991 1993 1995 2 
 
Spain 1991 1992 1993 1995 2 
 
Netherlands 1990 1992 1993 1995 1 
 
Finland 1992 1992 1993 1994 1 
 
Colombia 1989 1992 1994 1995 2 
 
Czech Republic 1991 1991 1994 1995 2 
 
South Korea 1991 1992 1994 1995 2 
 
Canada 1991 1993 1993 1994 1 
 
Jamaica 1981 1994 1992 1995 2 
 
Panama 1990 1990 1994 . 0 
 
Panama 1990 1990 1994 . 0 
 
Panama 1985 1991 1994 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1980 1992 1995 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 1992 1995 . 0 
 
France 1991 1992 1995 . 0 
 
Australia 1985 1993 1995 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1988 1993 1995 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1983 1993 1995 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1989 1994 1995 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1988 1994 1995 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1993 1994 1995 . 0 
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Jamaica 1984 1989 1994 1995 2 
 
Zambia 1983 1990 1994 1995 2 
 
Togo 1985 1990 1994 1996 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1986 1990 1994 1995 2 
 
Spain 1989 1990 1994 1995 1 
 
Jamaica 1983 1991 1994 1995 2 
 
Jamaica 1986 1991 1994 1996 2 
 
Ecuador 1991 1991 1995 1996 2 
 
Togo 1986 1991 1994 1996 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1992 1992 1994 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1987 1992 1994 1995 1 
 
Hungary 1989 1992 1994 1996 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 1992 1995 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1986 1992 1995 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1993 1995 1996 2 
 
Peru 1992 1992 1994 1996 2 
 
Zaire 1993 1993 1995 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1993 1995 1996 2 
 
Colombia 1987 1993 1994 1995 2 
 
Hungary 1991 1993 1995 1996 1 
 
Jamaica 1980 1993 1995 1996 2 
 
Czech Republic 1991 1994 1995 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1983 1994 1996 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1989 1994 1996 1996 1 
 
Jamaica 1988 1994 1995 1995 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1994 1996 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1989 1994 1996 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1994 1996 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1994 1996 1996 1 
 
France 1989 1991 1995 . 0 
 
Australia 1991 1993 1996 . 0 
 
Canada 1991 1993 1995 . 0 
 
France 1987 1993 1996 . 0 
 
Austria 1992 1994 1996 . 0 
 
Canada 1990 1993 1995 . 0 
 
France 1995 1995 1996 . 0 
 
Spain 1991 1994 1996 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1991 1994 1995 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1991 1995 1995 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1991 1995 1996 . 0 
 
Ecuador 1989 1991 1995 1997 2 
 
Spain 1985 1992 1995 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1983 1992 1995 1997 2 
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Jamaica 1984 1993 1995 1997 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1986 1992 1995 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1983 1993 1995 1997 2 
 
Canada 1990 1993 1994 1996 1 
 
France 1992 1993 1995 1997 2 
 
France 1990 1993 1995 1996 1 
 
Poland 1990 1993 1995 1997 1 
 
Canada 1985 1993 1994 1995 1 
 
Australia 1989 1993 1995 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1987 1993 1995 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1984 1993 1995 1996 2 
 
Jamaica 1983 1994 1995 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1991 1994 1996 1996 2 
 
Colombia 1990 1994 1996 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1982 1995 1997 1997 2 
 
Finland 1995 1995 1996 1996 1 
 
Australia 1994 1996 1997 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1994 1996 1997 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1992 1996 1997 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1994 1996 1997 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1992 1996 1997 1997 2 
 
Australia 1989 1993 1997 . 0 
 
Ireland 1989 1994 1996 . 0 
 
New Zealand 1987 1994 1997 . 0 
 
Canada 1992 1994 1997 . 0 
 
Canada 1992 1994 1997 . 0 
 
New Zealand 1990 1995 1997 . 0 
 
Slovakia 1991 1994 1997 . 0 
 
Canada 1993 1994 1997 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1991 1994 1997 . 0 
 
Australia 1992 1994 1996 . 0 
 
France 1990 1995 1997 . 0 
 
Iceland 1992 1995 1996 . 0 
 
Austria 1992 1995 1997 . 0 
 
Spain 1991 1995 1997 . 0 
 
Australia 1994 1995 1996 . 0 
 
Germany 1989 1996 1997 . 0 
 
Spain 1991 1996 1997 . 0 
 
Canada 1986 1995 1997 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1985 1992 1995 1997 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1993 1993 1995 1997 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1993 1993 1995 1997 1 
 
Jamaica 1987 1993 1995 1998 2 
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Trinidad and Tobago 1991 1993 1995 1998 2 
 
Peru 1992 1993 1996 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1984 1995 1995 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1986 1993 1994 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1994 1997 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1990 1995 1997 1997 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1995 1995 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1989 1994 1996 1998 2 
 
Georgia 1993 1994 1996 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1995 1996 1998 2 
 
Latvia 1993 1995 1996 1998 1 
 
Netherlands 1989 1994 1996 1998 1 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1992 1995 1996 1998 2 
 
Guyana 1988 1996 1997 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1992 1996 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1992 1996 1998 1998 2 
 
Australia 1993 1996 1997 1997 1 
 
Jamaica 1995 1996 1996 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1994 1995 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1996 1997 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1993 1997 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1991 1997 1998 1998 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1994 1998 1998 1998 1 
 
Jamaica 1988 1997 1998 . 0 
 
Hungary 1994 1996 1996 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1990 1994 1998 . 0 
 
South Korea 1989 1993 1996 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1987 1994 1996 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1987 1994 1996 1998 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 1994 1996 1998 2 
 
Netherlands 1991 1994 1996 1998 1 
 
Jamaica 1986 1994 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1995 1996 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1990 1995 1996 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1990 1995 1997 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1990 1995 1998 1998 2 
 
South Korea 1989 1994 1996 1998 2 
 
Canada 1982 1994 1997 1999 2 
 
South Korea 1992 1995 1997 1999 1 
 
Jamaica 1983 1994 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1984 1994 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1985 1995 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1988 1993 1999 1999 2 
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Jamaica 1984 1994 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1985 1995 1998 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1982 1995 1999 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1987 1995 1999 1999 2 
 
Italy 1988 1999 1999 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1979 1996 1999 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1990 1995 1999 1999 1 
 
Austria 1991 1996 1997 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1992 1996 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1992 1995 1998 1998 2 
 
Jamaica 1989 1996 1999 1999 1 
 
Jamaica 1990 1996 1998 1998 2 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 1996 1998 1998 1 
 
New Zealand 1983 1996 1999 1999 1 
 
Zambia 1982 1997 1999 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1991 1997 1999 1999 2 
 
Netherlands 1995 1996 1999 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1995 1997 1999 1999 2 
 
Jamaica 1987 1995 1999 . 0 
 
Australia 1988 1995 1998 . 0 
 
Czech Republic 1993 1995 1998 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1989 1994 1999 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1995 1995 1999 . 0 
 
Chile 1993 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Chile 1994 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Czech Republic 1994 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Australia 1992 1995 1999 . 0 
 
Venezuela 1989 1997 1999 . 0 
 
Chile 1995 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Canada 1980 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Canada 1995 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Croatia 1991 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Chile 1993 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Australia 1991 1995 1999 . 0 
 
Russia 1993 1997 1999 . 0 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 1996 1998 1999 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1991 1997 1999 . 0 
 
Bulgaria 1992 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Finland 1990 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Jamaica 1985 1995 1999 2000 2 
 
Norway 1984 1994 1997 1999 2 
 
France 1989 1995 1997 1999 2 
 
Netherlands 1991 1995 1997 1999 1 
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Peru 1985 1995 1998 2000 2 
 
France 1992 1995 1997 2000 2 
 
France 1991 1995 1997 2000 2 
 
Canada 1985 1996 1999 1999 2 
 
Spain 1993 1995 1998 2000 2 
 
Angola 1991 1996 1998 2000 2 
 
Jamaica 1991 1996 2000 2000 2 
 
Jamaica 1994 1997 2000 2000 2 
 
Namibia 1989 1996 1998 2000 2 
 
Norway 1982 1996 1998 2000 1 
 
Russia 1989 1996 2000 2000 2 
 
Belarus 1997 1997 2000 2000 2 
 
Norway 1993 1996 1999 1999 1 
 
Sweden 1993 1996 1999 . 0 
 
France 1989 1996 2000 . 0 
 
Australia 1994 1996 2000 . 0 
 
Spain 1990 1996 1999 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1994 1996 2000 . 0 
 
Czech Republic 1991 1997 2000 . 0 
 
Canada 1985 1997 1999 . 0 
 
Bulgaria 1993 1997 2000 . 0 
 
France 1991 1997 1999 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1991 1998 1999 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1993 1997 1999 . 0 
 
Norway 1995 1999 2000 . 0 
 
Netherlands 1995 1999 1999 . 0 
 
New Zealand 1990 1997 2000 . 0 
 
Canada 1993 1999 2000 . 0 
 
Canada 1995 1999 2000 . 0 
 
 
 
